*** CANADA is the only one not on the list - how embrassing. MS ***
FROM: http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/reuters/100628/world/international_us_security_radicalisation
LONDON (Reuters) - Western prisons could root out militant Islamism among inmates by adopting the more imaginative approaches to prisoners used in parts of the Middle East and Asia, a British study suggests.
The provision of religious advice and helping prisoners cultivate non-extremist social networks are among measures proposed in the study of prisons in 15 countries.
Britain's chief prison inspector said last month the treatment of Muslim inmates by prison staff as potentially dangerous militants risked driving them into the hands of radical groups.
Prisons occupy a central place in the history of militant Islamist groups such as al Qaeda which see them as valued centers of learning, recruitment and indoctrination.
Creative programs can turn the tide, argues the study of prison militants in Afghanistan, Algeria, Britain, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Israel, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, the United States and Yemen.
For example in Singapore, alleged terrorists are systematically re-educated in prison, said the report by London's International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR).
A team of trained religious advisers helps them go through the Koran, showing how critical passages need to be read in context, and how extremist notions about violence are often based on misreadings and misinterpretations, the report says.
Prisons can be "a place for reform as well as radicalization," Peter Neumann, study author and director of ICSR based at London University's King's College, told Reuters.
"Prisons can play a positive role in tackling problems of radicalization and terrorism in society as a whole."
"SECURITY FIRST" APPROACH
Most Western prison systems practiced a "security first" approach with radicalized inmates, Neumann said, arguing this amounted to "locking people away and making sure they don't cause any trouble." Opportunities for reform were missed.
In Saudi Arabia, officials spend heavily to reform and re-integrate former militants to try to ensure they can look forward to a meaningful and productive life after leaving prison, the report says. In some cases, this process has included buying them houses and cars, and even finding them wives.
"None of the de-radicalization programs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia is perfect," said Neumann.
"But they should serve as an inspiration for people in the West to think more creatively about what positive things could be done with radicals and terrorists in the state's custody."
Neumann said this approach would not work everywhere, because de-radicalization depended on a conducive environment.
Releasing people into hostile communities with no further supervision would not work because all good de-radicalization programs were based on follow-up and after-care, which in case of Afghanistan for example was difficult, he said.
The study's proposed measures include:
-- A mix of education, typically combining ideological and/or religious re-education with vocational training.
-- Appointing credible interlocutors, who can relate to prisoners' personal and psychological needs.
-- Sophisticated methods for locking prisoners into multiple commitments and obligations toward family and community.
Showing posts with label Radicalization in prison. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Radicalization in prison. Show all posts
Monday, June 28, 2010
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
RADICALIZATION IN PRISON : CONVERTS OFF TO YEMEN ?
FROM: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/world/middleeast/20terror.html?partner=rss&emc=rss
WASHINGTON — Some American former convicts who converted to Islam in prison have moved to Yemen and a few may have joined extremist groups there, according to a new Senate report.
The report, from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that as many as 36 American Muslims who were prisoners have moved to Yemen in recent months, ostensibly to study Arabic, and that several of them have “dropped off the radar” and may have connected to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The report warns that Americans recruited in Yemen or Somalia may pose a particular threat, since they can operate freely inside the United States.
American intelligence and counterterrorism officials, though, said they thought the report’s claim about former prisoners was exaggerated. A law enforcement official confirmed that some of them had traveled to Yemen — perhaps one or two dozen over the past several years — intending to study Arabic or Islam. The official said the former convicts did not appear to be part of any organized recruitment effort, however, and few are known to have connections with extremists.
Yemen has come under increased scrutiny from American counterterrorism agencies since November, after it emerged that Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army psychiatrist accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Tex., had exchanged e-mail messages with Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Yemeni-American cleric in hiding in Yemen. The focus intensified after the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Dec. 25 by a Nigerian man who allegedly was trained and supplied with explosives in Yemen.
The Senate report, written by the committee’s Democratic staff, said the government was “on heightened alert because of the potential threat from extremists carrying American passports and the related challenges involved in detecting and stopping homegrown operatives.”
