*** There are people who know this mindset - so why not work with them instead of taking a we-know-best approach? Because we can all see how well that worked out. MS ***
FROM: http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2010/February/How-London-Became-a-Terrorist-Hotbed/
Great Britain recently raised its terror alert to "severe" following reports that al Qaeda was plotting new attacks.
But Britain may be facing an even greater threat from within -- one the British government helped to create.
CBN News recently traveled to London to interview a number of leading Islamic radicals who have settled there with the full knowledge of the British government.
All Eyes on London
Just one year before attempting to blow up an airliner over Detroit, Christmas Day bombing suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab studied engineering at University College London.
During his stay there, he networked with known Islamic radicals. Security sources believe he may have linked up with al Qaeda.
Abdulmutallab is just one of many Islamic terrorists with ties to London. Some live there with help from the state.
One example is Yasser al-Sirri, who faces a death sentence in Egypt.
Then there is Anjem Choudary. To date, he has not been charged with terrorism, but his pro-jihad views have led some to call him Great Britain's most hated man.
"Many people love the idea of jihad, you know?" Choudary told CBN News. "And they want to engage in it."
A radical Islamist can find a little bit of everything in London. Ex-jihadists, current jihadists, "wannabe" jihadists: they're all there. So how did this happen?
During the 1980s and 1990s, British authorities granted asylum to a number of Islamic terrorists wanted in their home countries.
"All of this happened under the assumption that if you allowed these people to operate in London, if you allowed them to do whatever they wanted to do, they would not be attacking Britain," terrorism expert Peter Neumann explained.
Neumann is author of the book Old and New Terrorism and heads the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization in London.
"The government, quite cynically, thought that whatever happened in other countries, whatever these people were plotting in other countries, was of no concern to the British government," he added.
Policy Backfires
On July 7, 2005, explosions proved the British government's open door strategy horribly wrong, as al Qaeda-linked terrorists killed 52 people in a series of bombings against London's mass transit system.
One year later, London was the staging ground for a massive al Qaeda plot to blow up 10 transatlantic airliners.
"Only then did the policy change," Neumann said. "However, the seeds of the radical Islamists' activity had already been sown."
Yasser al-Sirri has lived in London since 1994. In Egypt, he belonged to a terrorist organization led by al Qaeda's second-in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 1993, he was found guilty of participating in a failed assassination plot against Egypt's then-prime minister and sentenced to death.
His recent interview with CBN News marked his first appearance on an American television network.
"The British government knows about my activities, my situation," al-Sirri said. "Everything is clear and I have done nothing to break the law."
The British government locked al-Sirri up in 2001 on terrorism charges. He was found not guilty and later released, but American officials still want to get their hands on al-Sirri.
In 2005, he was found guilty in a U.S. federal court of assisting terrorist mastermind Omar Abdel Rahman, the notorious "blind sheikh" behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
False Accusations?
Both the U.S. and Egypt have tried to extradite al-Sirri from Britain for years. He declares he is innocent.
"Many times the American government uses the wrong people for spies or to get intelligence information," al-Sirri claimed. "Some people do business with the FBI, CIA and give them wrong information and sometimes the wrong decision is made."
Al-Sirri didn't help his cause in 2008 when he was photographed walking on a London street with Abu Qatada, al Qaeda's spiritual leader in Europe.
Qatada received asylum in London in 1993 and collected welfare benefits for years. He is now in prison and awaiting deportation to Jordan, where he has been convicted on terrorism charges.
"There was a permissive environment to some extent," said Oxford-based terrorism expert Mahan Abedin. "There was the issue of a lot of foreigners, foreign fighters for instance, and foreign ideologues basing themselves here in London and finding a receptive audience."
Aaad al-Faqih is wanted in his native Saudi Arabia for allegedly seeking to overthrow the Saudi regime.
CBN News recently conducted an off-camera interview with al-Faqih in his London home.
He was designated by the U.S. and U.N. as a global terrorist in 2004 for alleged links to al Qaeda but maintains his innocence. Al Faqih says he meets with British government officials regularly and that they respect his work.
He believes there will be more confrontation between the West and the Muslim world, including terrorist attacks "even bigger than in 2001."
