A HUNDRED OSAMAS: ISLAMIST THREATS AND THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

*** This was written in 2005 but many of its point are quite relevant now. MS ***


http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ to download full monograph.


The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.


(Foreward & Summary only)


FOREWORD

The future of the Global War on Terror is now, and may continue indefinitely to be, a key concern for U.S. military and policymakers. Islamist terror has not arisen from a vacuum, but has evolved over decades and requires more calibrated coordination and a different type of strategic planning than other types of conflicts. The author of this monograph, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, examines the intensity and diversification of extremist efforts and outlines their “new jihad” and its relationship to the regeneration of extremist leadership. She reviews “lessons learned” with regard to Islamist extremist tactics, recruitment, and their relationship to a broader Islamic awakening which must be factored into the U.S. desire for democratization of the Middle East and the broader Islamic world.

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SUMMARY

If America’s pursuit of a Global War on Terror is strategically and politically well-grounded, then why are Islamist insurgencies and extremist movements continuing to operate, generating parallel cells that terrify the world with violent attacks from Iraq to London?

While analysts debate the intensity and longevity of the latest round of terrorist attacks,1 we would do well to consider whether U.S. long-term goals in the war on terror—namely diminishing their presence and denying terrorists the ability to operate, while also altering conditions that terrorists exploit—are being met. If we
are not pursuing the proper strategy or its implementation is not decreasing support for terrorists, then we should adapt accordingly.

This monograph addresses these questions and examines the efficacy of proposed or operative strategies in light of the evolution of Islamist jihadist leaders, ideas, and foot-soldiers. Jihadist strategy has emerged in a polymorphous pattern over the last 30 years, but many Americans only became aware of the intensity of this problem
post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), and through observation of the 2003-05 insurgency in Iraq.

The author proposes that extremist (jihadist) Islamist groups are not identical to any other terrorist group. Islamist discourse, and extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given the fiscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its coordination may be at odds with great power competition,2 and
certainly contests the interests of other smaller states (like Iran), why are we aiming at eradication, rather than containment, and is eradication possible? Differentiating a “true Islam” from the false and destructive aims of such groups is an important response.

Each region-based administration has so crafted its anti-terrorist rhetoric, and Muslims, in general, are not willing to view their religion as a destructive, anachronistic entity, so this unfortunately difficult task of ideological differentiation is an acceptable theme. But it is insufficient as a strategy because Islamist insurgencies have arisen in the context of a much broader, polychromatic religious and political “Islamic awakening” that shows no signs of receding. That broader movement informs Muslim sentiment today from Indonesia to Mauritania, and Nigeria to London. Official statements will not diminish recruitment; deeds, not words, are needed.

Finally, eradication may be impossible, but containment is philosophically unattractive. A combination of eradication (denial) and cooptation, as we have seen in the Muslim world thus far, probably makes sense. Certain assumptions that underlie U.S. strategies of denying and diminishing the terrorism of Islamist extremists therefore need to be reconsidered.

Among the recommendations made in this monograph are:

1. Revise strategies that too narrowly or too broadly define extremist networks and their operational modes.

2. Acknowledge the evolution and change of Islamist extremist leadership and develop strategies to contain it. Utilize those who know the extremist bases of operations well and speak the appropriate languages instead of relegating this enormously
difficult task to those who have no deep understanding of the area, ideological issues, or delicacy of the issues.

3. Focus on antiterrorist as well as counterterrorist principles.

4. Understand and respond to the increasing sophistication of Islamist tactical and strategic efforts.

5. Carefully consider the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and in other areas of the Muslim world on the stated aims of the Global War on Terror.

6. Continue working with local governments in their counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts.

7. Establish centers for international counterterrorist operations to specifically address Islamist extremists (rather than all global forms of terrorism).

8. Avoid the use of physical and psychological torture and extralegal measures.

9. Encourage local governments to normalize relations with Islamist groups, and utilize dialogue programs or amnesty efforts in order to return supporters of jihad to society.

10. Recognize the potential of moderate Islamist groups and actors to participate in political processes. This does not mean that moderate or “progressive” Islamists as defined in urban American settings can serve as mediators or spokespersons
for counterparts in the region.