With the United States putting Al Qaeda under intense pressure in Pakistan, some fighters have moved to join militant groups in Yemen and Somalia, as well as in North Africa and Southeast Asia, the report said. “These groups may have only an informal connection with Al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan, but they often share common goals,” Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, the committee’s Democratic chairman, wrote in a letter accompanying the report.
The report notes that members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, appeared at an antigovernment rally in southern Yemen last month. In video later shown on Al Jazeera television, a militant told the crowd that the group’s war was with the United States, not the Yemeni Army.
In addition to the American former prisoners in Yemen, the report said there were about 10 other Americans not of Yemeni ancestry who have also moved there, married Yemeni women and adopted a radical form of Islam. None in that group, however, appear to have sought terrorist training, the report said.
In nearby Somalia, the Senate report recounted, news reports told of Somali-Americans traveling to join a militant group, the Shabab. It also described Americans caught entering Somalia from Djibouti.
An immigration official in Djibouti said that he had recently turned away two Somali-Americans trying to cross into Somalia, because he thought they might be trying to link up with the Shabab. Two others were arrested and prosecuted in Djibouti for entering illegally.
The possibility that American prisons could become an incubator for radical Islam has long been raised by experts on terrorism, and a few Muslim prison chaplains in United States prisons have been accused of having extremist views. To date, only a handful of alleged terrorist plots, none of them successful, have involved American Muslims who are former prisoners.
Three American Muslims were convicted for a 2005 plot to attack Jewish institutions and military bases around Los Angeles that was said to have been concocted inside New Folsom Prison, near Sacramento. Michael Finton, who converted to Islam while imprisoned in Illinois from 1999 to 2005, was charged last year with trying to blow up the federal courthouse in Springfield, Ill.
And four former New York state prisoners, at least two of whom converted to Islam in prison, were accused last year of plotting to attack synagogues in the Bronx and shoot down military planes.
A. J. Sabree, a corrections official in Georgia and a Muslim, who worked for years as a prison chaplain, said he had never heard of Muslim former prisoners moving to Yemen. Erik Kriss, a spokesman for the New York State prison system, which employs about 40 imams to counsel inmates, said officials there were not aware of the phenomenon.
Mr. Kriss cautioned against equating conversion in prison to Islam, which is relatively common, to radicalization.
“We do not have any evidence of anything resembling widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting,” he said. “But we recognize the potential and therefore remain vigilant in guarding against it.”
Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.
WASHINGTON — Some American former convicts who converted to Islam in prison have moved to Yemen and a few may have joined extremist groups there, according to a new Senate report.
The report, from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that as many as 36 American Muslims who were prisoners have moved to Yemen in recent months, ostensibly to study Arabic, and that several of them have “dropped off the radar” and may have connected to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The report warns that Americans recruited in Yemen or Somalia may pose a particular threat, since they can operate freely inside the United States.
American intelligence and counterterrorism officials, though, said they thought the report’s claim about former prisoners was exaggerated. A law enforcement official confirmed that some of them had traveled to Yemen — perhaps one or two dozen over the past several years — intending to study Arabic or Islam. The official said the former convicts did not appear to be part of any organized recruitment effort, however, and few are known to have connections with extremists.
Yemen has come under increased scrutiny from American counterterrorism agencies since November, after it emerged that Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army psychiatrist accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Tex., had exchanged e-mail messages with Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Yemeni-American cleric in hiding in Yemen. The focus intensified after the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Dec. 25 by a Nigerian man who allegedly was trained and supplied with explosives in Yemen.
The Senate report, written by the committee’s Democratic staff, said the government was “on heightened alert because of the potential threat from extremists carrying American passports and the related challenges involved in detecting and stopping homegrown operatives.”
With the United States putting Al Qaeda under intense pressure in Pakistan, some fighters have moved to join militant groups in Yemen and Somalia, as well as in North Africa and Southeast Asia, the report said. “These groups may have only an informal connection with Al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan, but they often share common goals,” Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, the committee’s Democratic chairman, wrote in a letter accompanying the report.