British officials have pushed to deport men like al-Faqih and Yasser al-Sirri back to their home countries. But the European Union and a number of British judges have blocked these efforts over human rights concerns.
"Over years, perhaps decades, a whole sub-culture had grown up," Neumann observed. "And to get to grips with that only through law enforcement and intelligence is very difficult. This subculture of jihadism still exists."
In April 2008, Britain's then home secretary said that British intelligence was monitoring some 2,000 individuals, as well as 200 radical Islamic networks and 30 active terrorist plots.
The British government banned Anjem Choudary's group, Islam4UK, last month under the country's counter-terrorism laws.
Choudary calls for Islamic Sharia law to be enforced in the United Kingdom. His group praised the 9/11 hijackers as "the magnificent 19."
"There is a huge amount of support for people like sheikh Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri [among British Muslims]," Choudary told CBN News.
A Ticking Time Bomb?
Choudary -- who collects welfare benefits from the state -- says his group is a non-violent political and ideological movement. But several former members have been convicted on terrorism charges.
"There are many youth out there who do contact us and do come to our talks and they have other ideas," Choudary said. "And we can make sure that those energies are channeled through discussion, dialogue, interaction. But if you take us out of the picture, then you have a very volatile situation."
"It's not a threat. It's a warning. It's a reality check," he added.
Abedin said things have improved significantly in London since 2005 and the British government has taken important steps to battle radicalism among young Muslims.
"The permissive environment that prevailed prior to July 7, 2005 is no longer the case," he said. "Radical preachers like Omar Bakri Mohammed, like Abu Hamza, for instance, have departed the arena. They've either been deported, expelled, or imprisoned.
But others like Anjem Choudary walk the streets of London as free men.
"I think that the British government is sitting on a tinderbox, you know, full of dynamite" he said. "And they have the matches in their hand and they're being very flippant."
"They're not dealing with it properly," Choudary continued. "It could all blow up in their face and it could be a very vicious situation."
Showing posts with label US and UK homegrown terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US and UK homegrown terrorism. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
FACING HOMEGROWN RADICALIZATION
FROM: http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3113
By Myriam Benraad
September 3, 2009
Last month, Kamal Hassan, a Somali-American living in Minnesota, pled guilty to training and fighting with al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group in Somalia. In July, two other Somali-Americans in Minnesota pled guilty to similar charges, with the FBI continuing to investigate more than a dozen others who may have traveled from the United States to Somalia. The FBI also recently arrested seven individuals in North Carolina on terrorism-related charges, including one who had spent time in Afghan training camps. These and other recent events have raised new concerns in the United States about the threat of homegrown radicalization. As U.S. attorney general Eric Holder acknowledged in a July speech, the "whole notion of radicalization is something that did not loom as large a few months ago...as it does now." While the U.S. government has focused primarily on Europe as a source of potential terrorists, Washington should also look to the continent as a model in confronting homegrown radicalization.
A Troubling Phenomenon
During his first major speech in July, White House counterterrorism advisor John Brennan provided an overview of the current administration's approach to protecting American citizens from violent extremism and terrorism. Although Brennan emphasized President Barack Obama's new partnership with Muslim communities and the administration's commitment to defeating al-Qaeda's capacities overseas, little was said about homegrown Islamist radicalization. This fundamental issue has long been downplayed by U.S. federal authorities and counterterrorism experts, who believe that Muslims and Arabs are generally better integrated into U.S. society -- as opposed to their counterparts in European society -- and are thus less vulnerable to the al-Qaeda narrative.
Homegrown radicalization has now returned to the spotlight after the watershed Somali cases. Court hearings have revealed that Islamist leaders approached most of the Minneapolis recruits and urged them to attend clandestine meetings where they were persuaded to travel to Somalia and become part of the local armed insurgency. Most troublingly, however, is that a number of the Somali-Americans who joined al-Shabab suffer from identity and integration issues similar to those of radicalized youth in Europe. Until now, the United States had seemingly been immune from this particular phenomenon.
