NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE NEEDED

*** Canada is the only one to not have one. The Harper govt. is making us look bad on the world stage - and I don't mean because of his missed photo ops either. MS ***

FROM: http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2977918

It has a ring of cloak and dagger, with members of Parliament bound to secrecy for life, poring over classified papers at undisclosed locations.

But it's all in a day's work for politicians in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, where permanent committees of security-cleared legislators have existed for years.

And periodically in Canada, House of Commons committees have been entrusted with secrets about the country's intelligence agency, organized crime, defence and foreign affairs matters.

Given that history, some say, all-party efforts underway this week to establish a process through which MPs could see the uncensored versions of Afghan-detainee documents should not be insurmountable.

"Some of the players are just going to have to back off half a step and collaborate a bit more because I have done it, other MPs have done this, other parliaments have done it," says Liberal MP Derek Lee.

Mr. Lee is an advocate of a five-year-old legislative proposal to create a permanent parliamentary "national security committee" comprised of MPs and Senators with access to classified information and bound to an oath of secrecy, as are MPs who are appointed to the federal cabinet.

"Had we passed the bill five years ago that created an intelligence committee, we would have built a mechanism that everyone could see that protected sensitive documents," Mr. Lee said.

"It's that teachable moment that we should have had. It was realized then that it was necessary for Parliament to fulfil its function."

Mr. Lee chaired an all-party Commons-Senate committee in 2004 that forged that legislation, based in part on looking at the U.S., British and Australian models of intelligence and security committees.

The Liberal government of Paul Martin tabled the bill in the Commons in the fall of 2005 but it died when Martin was defeated by the Conservatives a couple of months later.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has not revived the bill. Mr. Lee reintroduced it in 2007 as a private member's bill that has not been chosen by lottery for debate.

It is pertinent now, in the wake of Commons Speaker Peter Milliken's ruling this past Tuesday upholding the right of MPs to see uncensored detainee-related documents.

He issued a two-week deadline for the government and three opposition parties to work out a mechanism to protect state secrets while providing MPs with access to the documents.

More than 10,000 pages of documents already tabled in the Commons contain passages blacked out on grounds of potential injury to national security, defence and international affairs.

It is the contents of some of those hidden passages that opposition MPs are demanding to see to assess allegations that government and military officials turned a blind eye to the risk of torture of detainees captured by Canadian armed forces and transferred to Afghan custody.

Mr. Lee says a two-page secrecy protocol for a Commons justice committee study of organized crime in 2000 "was complied with so well that the committee got no publicity at all."

"They did a great job and reported to Parliament and all the information was protected," he said.

Mr. Lee was not a member of that committee but he was on a special 1990-91 Commons committee assigned to see if the then five-year-old Canadian Security Intelligence Service was working out as planned.

"It was closely handled," he recalled. "We weren't sworn [to an official oath of secrecy], but when we saw the sensitive stuff it was not on parliamentary premises and in most cases we did not have staff with us. . . . The documents were retained at the location where they were."

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative party was in power, New Democratic Party leader Audrey McLaughlin was sworn in as a privy councillor so that she could be given secret information.

Then Liberal leader Jean Chretien was already a privy councillor, bound by a lifelong oath of secrecy. There was no Bloc Quebecois party in the Commons at the time.

RACIAL / RELIGIOUS PROFILING AT BORDER

*** Racial / religious profiling exists? Imagine my shock. Better not let them grannies git away! MS ***

FROM: http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/763792--border-race-profiling-a-reality-report-finds?bn=1

OTTAWA–A civil liberties coalition report puts a human face on the hassles and horrors of travelling, with multiple anecdotes suggesting religious and racial profiling is a reality when crossing the border.

"There is a huge amount of stigma to being labelled a security risk," Micheal Vonn, policy director of the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, said Wednesday.

"This was an attempt to systematically catalogue some of the things that have been impacting people's real lives," she said.

The Ottawa-based coalition of rights and labour organizations, calling itself the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, began researching the impact of security measures like the no-fly list two years ago.

"The staggering number of complex programs, rules and regulations, border controls and watch lists have had an indisputable impact on all travellers on both sides of the border," concluded the report.

It calls for the creation of independent watchdog to oversee the operations of all agencies involved in national security, including the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Transport Canada, and urges parliamentarians to conduct a full examination of the no-fly list and any new program that could mirror the upcoming U.S. Secure Flight program.