The report notes that members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, appeared at an antigovernment rally in southern Yemen last month. In video later shown on Al Jazeera television, a militant told the crowd that the group’s war was with the United States, not the Yemeni Army.
In addition to the American former prisoners in Yemen, the report said there were about 10 other Americans not of Yemeni ancestry who have also moved there, married Yemeni women and adopted a radical form of Islam. None in that group, however, appear to have sought terrorist training, the report said.
In nearby Somalia, the Senate report recounted, news reports told of Somali-Americans traveling to join a militant group, the Shabab. It also described Americans caught entering Somalia from Djibouti.
An immigration official in Djibouti said that he had recently turned away two Somali-Americans trying to cross into Somalia, because he thought they might be trying to link up with the Shabab. Two others were arrested and prosecuted in Djibouti for entering illegally.
The possibility that American prisons could become an incubator for radical Islam has long been raised by experts on terrorism, and a few Muslim prison chaplains in United States prisons have been accused of having extremist views. To date, only a handful of alleged terrorist plots, none of them successful, have involved American Muslims who are former prisoners.
Three American Muslims were convicted for a 2005 plot to attack Jewish institutions and military bases around Los Angeles that was said to have been concocted inside New Folsom Prison, near Sacramento. Michael Finton, who converted to Islam while imprisoned in Illinois from 1999 to 2005, was charged last year with trying to blow up the federal courthouse in Springfield, Ill.
And four former New York state prisoners, at least two of whom converted to Islam in prison, were accused last year of plotting to attack synagogues in the Bronx and shoot down military planes.
A. J. Sabree, a corrections official in Georgia and a Muslim, who worked for years as a prison chaplain, said he had never heard of Muslim former prisoners moving to Yemen. Erik Kriss, a spokesman for the New York State prison system, which employs about 40 imams to counsel inmates, said officials there were not aware of the phenomenon.
Mr. Kriss cautioned against equating conversion in prison to Islam, which is relatively common, to radicalization.
“We do not have any evidence of anything resembling widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting,” he said. “But we recognize the potential and therefore remain vigilant in guarding against it.”
Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
BLOOD GLASS AND DEBRIS EVERYWHERE: TORONTO BOMB PLOT
FROM: http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/01/13/%E2%80%9Cthere-will-be-blood-glass-and-debris-everywhere%E2%80%9D/
For a man who insists he is innocent, Shareef Abdelhaleem sure spent a lot of time worrying about police surveillance teams. The accused Canadian terrorist was so afraid of being photographed by CSIS and the RCMP that he grew increasingly paranoid about meeting in certain places or being seen with certain people, especially outdoors. Three weeks before being rounded up as part of the “Toronto 18”, he asked Zakaria Amara—the group’s confessed ringleader—whether he thought the authorities were watching him. “No,” he assured him. “Not anymore.”
The irony, of course, is that Abdelhaleem’s every word—including that chat with Amara—was being secretly recorded by the very investigators he was desperate to dodge. As he now painfully realizes, anti-terror cops used at least two tiny microphones to capture his conversations: one inside the Canadian Tire gas station where Amara worked, and another hidden somewhere on the body of a police informant named Shaher Elsohemy. In other words, whenever Abdelhaleem mused about whether police were watching him, he was speaking directly to them.
Abdelhaleem’s stress level about being caught fluctuated depending on the day, says Elsohemy, who is now testifying at the criminal trial of his old “friend.” On May 15, 2006, for example, Abdelhaleem told the RCMP’s undercover asset that “he does not believe authorities know anything about this plot.” Three days later, though, he said a CSIS spy followed he and Amara as they drove around Mississauga. “He told me they went after [the CSIS agent] and tried to check him out,” Elsohemy testified on Wednesday. “They videotaped him, too. Mr. Abdelhaleem believed his picture was taken, too.”