Building on Europe's Lessons
Although American policymakers have long worried that Islamists radicalized in Europe would attack the United States, Washington can learn valuable lessons from Europe in addressing the challenge of homegrown radicalization. Consider, for example, some of the measures undertaken in France. Although the internal dynamics nurturing radicalization in France and the United States differ significantly, comparable trends exist. The impact of socioeconomic deprivation, political alienation, and identity issues as vehicles of radical narratives -- a factor that looms large in the Somali-American cases -- appears to be a common pattern. The malaise experienced by nonintegrated second- and third-generation immigrants, as well as the lack of educational and professional prospects for young people, has nurtured homegrown radicalization in France. While this phenomenon is far less widespread in the United States, the recent Somali cases indicate that it is occurring, at least to some extent.
France's law enforcement and intelligence efforts have been fairly far reaching and certainly go beyond what might be politically acceptable in the United States. French counterterrorism magistrates have frequently used their preventive detention powers to target individuals suspected of inciting violence, incarcerating some and deporting others. In 2004, for example, a wave of French prosecutions targeted radical imams and included the deportation of Chelali Benchellali, the Salafist imam of Venissieux's now famous mosque -- an act that would certainly have been more controversial in the United States. (MS: Why would it be controversial, I don't understand.)
France has also prosecuted a number of its citizens after they returned home from jihadist activities overseas -- a move the United States is now taking in the Somali cases as well. In May 2008, for instance, France condemned and jailed members of a Parisian network of jihadists recruited by young Salafi imam Farid Benyettou to fight in Iraq. Court hearings showed how Benyettou, a French citizen of Algerian background, managed to radicalize a group of men in 2003 through private readings of online Islamist propaganda and vehement anti-American rhetoric.
Following the massive riots of 2005 -- which witnessed the uprising of deprived multiethnic youth in French suburbs -- France has been forced to acknowledge the necessity of coupling its often harsh police methods with greater social dialogue and political engagement. After his election in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy made ethnoreligious discrimination one of his top priorities. As such, he appointed Rachida Dati as the minister of justice, the first individual of North African/Muslim origin to access a top cabinet position.
In addition, France has undertaken efforts to better understand the ideological motivations of Islamists. Monitoring and counterradicalization programs have been implemented in the French prison system, historically a crucible for radical ideology and recruitment. Interestingly, official sources indicate that many American homegrown Islamists have also been radicalized while incarcerated, including the members of the prison-formed Jamiyat al-Islam al-Sahih cell in California that was convicted in 2007 for its plans to attack not only synagogues but also the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles. Indeed, prisons provide an ideal place for radicalizing the young and disenchanted in search of a sense of belonging and importance. Within the prison setting, Islam has the added appeal of addressing feelings of inequality and injustice. Fresh converts are protected by fellow inmates and accepted into a new world where the slate is wiped clean. Radicalization often occurs very quickly in this setting, and it is only recently that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has pushed for an increased and systematic monitoring of radical material in U.S. prisons. To their credit, however, U.S. authorities have lately engaged in enhanced cooperation with France regarding prison issues, such as the training of Muslim chaplains.
Conclusion
Information regarding Islamist radicalization in America currently remains limited, and recent developments should therefore serve as a clear warning. Already, the Obama administration is favoring a new approach that shifts from exclusively military options to increased law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Much remains to be done, however, and while U.S. policies are still mainly focused on defeating al-Qaeda's narrative and capacities overseas, dealing with radicals at home might prove all the more critical. Since al-Qaeda is evolving into a "franchise" operation, homegrown recruits could become the most serious threat to the United States. The phenomenon has become all the more worrying in light of many recent attempts by U.S. extremists to link up with foreign Islamist movements and inscribe their struggle at a global level.
In addressing homegrown radicalization, the French experience could provide the Obama administration with policy inspiration. France, although not a parallel model -- especially since it is still addressing the pervasive discontent of poorly integrated Muslim populations -- has witnessed no terrorist attack since the 1990s. Its success in handling the grassroots Islamist phenomenon has resulted from effective interagency coordination and the establishment of specific legal provisions and structures charged with the antiterrorist struggle. Figuring out ways to replicate this in the United States, including the possibility of establishing separate counterterrorism courts, would be an important step forward.
Myriam Benraad is the Keston Family scholar for The Washington Institute's Project Fikra, focusing on radicalization and counterradicalization in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and the United States.