The group collected personal stories with the help of previously published media reports as well as a website and toll-free hotline that netted about 50 complaints.

Skin colour and religion appeared to play a large role in many of the complaints of undue harassment while going through airport security or crossing the border by land.

"The government must acknowledge this reality and Parliament should engage in a review of these practices to reaffirm that they are inappropriate under the Canadian Charter of Rights," the report gave as one of its recommendations.

The report cites a Muslim man from the Toronto area who recounts how it is "a regular routine to be hauled in for questioning and for additional searches by a CBSA agent."

On a recent trip, all the man's bags were opened and searched one by one, while his laptop and cellphone were taken for additional screening.

A dance instructor from Coquitlam, B.C., named Desiderio Fortunato was pepper-sprayed in the face in March 2009 after asking a U.S. border guard to say "please."

He also finds Canadian border officials are initially tense.

"I'm sometimes mistaken for Moroccan or an Iranian by CBSA agents. My skin is a bit dark and I have an accent," he said in the report.

"They always ask where I was born ... Once I say: `Portugal,' their body language changes, they relax a bit."

Vancouver psychotherapist Andrew Feldmar is barred from visiting his children in the United States because when he tried to cross the border in August 2006, a border agent found an article he had penned detailing an acid trip he had taken in the 1960s.

James Kusie, a spokesperson for Transport Minister John Baird, said the department will take time to review the report before responding, but added, "the safety and security of the travelling public is of utmost importance to our government."

Public Safety spokesperson Christine Csversko said "the CBSA is committed to the fair treatment of all travellers."

LIBERALS PLEDGE EFFECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY OF FED AGENCIES

FROM: http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/100126/national/20100126_liberals_watchdogs

OTTAWA - Michael Ignatieff is promising to strengthen and respect the independence of federal agencies that protect the health and safety of Canadians and hold government to account.

The Liberal leader says his willingness to give real teeth to the watchdogs shows he's prepared to put limits on prime ministerial power.

Among other things, he says a Liberal government would "seriously consider" creating a public-appointments commission to ensure those chosen to sit on various tribunals are qualified and independent.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper once promised such a commission but it has never materialized.

Liberals heard today from three watchdogs muzzled by the Harper government - Linda Keen, former head of the nuclear safety commission; Paul Kennedy, former head of the RCMP's public complaints commission; and Peter Tinsley, former military police complaints commissioner.

Keen, who was fired by the Tories, told Liberals that federal watchdogs are "under attack" by the government and that supposedly independent commissioners are afraid they'll lose their jobs if they take tough stands.

CSIS TRUMPS RCMP ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Ron Atkey

Special to Globe and Mail Update Published on Thursday, Dec. 03, 2009 7:16PM EST Last updated on Thursday, Dec. 03, 2009 7:18PM EST

There could not have been a starker contrast between the visions of our security intelligence agency and our national police force, described by Wesley Wark in The Globe and Mail last week (Post-9/11 Fatigue Sets In – Nov. 23). Surprisingly, Mr. Wark ignores history by throwing in his lot with the RCMP and dissing CSIS.

There are four fundamental points: (1) preventing terrorism through good security intelligence is preferable to relying on criminal prosecutions after the event; (2) almost every time the RCMP gets into serious trouble, it is over its activities in the security intelligence field; (3) CSIS was created by Parliament 25 years ago as a separate civilian body as a result of botched work by the RCMP in the 1970s; (4) CSIS operates under law with full accountability, while the RCMP still does not have full accountability.

Virtually everyone agrees on the need for national security in this age of international and domestic terrorist threats. Human rights have been given new meaning by our courts and various commissions of inquiry, extending the notions of fairness and freedoms not only to individuals but to society as a whole. Security is a human right, as the new CSIS director, Richard Fadden, has noted. Canadians yearn for both civil liberties and security, and have a right to both.

But then the discussion gets murky. Mr. Wark criticizes Mr. Fadden for not being as transparent and open to dialogue as former CSIS chiefs. But that's exactly what Mr. Fadden did in his first public outing on Oct. 29, when he candidly described the turbulent legal environment in which CSIS finds itself. He set forth the underlying assumptions of the original CSIS Act of 1984: CSIS would be separate from the police and would not collect evidence; to protect privacy, information would only be retained if strictly necessary; and CSIS agents would rarely appear in court.