Now 34, Abdelhaleem is charged with participating in a now-infamous terrorist plot to detonate truck bombs at three locations in southern Ontario, including the Toronto Stock Exchange. Although 18 suspects were rounded up in the sensational raids of June 2, 2006, only four were accused of actually participating in the bomb conspiracy. Three of those men, including the mastermind Amara, have since pleaded guilty, but Abdelhaleem has chosen to fight the charges in court. He denies any involvement, and claims that the RCMP’s prized informant cannot be believed because he was paid $4 million for his covert services.
Despite the other confessions, Abdelhaleem is considered innocent until proven guilty. However, in order to walk away a free man, he must convince a judge that he was oblivious to a murderous plot that clearly unfolded right under his nose—and, as the wiretaps reveal, he spent hours talking about.
“He described it as ‘the perfect crime,’ ” said Elsohemy, answering questions from the prosecution. “He said this plot will screw Stephen Harper, the government and the military, and might lead to Canada puling its troops out of Afghanistan because they are not tough like the British and the Americans.”
A former Air Canada flight attendant with a university degree in agricultural engineering, Elsohemy infiltrated the group by “dangling” his ability to acquire large quantities of explosive fertilizer from his “uncle’s” company. Amara, who had already built and perfected a cell phone-controlled detonator, trusted Elsohemy enough to place a $5,500 order for three tonnes of ammonium nitrate, the missing component of his would-be bombs.
According to Elsohemy, Abdelhaleem was Amara’s loyal deputy—the buffer between the ringleader and his newfound chemical supplier. It was Abdelhaleem, Elsohemy said, who placed Amara’s order, delivered envelopes full of cash, and boasted that their attack would “shut down” the entire country.
Testifying for the third consecutive day, Elsohemy said Abdelhaleem was obsessed with every aspect of the plot, from how to store the fertilizer to how to profit from the explosion. “Shareef went to a library and checked the stock market situation after Sept. 11th,” he testified. “He said our money could be increased seven times.”
In one breath, Abdelhaleem talked about fleeing the country 15 days before the attack (perhaps to his sister’s house in Cleveland) in order to avoid suspicion. In the next, he talked about being sentenced to ten years at Kingston Penitentiary, “where he will be considered a leader” by other Muslim inmates. “He also explained to me that when he thinks about being arrested, it is only after the fact, after the bombings,” said Elsohemy, a stocky, well-spoken man with a bald head and a pair of glasses. “He never imagined that the arrests would happen before the bombs were detonated.”
As for those bombs, Elsohemy said Abdelhaleem relished in the carnage they would cause. One of the three selected targets, the CSIS headquarters in downtown Toronto, “will be affected from the main floor to the top floor,” Abdelhaleem said. “There will be blood, glass and debris everywhere.” In his words, the attack will be dubbed “The Battle of Toronto.”
But of all the tough talking he did in the weeks leading up to the arrests, surveillance was a recurring theme. According to Elsohemy, Abdelhaleem believed that because he was in charge of purchasing the ammonium nitrate—and not driving one of the three truck bombs—he could be not convicted of a serious offence. “He said he will probably be charged with assisting, but not performing,” said Elsohemy, who has yet to be cross-examined. “In his opinion, as he described it to me, he thought there was a difference between assisting and performing. If he didn’t drive the truck, that was not performing.”
In some ways, it’s hard to blame Abdelhaleem for his flawed logic. Determined to keep his plot a secret, Amara didn’t share every aspect with every accomplice. Two of his underlings—Saad Khalid and Saad Gaya—were tasked with renting a storage facility and unloading the delivery of ammonium nitrate. Two others—Abdelhaleem (allegedly) and Elsohemy—were in charge of securing the chemicals. The parallel groups never crossed paths. In fact, Abdelhaleem did not even meet his two Saads until they were arrested and thrown in the same prison wing.
Which is exactly the way Abdelhaleem preferred it, Elsohemy said. In the days before the bust, Elsohemy began to press Amara for more details. He wanted to know how the detonators worked, how many people were involved in the plot, and when the event would occur. When Amara suggested that the three of them meet at a Toronto park to discuss specifics, Abdelhaleem refused. He didn’t want to draw any further attention to himself, Elsohemy said, and he questioned his friend for wanting to know so much. “It’s better not to know,” he said, according to Elsohemy. “If you are arrested and you go under a lie detector test, if you don’t know something, you don’t know it.” Translation: Abdelhaleem was more than happy to be a naïve accomplice, because the consequences were far less severe.