By Myriam Benraad
September 3, 2009
Last month, Kamal Hassan, a Somali-American living in Minnesota, pled guilty to training and fighting with al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group in Somalia. In July, two other Somali-Americans in Minnesota pled guilty to similar charges, with the FBI continuing to investigate more than a dozen others who may have traveled from the United States to Somalia. The FBI also recently arrested seven individuals in North Carolina on terrorism-related charges, including one who had spent time in Afghan training camps. These and other recent events have raised new concerns in the United States about the threat of homegrown radicalization. As U.S. attorney general Eric Holder acknowledged in a July speech, the "whole notion of radicalization is something that did not loom as large a few months ago...as it does now." While the U.S. government has focused primarily on Europe as a source of potential terrorists, Washington should also look to the continent as a model in confronting homegrown radicalization.
A Troubling Phenomenon
During his first major speech in July, White House counterterrorism advisor John Brennan provided an overview of the current administration's approach to protecting American citizens from violent extremism and terrorism. Although Brennan emphasized President Barack Obama's new partnership with Muslim communities and the administration's commitment to defeating al-Qaeda's capacities overseas, little was said about homegrown Islamist radicalization. This fundamental issue has long been downplayed by U.S. federal authorities and counterterrorism experts, who believe that Muslims and Arabs are generally better integrated into U.S. society -- as opposed to their counterparts in European society -- and are thus less vulnerable to the al-Qaeda narrative.
Homegrown radicalization has now returned to the spotlight after the watershed Somali cases. Court hearings have revealed that Islamist leaders approached most of the Minneapolis recruits and urged them to attend clandestine meetings where they were persuaded to travel to Somalia and become part of the local armed insurgency. Most troublingly, however, is that a number of the Somali-Americans who joined al-Shabab suffer from identity and integration issues similar to those of radicalized youth in Europe. Until now, the United States had seemingly been immune from this particular phenomenon.
Building on Europe's Lessons
Although American policymakers have long worried that Islamists radicalized in Europe would attack the United States, Washington can learn valuable lessons from Europe in addressing the challenge of homegrown radicalization. Consider, for example, some of the measures undertaken in France. Although the internal dynamics nurturing radicalization in France and the United States differ significantly, comparable trends exist. The impact of socioeconomic deprivation, political alienation, and identity issues as vehicles of radical narratives -- a factor that looms large in the Somali-American cases -- appears to be a common pattern. The malaise experienced by nonintegrated second- and third-generation immigrants, as well as the lack of educational and professional prospects for young people, has nurtured homegrown radicalization in France. While this phenomenon is far less widespread in the United States, the recent Somali cases indicate that it is occurring, at least to some extent.
France's law enforcement and intelligence efforts have been fairly far reaching and certainly go beyond what might be politically acceptable in the United States. French counterterrorism magistrates have frequently used their preventive detention powers to target individuals suspected of inciting violence, incarcerating some and deporting others. In 2004, for example, a wave of French prosecutions targeted radical imams and included the deportation of Chelali Benchellali, the Salafist imam of Venissieux's now famous mosque -- an act that would certainly have been more controversial in the United States. (MS: Why would it be controversial, I don't understand.)
France has also prosecuted a number of its citizens after they returned home from jihadist activities overseas -- a move the United States is now taking in the Somali cases as well. In May 2008, for instance, France condemned and jailed members of a Parisian network of jihadists recruited by young Salafi imam Farid Benyettou to fight in Iraq. Court hearings showed how Benyettou, a French citizen of Algerian background, managed to radicalize a group of men in 2003 through private readings of online Islamist propaganda and vehement anti-American rhetoric.
Following the massive riots of 2005 -- which witnessed the uprising of deprived multiethnic youth in French suburbs -- France has been forced to acknowledge the necessity of coupling its often harsh police methods with greater social dialogue and political engagement. After his election in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy made ethnoreligious discrimination one of his top priorities. As such, he appointed Rachida Dati as the minister of justice, the first individual of North African/Muslim origin to access a top cabinet position.