11. Extra-governmental diplomacy should be used to achieve mutual understanding on the relevant issues or obstacles to a more “global” pursuit of the Global War on Terror.

12. Establish a multi-country, full media (Web, television, radio, and print) program to discuss and debate Islamist and other forms of religious extremism.

13. Stay the course in promoting democratization of the Middle East and the Muslim world.

14. Provide advanced training to military, intelligence, and political leaders on the history, evolution, and tactics of Islamist extremists.

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY

1. Dexter Filkins and David Cloud argue that insurgents in Iraq are stronger, more sophisticated, and being quickly replaced. See “Defying U.S. Efforts,Guerrillas in Iraq Refocus and Strengthen,” New York Times, July 24, 2005. On the other hand, George Friedman claims that al-Qaeda’s global counteroffensive is a weak last-ditch effort. See “Al Qaeda’s Global Campaign: Tet Offensive or Battle of the Bulge? Stratfor, July 26, 2005, at http://www.strafor.biz/Story. Nora Bensahel of RAND explains that charting short-term trends in insurgent violence can be very misleading, hence we should measure progress against them with different yardsticks. See Commentary, “Gauging Counterinsurgency,” Baltimore Sun, August 9, 2005, at http//www.rand.org/commentary.

2. Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005, pp. 16-21. What is of interest to me are Biddle’s astute perceptions about the nature of international competition and the costs of a transformational policy like the Global War on Terrorism. In the
next section of the monograph, Biddle suggests that only radical political reform
will address terrorism in the Middle East, but I do not see the end of terrorism as
the only possible, or most likely, result of such reform, nor has such reform really
begun. Rather, states and elites are resisting these processes, and the Iraqi and
Afghani cases illustrate the difficulties of simultaneously building states, reforming preexisting structures and behaviors, and fighting extremism and terrorism.

Lack of space prohibits a full exploration of these issues in this monograph.

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Dr. Sherifa Zuhur has lectured widely and held faculty positions at many universities including MIT, University of California, Berkeley, the American University in Cairo, and Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Dr. Zuhur’s research includes Islamic movements, war and peace in the Middle East, modern Middle Eastern politics, topics in Islamic studies and social and cultural developments. Dr. Zuhur has published military and political studies on Islamic warfare and the new jihad, the security situation in a changing Saudi Arabia, political identity and the insurgency in Iraq, democratization, security and nationalism in the Middle East.

She has intensively studied Islamist movements and interviewed their membership and leaders since 1980 when she was a graduate student in Egypt and this work formed the basis of her first book. She is a published author of seven books, the most recent of which is The Middle East, and more than 46 monographs, journal articles and book chapters. Dr. Zuhur holds B.A. degrees in Political Science and Arabic and Arabic literature, a Master’s in Islamic Studies, and a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History,
all from UCLA. She also completed the Master’s level coursework in political science at American University in Cairo.

HOMEGROWN TERRORISM - A STUDY

*** The full document is at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Intelligence services and experts are increasingly paying attention to the
threat of “homegrown terrorism,” terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals
who were either born or raised in the West. Homegrown terrorists pose a particular
concern due to the increasing number of Westerners joining militant Islamic
movements, and the operatives’ familiarity with the societies they are targeting.

In recent years, over two hundred men and women born or raised in the West
have participated in, or provided support for Islamic terrorist plots and attacks.
Several studies have examined the demographics of homegrown Islamic terrorists,
and a lesser number of studies have examined their social affiliations. But
to date, no study has empirically examined the process through which these terrorists
are radicalizing, which constitutes a substantial gap in the literature. This
study addresses the present gap through an empirical examination of behavioral
manifestations of the radicalization process in 117 homegrown “jihadist” terrorists
from the United States and United Kingdom.

The individuals considered “homegrown” in this study either spent a significant
portion of their formative years in the West, or else their radicalization bears
a significant connection to the West. Individuals were included in the study if, in
addition to being “homegrown,” they participated in, or provided illegal support
for, jihadist terrorist plots. In evaluating the behavioral changes that the homegrown terrorists went through, this study relies wherever possible on their own
words: some have kept blogs, posted on online newsgroups, or issued communiqués.