With all the criminal cases, commissions of inquiry, resulting civil litigation, immigration cases and specialized review bodies requiring CSIS's attention these days, it was refreshing that Mr. Fadden would publicly discuss the impact of recent judicial rulings regarding retention of information in the context of the legislative mandate given to it by Parliament. Whether one agrees with him, he certainly was transparent and open to dialogue.

On the issue of disclosure, he was equally forthright: CSIS has worked hard to compromise but, in the Charkaoui security certificate case, was pushed to withdrawing information that caused the case to collapse rather than providing would-be terrorists a virtual road map to tradecraft and sources. And he acknowledged government support for this decision. No cover-up here.

There were two other areas where he encouraged public debate. He spoke of the ongoing reality of terrorism in Canada that is based on religious and political extremism, with the Internet allowing people to use social networking technologies to recruit, plan and execute acts of terror. And he made it clear what intelligence agencies do – hire the right people who are superb at technology and information and who will analyze and interpret intelligence that serves to actually protect.

Contrast this approach with a rare speech by RCMP Commissioner William Elliott the next day. While he offered a valuable glimpse into the world of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Somali pirates, Tamil Tigers, Sikh terrorists, espionage, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking and the Canada-U.S. border, he left the impression that the RCMP would like to get fully back to the security intelligence field. He complained about the enhanced focus on security intelligence overshadowing the role of law enforcement in protecting national security and groused about the fact that, since 9/11, government anti-terrorism expenditures of billions of dollars have gone to bolster Canada's intelligence capacity through CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment rather than the RCMP.

What was most disturbing is what he didn't say. There was no acknowledgment of past wrongdoings and no embracing of any true accountability or review body other than to reject the supervision of an intelligence czar currently being considered by the Air India inquiry.

Most curious was his historic view of the role of criminal law enforcement and his apparent acceptance of increased scrutiny and judicialization of intelligence information. What he may have missed is that the courts or commissions of inquiry or the media and the public will scrutinize not only intelligence information but the checkered conduct and track record of the organization that does the collecting, analysis and retention. History has a way of repeating itself, particularly if it is forgotten.

Ron Atkey is a security law specialist who teaches at Osgoode Hall and the University of Western Ontario. He served as chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee from 1984 to 1989.

SOURCE: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/csis-still-trumps-the-rcmp-for-national-security/article1387887/

*** Look, if prevention is better than cure, then it follows that CSIS is better than the RCMP

Or, if you would like it another way, an ancient Chinese proverb has it that an excellent doctor prevents disease, a mediocre doctor treats it, and the lowest is the one who actually has to cure it (after the fact).

However you take it - the point is that CSIS has a bigger job to do and rightfully deserves the lion's share of funding and support. CSIS is not the CIA and this should not be about which agency has the front seat in the theatres of power.

It helps no one to have competition between agencies rather, ALL must live by the following: Unity of Thought, Purpose of Action.

Now carry on. ***

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE RCMP

*** The RCMP is badly in need of effective oversight. Something like a parliamentary office that oversees national security operations of CSIS and RCMP (in real-time) is certainly warranted. Given the Conservative government's inability to hold themselves accountable to the Canadian public, the obligation upon parliament is thus, clear. ***

Historical Context

Prior to 1984, the RCMP Security Service was responsible for providing security intelligence services to the Government of Canada. However, the Service’s involvement in illegal activities led the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (McDonald Commission) to recommend that a new civilian security intelligence service be established.(1) Parliament disbanded the RCMP Security Service when it created the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984. CSIS is subject to a high level of civilian oversight.

On 11 September 2001, terrorists hijacked several aircraft and attacked civilian and military targets in the United States. These attacks resulted in a high number of civilian casualties, caused extensive property damage, and had a disruptive effect on air travel and the global economy.

Following these events, Parliament passed the Anti-terrorism Act. This statute enacted the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act and amended 20 other laws. By defining terrorist support as a criminal offence, it changed the RCMP’s role and provided an opportunity for the organization to be more involved in matters of national security.(2)

Although Parliament expanded the role of the RCMP, it did not subject its national security functions to comprehensive civilian oversight. This has created a disparity between the review mechanisms for CSIS and the RCMP, whereby the RCMP is subject to less rigorous scrutiny.