In addition, France has undertaken efforts to better understand the ideological motivations of Islamists. Monitoring and counterradicalization programs have been implemented in the French prison system, historically a crucible for radical ideology and recruitment. Interestingly, official sources indicate that many American homegrown Islamists have also been radicalized while incarcerated, including the members of the prison-formed Jamiyat al-Islam al-Sahih cell in California that was convicted in 2007 for its plans to attack not only synagogues but also the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles. Indeed, prisons provide an ideal place for radicalizing the young and disenchanted in search of a sense of belonging and importance. Within the prison setting, Islam has the added appeal of addressing feelings of inequality and injustice. Fresh converts are protected by fellow inmates and accepted into a new world where the slate is wiped clean. Radicalization often occurs very quickly in this setting, and it is only recently that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has pushed for an increased and systematic monitoring of radical material in U.S. prisons. To their credit, however, U.S. authorities have lately engaged in enhanced cooperation with France regarding prison issues, such as the training of Muslim chaplains.
Conclusion
Information regarding Islamist radicalization in America currently remains limited, and recent developments should therefore serve as a clear warning. Already, the Obama administration is favoring a new approach that shifts from exclusively military options to increased law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Much remains to be done, however, and while U.S. policies are still mainly focused on defeating al-Qaeda's narrative and capacities overseas, dealing with radicals at home might prove all the more critical. Since al-Qaeda is evolving into a "franchise" operation, homegrown recruits could become the most serious threat to the United States. The phenomenon has become all the more worrying in light of many recent attempts by U.S. extremists to link up with foreign Islamist movements and inscribe their struggle at a global level.
In addressing homegrown radicalization, the French experience could provide the Obama administration with policy inspiration. France, although not a parallel model -- especially since it is still addressing the pervasive discontent of poorly integrated Muslim populations -- has witnessed no terrorist attack since the 1990s. Its success in handling the grassroots Islamist phenomenon has resulted from effective interagency coordination and the establishment of specific legal provisions and structures charged with the antiterrorist struggle. Figuring out ways to replicate this in the United States, including the possibility of establishing separate counterterrorism courts, would be an important step forward.
Myriam Benraad is the Keston Family scholar for The Washington Institute's Project Fikra, focusing on radicalization and counterradicalization in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and the United States.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
HOMEGROWN TERRORISM - A STUDY
*** The full document is at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Intelligence services and experts are increasingly paying attention to the
threat of “homegrown terrorism,” terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals
who were either born or raised in the West. Homegrown terrorists pose a particular
concern due to the increasing number of Westerners joining militant Islamic
movements, and the operatives’ familiarity with the societies they are targeting.
In recent years, over two hundred men and women born or raised in the West
have participated in, or provided support for Islamic terrorist plots and attacks.
Several studies have examined the demographics of homegrown Islamic terrorists,
and a lesser number of studies have examined their social affiliations. But
to date, no study has empirically examined the process through which these terrorists
are radicalizing, which constitutes a substantial gap in the literature. This
study addresses the present gap through an empirical examination of behavioral
manifestations of the radicalization process in 117 homegrown “jihadist” terrorists
from the United States and United Kingdom.
The individuals considered “homegrown” in this study either spent a significant
portion of their formative years in the West, or else their radicalization bears
a significant connection to the West. Individuals were included in the study if, in
addition to being “homegrown,” they participated in, or provided illegal support
for, jihadist terrorist plots. In evaluating the behavioral changes that the homegrown terrorists went through, this study relies wherever possible on their own
words: some have kept blogs, posted on online newsgroups, or issued communiqués.
Others were caught on tape by government informants. The research for
this study also draws on court cases (which often include exhibits and testimony
that provide insight into the radicalization process) and credible open-source information that would be accepted in the professional and academic worlds.
CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF RADICALIZATION
This study examines six manifestations of the radicalization process that can
be observed in homegrown terrorists. Though the six steps differ in prevalence,
we found that all of them occurred frequently enough among the sample to be
considered significant.
Adopting a Legalistic Interpretation of Islam
A legalistic interpretation of Islam refers to how believers interpret their
rights and obligations in relation to Islam’s holy texts. An individual who has a
legalistic interpretation has adopted a rules-based approach in which the Qur’an
and sunnah provide strict guidelines—not just for the practice of the faith, but
also for virtually every aspect of one’s daily life. This legalistic interpretation will be manifested externally.
A person exhibiting a legalistic interpretation is not necessarily radical, or radicalizing: it may simply be indicative of a conservative practice of the faith.