Instead of a meeting, Amara suggested that Elsohemy record his questions on a USB memory stick and hand it to Abdelhaleem. Again, Abdelhaleem was furious. “You shouldn’t ask questions about things that don’t involve you.” But Abdelhaleem did as he was told, Elsohemy said. He delivered the USB stick to Amara.
On March 26, one week before Elsohemy and his entire family vanished into the witness protection program, he met the ringleader at the Café de Khan restaurant in Mississauga, in the same strip mall as the Al-Rahman Islamic Centre, the mosque where they attended Friday prayers. Amara handed him a USB stick. It included an audio message with answers to all of Elsohemy’s questions, and a short video depicting his homemade detonator in action (on the carpet of Amara’s living room, surrounded by his daughter’s toys).
Later that day, Elsohemy drove to an RCMP safe house and handed the memory stick to investigators. Played in court on Wednesday, Amara’s message assures Elsohemy that “nobody even knows you exist”—except two people. Amara. And Shareef Abdelhaleem.
The informant is back on the stand Friday morning.
For a man who insists he is innocent, Shareef Abdelhaleem sure spent a lot of time worrying about police surveillance teams. The accused Canadian terrorist was so afraid of being photographed by CSIS and the RCMP that he grew increasingly paranoid about meeting in certain places or being seen with certain people, especially outdoors. Three weeks before being rounded up as part of the “Toronto 18”, he asked Zakaria Amara—the group’s confessed ringleader—whether he thought the authorities were watching him. “No,” he assured him. “Not anymore.”
The irony, of course, is that Abdelhaleem’s every word—including that chat with Amara—was being secretly recorded by the very investigators he was desperate to dodge. As he now painfully realizes, anti-terror cops used at least two tiny microphones to capture his conversations: one inside the Canadian Tire gas station where Amara worked, and another hidden somewhere on the body of a police informant named Shaher Elsohemy. In other words, whenever Abdelhaleem mused about whether police were watching him, he was speaking directly to them.
Abdelhaleem’s stress level about being caught fluctuated depending on the day, says Elsohemy, who is now testifying at the criminal trial of his old “friend.” On May 15, 2006, for example, Abdelhaleem told the RCMP’s undercover asset that “he does not believe authorities know anything about this plot.” Three days later, though, he said a CSIS spy followed he and Amara as they drove around Mississauga. “He told me they went after [the CSIS agent] and tried to check him out,” Elsohemy testified on Wednesday. “They videotaped him, too. Mr. Abdelhaleem believed his picture was taken, too.”
Now 34, Abdelhaleem is charged with participating in a now-infamous terrorist plot to detonate truck bombs at three locations in southern Ontario, including the Toronto Stock Exchange. Although 18 suspects were rounded up in the sensational raids of June 2, 2006, only four were accused of actually participating in the bomb conspiracy. Three of those men, including the mastermind Amara, have since pleaded guilty, but Abdelhaleem has chosen to fight the charges in court. He denies any involvement, and claims that the RCMP’s prized informant cannot be believed because he was paid $4 million for his covert services.
Despite the other confessions, Abdelhaleem is considered innocent until proven guilty. However, in order to walk away a free man, he must convince a judge that he was oblivious to a murderous plot that clearly unfolded right under his nose—and, as the wiretaps reveal, he spent hours talking about.
“He described it as ‘the perfect crime,’ ” said Elsohemy, answering questions from the prosecution. “He said this plot will screw Stephen Harper, the government and the military, and might lead to Canada puling its troops out of Afghanistan because they are not tough like the British and the Americans.”
A former Air Canada flight attendant with a university degree in agricultural engineering, Elsohemy infiltrated the group by “dangling” his ability to acquire large quantities of explosive fertilizer from his “uncle’s” company. Amara, who had already built and perfected a cell phone-controlled detonator, trusted Elsohemy enough to place a $5,500 order for three tonnes of ammonium nitrate, the missing component of his would-be bombs.