Recent Events

A series of incidents have drawn attention to the expanded role of the RCMP. American authorities at New York’s Kennedy Airport arrested Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, in September 2002. Mr. Arar was then deported to Syria, where he spent 10 months in captivity and was tortured.(3) It has been reported that the RCMP provided information to the United States that may have contributed to his initial detention.(4) The House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade attempted to clarify this point in a series of hearings in the fall of 2003, but had limited success.(5) However, a public inquiry later found that “it is very likely that, in making the decisions to detain and remove Mr. Arar, American authorities relied on information about Mr. Arar provided by the RCMP.”(6)

In January 2004, RCMP officers used search warrants issued under the Security of Information Act (SOIA) to raid the home and office of Ottawa Citizen reporter Juliet O’Neill. It was reported that they were “looking for evidence that one of their own officers may have leaked damaging allegations in the … Maher Arar case.”(7) Following this event, the Ontario Court of Justice ruled that sections 4(1)(a), 4(3) and 4(4)(b) of the SOIA violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and ordered that the seized items be returned to Ms. O’Neill. The court also found that the issuance and execution of the warrants constituted an abuse of process by the RCMP, and ordered that they be quashed.(8) The Government of Canada decided not to appeal the court’s decision.(9)

Also in January 2004, the Government of Canada announced a public inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials dealing with the deportation and detention of Mr. Arar (O’Connor Commission). The terms of reference were issued the following month, and included a mandate for the presiding judge to “make any recommendations that he considers advisable on an independent, arm’s length review mechanism for the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police with respect to national security.”(10)

On 18 September 2006, Commissioner O’Connor issued his findings on the handling of the Arar case, repeatedly criticizing the RCMP’s conduct. Specifically, he found that the organization had breached its own policies on information sharing, provided American authorities with inaccurate information about Mr. Arar, given unclear and misleading direction to its own investigators, failed to properly oversee its own investigation of Mr. Arar, refused to support efforts by the Government of Canada to secure Mr. Arar’s release from jail in Syria, and when briefing the Privy Council Office and other senior government officials had omitted key facts that could have reflected adversely on the Force.(11)

Review Mechanisms for Canada's Security and Intelligence Agencies

A. RCMP

The RCMP is Canada’s national police service. It came into existence in 1920 when the Royal North West Mounted Police and the Dominion Police were merged into a single entity. The RCMP was involved in the provision of security intelligence services to the Government of Canada during World War II. Its security operations were expanded after the war with the establishment of the Special Branch (1950), the Directorate of Security and Intelligence (1962), and the Security Service (1970). In 1984, Parliament disbanded the RCMP Security Service and transferred its functions to the newly created CSIS.

The RCMP now provides federal police services throughout the country. In addition, the organization also provides services to provinces, territories, municipalities and First Nations communities on a contract basis. Passage of the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001 provided an opportunity for the RCMP to be more involved in matters of national security, as this law defined terrorist support as a criminal offence.

The Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (Commission) was established by Parliament in 1988. It is an independent civilian body that reports publicly to Parliament through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The Commission investigates public complaints regarding the conduct of RCMP members. In most cases, complainants must first approach the RCMP. However, the Commission Chair does have limited authority to commence his or her own investigation or may proceed directly to a public interest hearing. The RCMP is not obligated to follow recommendations made by the Chair or by a public interest hearing panel.

Shirley Heafey, former Commission Chair, repeatedly called for new powers to better enable the Commission to review the RCMP’s anti-terrorism activities. This call has been echoed by her successor, Paul Kennedy. A rebalancing of the relationship between the RCMP and the Commission might also preclude further litigation between the two bodies regarding the sharing of information.

B. Canadian Security Intelligence Service

CSIS is a civilian agency that does not have any law enforcement powers. Its role is to “investigate threats, analyze information and produce intelligence”(13) and it may gather information only on those individuals and organizations suspected of engaging in espionage and sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, political violence and terrorism, and subversion. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act prohibits the organization from investigating lawful acts of advocacy, protest or dissent.

To ensure an appropriate level of accountability, CSIS activities are subject to scrutiny by an Inspector General. Appointed by Cabinet, and answering to a deputy minister, the Inspector General is to be “the Minister’s eyes and ears in the Service … and to maintain an appropriate degree of ministerial responsibility.”(14) The Inspector General is charged with monitoring compliance with operational policies, reviewing operational activities, and evaluating reports provided by the Director of CSIS to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

The Inspector General does not accept public complaints. However, he or she may conduct research and inquiries at the request of the Minister or the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). The Inspector General is entitled to have access to all CSIS information except Cabinet documents. However, he or she may not convene public hearings or make binding recommendations. In certain cases, the Inspector General’s reports are conveyed through the Minister to SIRC.