However, for some homegrown terrorists, this legalistic understanding blends
naturally into the rest of their radicalization. This was the case for al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn, and also for the Lackawanna Six. In the latter case, a spiritual mentor created “an uncompromising religious atmosphere” rooted in a legalistic understanding of the faith designed to make members of the Lackawanna Six
feel ashamed for being “too American.” After introducing the men to legalistic
standards in which they constantly fell short, the spiritual mentor brought in a
“closer”—a young imam who built off their feelings of religious failure, arguing
that undertaking jihad was their only chance at salvation.
Trusting Only Select Religious Authorities
Another significant manifestation of the radicalization process is coming to
trust only the interpretations of a select and ideologically rigid set of religious authorities.
One example of this can be seen within the Wahhabi movement, where
more conservative (and frequently, militant) scholars are often seen as teaching
the only “authentic” interpretation of Islam. Conversely, more moderate scholars
are perceived as offering a watered-down and inauthentic version of the faith.
Sometimes the select religious authorities whom radicalizing individuals believe
they can trust will be contemporary hardline religious leaders, and other
times they will be luminaries of the past—such as Ahmad ibn Abdal-Halim ibn
Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and
Sayyid Abul A‘la Maududi.
Perceived Schism Between Islam and the West
As homegrown terrorists radicalize, they often come to perceive an inherent
schism between Islam and the West—believing that the two are at odds, and
perhaps even incapable of coexistence. This perception can be expressed in a
number of ways. In some cases, individuals attempt to isolate themselves from
Western society physically. In others, these individuals will explain the perceived
schism between Islam and the West to friends, family, or conspirators.
Frequently the concept of loyalty is critical to this stage: the idea that the
individual has obligations to Islam alone, and cannot have any kind of duty or
loyalty to a non-Muslim state. A second, more extreme idea may derive from
this principle: that even participation in democracy violates Islamic religious
principles. Also, this aspect of the radicalization process is sometimes manifested
by individuals separating themselves from, or even coming to hate, non-Muslims
who had previously been an important part of their lives.
Low Tolerance for Perceived Theological Deviance
As homegrown terrorists internalize rigid interpretations of Islam, many come
to view alternate interpretations and practices as not just incorrect theologically,
but as personal affronts. In this way, any disagreement about religion may be
personalized, and met with a great amount of vitriol. This intolerance of perceived
deviance is usually expressed verbally, through the chastisement of other
Muslims—but there have also been instances where this intolerance manifests in
violence.
Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others
Another significant step is when individuals attempt to impose their religious
beliefs on others. This step is often a natural extension of individuals’ low tolerance for perceived theological deviance: since religious transgressions are regarded as personal affronts, radicalizing individuals try to enforce their own religious values and customs on others. Family members and close friends often bear the brunt of these attempts, but they are by no means the only ones affected.
Political Radicalization
The homegrown terrorists in this study also evince a considerable amount of
political radicalization. While there is no single political ideology that all jihadists embrace, the contemporary jihadist political narrative can be broadly outlined:
Western powers have conspired against Islam to subjugate it, both physically and
morally. At the same time, Muslims worldwide have lost their faith, and lack the
strength that they possessed during Muhammad’s time. The only proper response
to the present situation is military action.
***
I suggest reading the entire document, it is well done. MS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Intelligence services and experts are increasingly paying attention to the
threat of “homegrown terrorism,” terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals
who were either born or raised in the West. Homegrown terrorists pose a particular
concern due to the increasing number of Westerners joining militant Islamic
movements, and the operatives’ familiarity with the societies they are targeting.
In recent years, over two hundred men and women born or raised in the West
have participated in, or provided support for Islamic terrorist plots and attacks.
Several studies have examined the demographics of homegrown Islamic terrorists,
and a lesser number of studies have examined their social affiliations. But
to date, no study has empirically examined the process through which these terrorists
are radicalizing, which constitutes a substantial gap in the literature. This
study addresses the present gap through an empirical examination of behavioral
manifestations of the radicalization process in 117 homegrown “jihadist” terrorists
from the United States and United Kingdom.
The individuals considered “homegrown” in this study either spent a significant
portion of their formative years in the West, or else their radicalization bears
a significant connection to the West. Individuals were included in the study if, in
addition to being “homegrown,” they participated in, or provided illegal support
for, jihadist terrorist plots. In evaluating the behavioral changes that the homegrown terrorists went through, this study relies wherever possible on their own
words: some have kept blogs, posted on online newsgroups, or issued communiqués.