According to Elsohemy, Abdelhaleem was Amara’s loyal deputy—the buffer between the ringleader and his newfound chemical supplier. It was Abdelhaleem, Elsohemy said, who placed Amara’s order, delivered envelopes full of cash, and boasted that their attack would “shut down” the entire country.
Testifying for the third consecutive day, Elsohemy said Abdelhaleem was obsessed with every aspect of the plot, from how to store the fertilizer to how to profit from the explosion. “Shareef went to a library and checked the stock market situation after Sept. 11th,” he testified. “He said our money could be increased seven times.”
In one breath, Abdelhaleem talked about fleeing the country 15 days before the attack (perhaps to his sister’s house in Cleveland) in order to avoid suspicion. In the next, he talked about being sentenced to ten years at Kingston Penitentiary, “where he will be considered a leader” by other Muslim inmates. “He also explained to me that when he thinks about being arrested, it is only after the fact, after the bombings,” said Elsohemy, a stocky, well-spoken man with a bald head and a pair of glasses. “He never imagined that the arrests would happen before the bombs were detonated.”
As for those bombs, Elsohemy said Abdelhaleem relished in the carnage they would cause. One of the three selected targets, the CSIS headquarters in downtown Toronto, “will be affected from the main floor to the top floor,” Abdelhaleem said. “There will be blood, glass and debris everywhere.” In his words, the attack will be dubbed “The Battle of Toronto.”
But of all the tough talking he did in the weeks leading up to the arrests, surveillance was a recurring theme. According to Elsohemy, Abdelhaleem believed that because he was in charge of purchasing the ammonium nitrate—and not driving one of the three truck bombs—he could be not convicted of a serious offence. “He said he will probably be charged with assisting, but not performing,” said Elsohemy, who has yet to be cross-examined. “In his opinion, as he described it to me, he thought there was a difference between assisting and performing. If he didn’t drive the truck, that was not performing.”
In some ways, it’s hard to blame Abdelhaleem for his flawed logic. Determined to keep his plot a secret, Amara didn’t share every aspect with every accomplice. Two of his underlings—Saad Khalid and Saad Gaya—were tasked with renting a storage facility and unloading the delivery of ammonium nitrate. Two others—Abdelhaleem (allegedly) and Elsohemy—were in charge of securing the chemicals. The parallel groups never crossed paths. In fact, Abdelhaleem did not even meet his two Saads until they were arrested and thrown in the same prison wing.
Which is exactly the way Abdelhaleem preferred it, Elsohemy said. In the days before the bust, Elsohemy began to press Amara for more details. He wanted to know how the detonators worked, how many people were involved in the plot, and when the event would occur. When Amara suggested that the three of them meet at a Toronto park to discuss specifics, Abdelhaleem refused. He didn’t want to draw any further attention to himself, Elsohemy said, and he questioned his friend for wanting to know so much. “It’s better not to know,” he said, according to Elsohemy. “If you are arrested and you go under a lie detector test, if you don’t know something, you don’t know it.” Translation: Abdelhaleem was more than happy to be a naïve accomplice, because the consequences were far less severe.
Instead of a meeting, Amara suggested that Elsohemy record his questions on a USB memory stick and hand it to Abdelhaleem. Again, Abdelhaleem was furious. “You shouldn’t ask questions about things that don’t involve you.” But Abdelhaleem did as he was told, Elsohemy said. He delivered the USB stick to Amara.
On March 26, one week before Elsohemy and his entire family vanished into the witness protection program, he met the ringleader at the Café de Khan restaurant in Mississauga, in the same strip mall as the Al-Rahman Islamic Centre, the mosque where they attended Friday prayers. Amara handed him a USB stick. It included an audio message with answers to all of Elsohemy’s questions, and a short video depicting his homemade detonator in action (on the carpet of Amara’s living room, surrounded by his daughter’s toys).