SIRC is an independent, external review body that reports publicly to Parliament through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness on an annual basis. It is empowered to examine CSIS’s performance of its duties and functions, and to investigate complaints made by any person regarding any act performed by the organization. SIRC is entitled to have access to all information held by CSIS and the Inspector General except Cabinet documents, but cannot hold public hearings or make binding recommendations.

C. Communications Security Establishment

The CSE was established in 1946. Originally, it was the Communications Branch of the National Research Council. In 1975, however, it was transferred to the Department of National Defence.

The role of the CSE is to “provide the Government of Canada with two key services: foreign signals intelligence in support of defence and foreign policy, and the protection of electronic information and communication.”(15) This role is set out in the National Defence Act.

The Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner was created in June 1996. The Commissioner is independent and has authority to review CSE activities to ensure they comply with Canadian law, and investigate complaints against the agency. Although the National Defence Act empowers the Commissioner to undertake any investigation that he or she considers necessary in response to a complaint, only complaints made by Canadian citizens and permanent residents, including CSE employees, are accepted at present. The Commissioner has access to all CSE information holdings; however, he or she may not convene public hearings or issue binding recommendations.

The Commissioner submits an annual report to the Minister of National Defence that is tabled in Parliament. Results of reviews of certain CSE activities are also submitted to the Minister; these, however, are not made public as they contain secret information.

Options for Oversight of the RCMP's National Security Functions

A. Strengthening the Role of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP

The table above points to a number of similarities between the Commission and SIRC. Both operate independently, receive public complaints, and have the power to initiate and conduct their own investigations, and to make recommendations. Key differences remain, however.

First, SIRC has a broader mandate. The Commission is devoted to receiving and investigating complaints of misconduct made by members of the public, while SIRC is charged with reviewing the performance by CSIS of all of its duties and functions. The receipt and investigation of complaints, while important, is but one part of a much larger oversight function.

Second, SIRC has broader powers to carry out its mandate. The most important of these is the right of access to information. The Commission may have access only to information held by the RCMP that is relevant to a particular complaint, and this has caused disagreement between the two organizations. SIRC, however, is entitled to all information held by CSIS and the Inspector General, except Cabinet documents.

There is a certain logic to the arguments that favour an expansion of the Commission’s role over the establishment of a second review mechanism. After all, the Commission is well established, already familiar with the RCMP’s duties, functions and organizational culture, and known to the public. In the second report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Commissioner O’Connor recommended that the Commission be restructured and renamed the Independent Complaints and National Security Review Agency for the RCMP (ICRA).(16) The ICRA would have jurisdiction to review all of the RCMP’s activities, including those related to national security.(17) Specifically, the Commissioner recommended that the ICRA have the authority to conduct self-initiated reviews using comprehensive new powers including the power to decide what information is necessary to fulfil its mandate, and to subpoena documents and compel testimony from any federal, provincial, municipal or private sector person or entity.(18)

B. Establishing a New Review Mechanism for the RCMP

Alternatively, the Government of Canada could opt for a two-tiered review mechanism for the RCMP. This mechanism could take a variety of forms, including:

1. retaining the Commission in its present form (i.e., primarily a complaint review mechanism) while granting a new agency powers to review the RCMP’s national security functions;
2. maintaining the Commission as a review mechanism for most complaints while granting a new agency powers to review the RCMP’s national security functions and process a limited number of complaints (i.e., only complaints of misconduct against RCMP personnel involved in investigating matters of national security);
3. abolishing the Commission and adopting the model used to review CSIS’s activities (i.e., an Inspector General or equivalent plus an oversight committee).

It is suggested that in the event that a two-tiered model is selected, care will have to be taken to ensure that the roles of the two agencies are complementary.
C. Leaving the Existing Review Mechanism for the RCMP Unchanged

Finally, the Government of Canada could opt to leave the existing structures in place. After all, the mandate of the Commission does not preclude it from investigating complaints of misconduct against RCMP personnel involved in investigating matters of national security. While the Commission’s oversight powers are more limited than those of either SIRC or the CSE Commissioner, most of the federal departments and agencies with national security functions currently operate without scrutiny by any review mechanism. Nonetheless, the RCMP’s apparent reluctance to fully cooperate with the Commission where matters of national security are involved,(19) coupled with the recommendations of the O’Connor Commission, make the status quo an unlikely choice.

*References cited can be viewed at the source document at:
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0409-e.htm