Others were caught on tape by government informants. The research for
this study also draws on court cases (which often include exhibits and testimony
that provide insight into the radicalization process) and credible open-source information that would be accepted in the professional and academic worlds.
CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF RADICALIZATION
This study examines six manifestations of the radicalization process that can
be observed in homegrown terrorists. Though the six steps differ in prevalence,
we found that all of them occurred frequently enough among the sample to be
considered significant.
Adopting a Legalistic Interpretation of Islam
A legalistic interpretation of Islam refers to how believers interpret their
rights and obligations in relation to Islam’s holy texts. An individual who has a
legalistic interpretation has adopted a rules-based approach in which the Qur’an
and sunnah provide strict guidelines—not just for the practice of the faith, but
also for virtually every aspect of one’s daily life. This legalistic interpretation will be manifested externally.
A person exhibiting a legalistic interpretation is not necessarily radical, or radicalizing: it may simply be indicative of a conservative practice of the faith.
However, for some homegrown terrorists, this legalistic understanding blends
naturally into the rest of their radicalization. This was the case for al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn, and also for the Lackawanna Six. In the latter case, a spiritual mentor created “an uncompromising religious atmosphere” rooted in a legalistic understanding of the faith designed to make members of the Lackawanna Six
feel ashamed for being “too American.” After introducing the men to legalistic
standards in which they constantly fell short, the spiritual mentor brought in a
“closer”—a young imam who built off their feelings of religious failure, arguing
that undertaking jihad was their only chance at salvation.
Trusting Only Select Religious Authorities
Another significant manifestation of the radicalization process is coming to
trust only the interpretations of a select and ideologically rigid set of religious authorities.
One example of this can be seen within the Wahhabi movement, where
more conservative (and frequently, militant) scholars are often seen as teaching
the only “authentic” interpretation of Islam. Conversely, more moderate scholars
are perceived as offering a watered-down and inauthentic version of the faith.
Sometimes the select religious authorities whom radicalizing individuals believe
they can trust will be contemporary hardline religious leaders, and other
times they will be luminaries of the past—such as Ahmad ibn Abdal-Halim ibn
Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and
Sayyid Abul A‘la Maududi.
Perceived Schism Between Islam and the West
As homegrown terrorists radicalize, they often come to perceive an inherent
schism between Islam and the West—believing that the two are at odds, and
perhaps even incapable of coexistence. This perception can be expressed in a
number of ways. In some cases, individuals attempt to isolate themselves from
Western society physically. In others, these individuals will explain the perceived
schism between Islam and the West to friends, family, or conspirators.
Frequently the concept of loyalty is critical to this stage: the idea that the
individual has obligations to Islam alone, and cannot have any kind of duty or
loyalty to a non-Muslim state. A second, more extreme idea may derive from
this principle: that even participation in democracy violates Islamic religious
principles. Also, this aspect of the radicalization process is sometimes manifested
by individuals separating themselves from, or even coming to hate, non-Muslims
who had previously been an important part of their lives.
Low Tolerance for Perceived Theological Deviance
As homegrown terrorists internalize rigid interpretations of Islam, many come
to view alternate interpretations and practices as not just incorrect theologically,
but as personal affronts. In this way, any disagreement about religion may be
personalized, and met with a great amount of vitriol. This intolerance of perceived
deviance is usually expressed verbally, through the chastisement of other
Muslims—but there have also been instances where this intolerance manifests in
violence.
Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others
Another significant step is when individuals attempt to impose their religious
beliefs on others. This step is often a natural extension of individuals’ low tolerance for perceived theological deviance: since religious transgressions are regarded as personal affronts, radicalizing individuals try to enforce their own religious values and customs on others. Family members and close friends often bear the brunt of these attempts, but they are by no means the only ones affected.
Political Radicalization
The homegrown terrorists in this study also evince a considerable amount of
political radicalization. While there is no single political ideology that all jihadists embrace, the contemporary jihadist political narrative can be broadly outlined:
Western powers have conspired against Islam to subjugate it, both physically and
morally. At the same time, Muslims worldwide have lost their faith, and lack the
strength that they possessed during Muhammad’s time. The only proper response
to the present situation is military action.
***
I suggest reading the entire document, it is well done. MS
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