Later that day, Elsohemy drove to an RCMP safe house and handed the memory stick to investigators. Played in court on Wednesday, Amara’s message assures Elsohemy that “nobody even knows you exist”—except two people. Amara. And Shareef Abdelhaleem.
The informant is back on the stand Friday morning.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
Prisons as Breeding Ground for Islamist Extremism
Something is missing from the debate over prison reform: What is Canada to do about the influx of incarcerated Islamist terrorists?
Since March, 2009, seven suspected Canadian terrorists, including Momin Khawaja, Said Namouh and five members of the Toronto 18, have been prosecuted. Another half-dozen trials are ongoing.
Canadians should commend the RCMP, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, local police and various branches of the judiciary for successfully tracking, foiling and indicting these individuals. But imprisoning terrorists poses a challenge.
The associated risk is prison radicalization, wherein members of the general prison population are introduced to and convert to militant interpretations of radical Islam. Already, Crown prosecutors have revealed that one Toronto 18 member, Ali Dirie, “took an active role in recruiting other inmates to adopt extreme jihadi beliefs” while under remand.
Prisons are filled with young and often dangerous individuals with a predisposition for anti-social behaviour. Some consider themselves victims of society and may be especially susceptible to ideologies that espouse retribution.
International trends suggest that prison radicalization and recruitment are common. Richard Reid, the 2001 shoe bomber, and Muktar Said Ibrahim, involved with the second and failed London attacks in 2005, were radicalized while serving time for petty crimes in Britain. Jamal Ahmidan, a leader of the 2004 Madrid bombings, was radicalized while serving time for theft. Mohamed Achraf, while serving time for credit-card fraud in Spain, established the Martyrs for Morocco, recruiting nearly 20 inmates for attacks on Spain's National Court. Safe Bourada created the Partisans of Victory while serving time in France and recruited convicts for attacks in Paris. Jose Padilla, currently serving a 17-year terrorism conviction, and Michael Finton, arrested last month while allegedly attempting to detonate a bomb in Illinois, were both introduced to radical Islam while serving time on non-terrorism-related charges. And Kevin James founded the Assembly of Authentic Islam behind bars in California, recruiting two fellow inmates for attacks in Los Angeles.
Preventing similar outcomes in Canada will take five steps.
First, we need to better understand how extremist ideologies spread within prison. Lessons are to be found from existing research on prison gangs and the radicalization of white supremacists. We can also follow the lead of other countries and establish a national counter-radicalization task force. By bringing together academics, policy-makers and community experts, trends can be monitored and countered.
Second, extremists need to be segregated from the general prison population. We should ensure that there are enough qualified imams for Canadian prisons to eliminate the risk that radical inmates will use a dearth of leadership to captivate a susceptible audience, spread violent views and recruit. Lectures and courses could be offered to ensure that newly observant inmates receive a full, rather than selective, reading of their new faith and practice. Also, ensuring that Muslim inmates have what they need to practise their faith, from halal food to prayer halls, might help to avert grievances.
Third, prison officials need to be trained to recognize and impede radicalization. We should imitate the French and publish a prison guide that traces the indicators of radicalization. Intelligence on radicals should be collected and properly shared between prisons. Ensuring the Correctional Service of Canada has the means to co-ordinate with other agencies might also require establishing new partnerships. For instance, California's Joint Regional Intelligence Center puts local prison officials in constant contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Los Angeles Police Department and Department of Homeland Security.
Fourth, specific inmates should be tracked and monitored as they move through the correctional system. If required, they should be contained. The British dispersal strategy, which spreads convicted terrorists around the country, and France's use of displacement, which impedes criminal bonding by moving radicals around, are two suggestions.
Finally, Canada should follow through after prisoner release. Helping inmates reintegrate into society will impede radical groups outside prison from preying on former convicts. Some inmates should be required, upon release, to enroll in de-radicalization programs, such as the Specialized De-Radicalization Intervention program in Toronto. And those who have renounced violence should be encouraged to help turn others away from terrorism.
With terrorists heading to Canadian jails, this is the time to take action – before they have time to recruit.