Others were caught on tape by government informants. The research for
this study also draws on court cases (which often include exhibits and testimony
that provide insight into the radicalization process) and credible open-source information that would be accepted in the professional and academic worlds.

CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF RADICALIZATION

This study examines six manifestations of the radicalization process that can
be observed in homegrown terrorists. Though the six steps differ in prevalence,
we found that all of them occurred frequently enough among the sample to be
considered significant.

Adopting a Legalistic Interpretation of Islam

A legalistic interpretation of Islam refers to how believers interpret their
rights and obligations in relation to Islam’s holy texts. An individual who has a
legalistic interpretation has adopted a rules-based approach in which the Qur’an
and sunnah provide strict guidelines—not just for the practice of the faith, but
also for virtually every aspect of one’s daily life. This legalistic interpretation will be manifested externally.

A person exhibiting a legalistic interpretation is not necessarily radical, or radicalizing: it may simply be indicative of a conservative practice of the faith.

However, for some homegrown terrorists, this legalistic understanding blends
naturally into the rest of their radicalization. This was the case for al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn, and also for the Lackawanna Six. In the latter case, a spiritual mentor created “an uncompromising religious atmosphere” rooted in a legalistic understanding of the faith designed to make members of the Lackawanna Six
feel ashamed for being “too American.” After introducing the men to legalistic
standards in which they constantly fell short, the spiritual mentor brought in a
“closer”—a young imam who built off their feelings of religious failure, arguing
that undertaking jihad was their only chance at salvation.

Trusting Only Select Religious Authorities

Another significant manifestation of the radicalization process is coming to
trust only the interpretations of a select and ideologically rigid set of religious authorities.

One example of this can be seen within the Wahhabi movement, where
more conservative (and frequently, militant) scholars are often seen as teaching
the only “authentic” interpretation of Islam. Conversely, more moderate scholars
are perceived as offering a watered-down and inauthentic version of the faith.
Sometimes the select religious authorities whom radicalizing individuals believe
they can trust will be contemporary hardline religious leaders, and other
times they will be luminaries of the past—such as Ahmad ibn Abdal-Halim ibn
Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and
Sayyid Abul A‘la Maududi.

Perceived Schism Between Islam and the West

As homegrown terrorists radicalize, they often come to perceive an inherent
schism between Islam and the West—believing that the two are at odds, and
perhaps even incapable of coexistence. This perception can be expressed in a
number of ways. In some cases, individuals attempt to isolate themselves from
Western society physically. In others, these individuals will explain the perceived
schism between Islam and the West to friends, family, or conspirators.

Frequently the concept of loyalty is critical to this stage: the idea that the
individual has obligations to Islam alone, and cannot have any kind of duty or
loyalty to a non-Muslim state. A second, more extreme idea may derive from
this principle: that even participation in democracy violates Islamic religious
principles. Also, this aspect of the radicalization process is sometimes manifested
by individuals separating themselves from, or even coming to hate, non-Muslims
who had previously been an important part of their lives.

Low Tolerance for Perceived Theological Deviance

As homegrown terrorists internalize rigid interpretations of Islam, many come
to view alternate interpretations and practices as not just incorrect theologically,
but as personal affronts. In this way, any disagreement about religion may be
personalized, and met with a great amount of vitriol. This intolerance of perceived
deviance is usually expressed verbally, through the chastisement of other
Muslims—but there have also been instances where this intolerance manifests in
violence.

Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others

Another significant step is when individuals attempt to impose their religious
beliefs on others. This step is often a natural extension of individuals’ low tolerance for perceived theological deviance: since religious transgressions are regarded as personal affronts, radicalizing individuals try to enforce their own religious values and customs on others. Family members and close friends often bear the brunt of these attempts, but they are by no means the only ones affected.

Political Radicalization

The homegrown terrorists in this study also evince a considerable amount of
political radicalization. While there is no single political ideology that all jihadists embrace, the contemporary jihadist political narrative can be broadly outlined:

Western powers have conspired against Islam to subjugate it, both physically and
morally. At the same time, Muslims worldwide have lost their faith, and lack the
strength that they possessed during Muhammad’s time. The only proper response
to the present situation is military action.


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I suggest reading the entire document, it is well done. MS