Alex Wilner is a fellow in defence and security with the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies in Halifax and a senior researcher at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.
Source: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/we-must-make-sure-that-prison-isnt-terrorism-school/article1329820/
Since March, 2009, seven suspected Canadian terrorists, including Momin Khawaja, Said Namouh and five members of the Toronto 18, have been prosecuted. Another half-dozen trials are ongoing.
Canadians should commend the RCMP, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, local police and various branches of the judiciary for successfully tracking, foiling and indicting these individuals. But imprisoning terrorists poses a challenge.
The associated risk is prison radicalization, wherein members of the general prison population are introduced to and convert to militant interpretations of radical Islam. Already, Crown prosecutors have revealed that one Toronto 18 member, Ali Dirie, “took an active role in recruiting other inmates to adopt extreme jihadi beliefs” while under remand.
Prisons are filled with young and often dangerous individuals with a predisposition for anti-social behaviour. Some consider themselves victims of society and may be especially susceptible to ideologies that espouse retribution.
International trends suggest that prison radicalization and recruitment are common. Richard Reid, the 2001 shoe bomber, and Muktar Said Ibrahim, involved with the second and failed London attacks in 2005, were radicalized while serving time for petty crimes in Britain. Jamal Ahmidan, a leader of the 2004 Madrid bombings, was radicalized while serving time for theft. Mohamed Achraf, while serving time for credit-card fraud in Spain, established the Martyrs for Morocco, recruiting nearly 20 inmates for attacks on Spain's National Court. Safe Bourada created the Partisans of Victory while serving time in France and recruited convicts for attacks in Paris. Jose Padilla, currently serving a 17-year terrorism conviction, and Michael Finton, arrested last month while allegedly attempting to detonate a bomb in Illinois, were both introduced to radical Islam while serving time on non-terrorism-related charges. And Kevin James founded the Assembly of Authentic Islam behind bars in California, recruiting two fellow inmates for attacks in Los Angeles.
Preventing similar outcomes in Canada will take five steps.
First, we need to better understand how extremist ideologies spread within prison. Lessons are to be found from existing research on prison gangs and the radicalization of white supremacists. We can also follow the lead of other countries and establish a national counter-radicalization task force. By bringing together academics, policy-makers and community experts, trends can be monitored and countered.
Second, extremists need to be segregated from the general prison population. We should ensure that there are enough qualified imams for Canadian prisons to eliminate the risk that radical inmates will use a dearth of leadership to captivate a susceptible audience, spread violent views and recruit. Lectures and courses could be offered to ensure that newly observant inmates receive a full, rather than selective, reading of their new faith and practice. Also, ensuring that Muslim inmates have what they need to practise their faith, from halal food to prayer halls, might help to avert grievances.
Third, prison officials need to be trained to recognize and impede radicalization. We should imitate the French and publish a prison guide that traces the indicators of radicalization. Intelligence on radicals should be collected and properly shared between prisons. Ensuring the Correctional Service of Canada has the means to co-ordinate with other agencies might also require establishing new partnerships. For instance, California's Joint Regional Intelligence Center puts local prison officials in constant contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Los Angeles Police Department and Department of Homeland Security.
Fourth, specific inmates should be tracked and monitored as they move through the correctional system. If required, they should be contained. The British dispersal strategy, which spreads convicted terrorists around the country, and France's use of displacement, which impedes criminal bonding by moving radicals around, are two suggestions.
Finally, Canada should follow through after prisoner release. Helping inmates reintegrate into society will impede radical groups outside prison from preying on former convicts. Some inmates should be required, upon release, to enroll in de-radicalization programs, such as the Specialized De-Radicalization Intervention program in Toronto. And those who have renounced violence should be encouraged to help turn others away from terrorism.
With terrorists heading to Canadian jails, this is the time to take action – before they have time to recruit.
Alex Wilner is a fellow in defence and security with the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies in Halifax and a senior researcher at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.
Source: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/we-must-make-sure-that-prison-isnt-terrorism-school/article1329820/
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