*** And Canada has nothing like this - absolutely nothing. We're still stuck in the past thinking that we can arrest the problem away. What will it take for us to wake up and realize we should be PROACTIVE with this issue? MS ***
FROM: http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/100719/world/eu_germany_islamic_extremists
BERLIN - Germany's domestic intelligence service on Monday started a program for Islamist radicals who want to quit extremism, an initiative under which people will be offered help finding new jobs and moving home.
A spokeswoman for the agency, who was talking on condition of anonymity in line with agency policy, declined to say how much money had been allocated or how many employees were working for the program.
However, she said the agency would guarantee confidentiality to users, and also help with safety measures if people seeking to quit are threatened by radicals.
"Our program is an offer for those who want to leave extremism behind," she said. "Once we find out what their needs are, we will develop the program accordingly."
The intelligence service estimates there are more than 36,000 Islamist extremists in Germany, but only a fraction of those are considered potentially violent. The Muslim population in Germany is estimated to be between 3.8 million and 4.3 million — meaning Muslims make up between 4.6 and 5.2 per cent of the population.
The program, which is called HATIF — meaning phone in Arabic — also is aimed at family members or friends of people who have come under influence of extremists.
They can contact members of the intelligence service online or call a specific number. The service is offered in German, Turkish and Arabic.
Germany has not seen a large-scale terror attack, but in recent years, there have been attempts to commit attacks on public transportation and U.S. military bases.
Countries like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Singapore have also implemented deradicalization programs in recent years, but they mainly work with convicted terrorists in prisons, while Germany tries to reach out to extremists before they commit a crime, said Peter Neumann, an expert from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence in London. He said there are no similar programs in other European countries so far.
"We know that in almost all of these groups, there are people who want to leave, but it is not easy to get out of such an environment," he said. "Therefore it is great that Germany makes this offer — even though this definitely won't lead to the end of radical Islam in Germany."
Showing posts with label deradicalization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label deradicalization. Show all posts
Monday, July 19, 2010
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS SHOW PROMISE
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/07/100702194140.htm
Prison-based programs to de-radicalize terrorists show promise, if well-run, says a new joint report from U.S. and British researchers. Their initial findings -- the most comprehensive to date, based on programs in 15 nations -- were presented at a conference this week.
Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalization and De-radicalization in Countries is a joint report of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based at the University of Maryland, and the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), based at Kings College in London.
The report concludes that individual de-radicalization and disengagement programs, such as those in Saudi-Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia and other nations, "can make a difference." The researchers say their work could have policy implications for prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq.
"This is a much bigger issue than most people appreciate," says University of Maryland professor and START Director Gary LaFree. "It's a classic problem really. Prisons change behavior for both good and for bad. It's difficult to detain prisoners forever, but when is it safe to let them go?"
The final report will be presented in Washington, D.C. this fall.
"Initial results indicate that the programs can work, though probably not 100 percent of the time," LaFree adds. "Just as with regular criminals, individual and community supports help combat recidivism. But with terrorism and ideology there's an added dimension. In general, it's easier to de-radicalize when a movement is on the decline, when the battle seems lost."
Key Findings And Recommendations
The report identifies principles and best practices to help governments and policymakers avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes. These include:
* Prison services should be more ambitious in promoting positive influences inside prison, and develop more innovative approaches to facilitate extremists' transition back into mainstream society. The current emphasis on security and containment of terrorists leads to missed opportunities to promote reform.
* Over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions that lend themselves to radicalization. Badly run prisons make the detection of radicalization difficult, and they also create the physical and ideological space in which extremist recruiters can operate freely.
* Religious conversion is not the same as radicalization. Good counter-radicalization policies -- whether in or outside prison -- never fail to distinguish between legitimate expression of faith and extremist ideologies. Prison services should invest more in staff training and consider sharing specialized resources.
* Individual de-radicalization and disengagement programs -- such as those in Saudi-Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia, and other countries -- can make a difference. Their positive and outward-looking approach should serve as an inspiration for governments and policymakers everywhere.
* Even in the best circumstances, de-radicalization and disengagement programs complement rather than replace other instruments in the fight against terrorism. They work best when the political momentum is no longer with the terrorists or insurgents.
The report was made possible by funding from the governments of Australia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It is based on research by 16 of the world's leading terrorism experts. START is funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and is based at the University of Maryland.
A copy of the preliminary report is available online at: http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf
Prison-based programs to de-radicalize terrorists show promise, if well-run, says a new joint report from U.S. and British researchers. Their initial findings -- the most comprehensive to date, based on programs in 15 nations -- were presented at a conference this week.
Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalization and De-radicalization in Countries is a joint report of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based at the University of Maryland, and the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), based at Kings College in London.
The report concludes that individual de-radicalization and disengagement programs, such as those in Saudi-Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia and other nations, "can make a difference." The researchers say their work could have policy implications for prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq.
"This is a much bigger issue than most people appreciate," says University of Maryland professor and START Director Gary LaFree. "It's a classic problem really. Prisons change behavior for both good and for bad. It's difficult to detain prisoners forever, but when is it safe to let them go?"
The final report will be presented in Washington, D.C. this fall.
"Initial results indicate that the programs can work, though probably not 100 percent of the time," LaFree adds. "Just as with regular criminals, individual and community supports help combat recidivism. But with terrorism and ideology there's an added dimension. In general, it's easier to de-radicalize when a movement is on the decline, when the battle seems lost."
Key Findings And Recommendations
The report identifies principles and best practices to help governments and policymakers avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes. These include:
* Prison services should be more ambitious in promoting positive influences inside prison, and develop more innovative approaches to facilitate extremists' transition back into mainstream society. The current emphasis on security and containment of terrorists leads to missed opportunities to promote reform.
* Over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions that lend themselves to radicalization. Badly run prisons make the detection of radicalization difficult, and they also create the physical and ideological space in which extremist recruiters can operate freely.
* Religious conversion is not the same as radicalization. Good counter-radicalization policies -- whether in or outside prison -- never fail to distinguish between legitimate expression of faith and extremist ideologies. Prison services should invest more in staff training and consider sharing specialized resources.
* Individual de-radicalization and disengagement programs -- such as those in Saudi-Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia, and other countries -- can make a difference. Their positive and outward-looking approach should serve as an inspiration for governments and policymakers everywhere.
* Even in the best circumstances, de-radicalization and disengagement programs complement rather than replace other instruments in the fight against terrorism. They work best when the political momentum is no longer with the terrorists or insurgents.
The report was made possible by funding from the governments of Australia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It is based on research by 16 of the world's leading terrorism experts. START is funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and is based at the University of Maryland.
A copy of the preliminary report is available online at: http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf
Sunday, January 10, 2010
RADICALIZATION & DERADICALIZATION IN YEMEN
*** The problem with this program was that the "graduates" were all persuaded not to commit acts of terrorism inside Yemen. That left the door open for these guys to go elsewhere instead of Yemen being accused of becoming a terrorist haven: oops, too late!
Don't dismiss deradicalization; it saved me from going down the wrong path and it is a very important tool - one among of a number of tools we should have in the toolbox. MS ***
FROM: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126299677407522423.html?mod=rss_whats_news_us
SAN'A, Yemen -- As Yemeni security forces mobilize against al Qaeda, Hamoud Al Hitar, minister of Islamic Endowment, is advocating what he says is a better way of curing the country of its Islamist militants: rehab.
Mr. Hitar ran a government-sponsored militant-rehabilitation program from 2002 to 2005, with mixed results. He says he successfully pacified hundreds of militant Islamist detainees by using the Quran to teach the fallacies of extremist ideology.
U.S. officials, however, criticized the program's effectiveness after American forces in Iraq started detaining some Yemeni graduates.
Nasser al Bahri, a management consultant who was once a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden and spent more than a decade in the ranks of al Qaeda, was a graduate of Mr. Hitar's program. He says a beefed-up program could do good, but the version Mr. Hitar ran was ineffective -- in part because many fellow prisoners pretended to have changed their ways simply to be let out of jail.
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has recently asked for more international assistance in its military fight against terrorism, as well as financing to build a secure facility for terrorist suspects and a rehab program for those willing to join.
Washington this month said it will double aid to Yemen to combat terrorism, in the wake of the alleged attempt to down a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day. The alleged attempt has been linked to the Yemen-based branch of al Qaeda.
For now, President Saleh is relying heavily on his military options. Yemeni forces launched two major military attacks against multiple, suspected al Qaeda strongholds across the country on Dec. 17 and Dec. 24. Government officials say those operations were based on intelligence showing that al Qaeda had prepared eight suicide attacks against foreign and Yemeni targets in San'a, the capital.
Yemeni officials have said at least 30 al Qaeda members died and scores more were arrested in the two December attacks.
This week, Yemeni forces launched what U.S. officials called a successful antiterrorism operation that allowed Washington to reopen its embassy, which had closed for two days because of an al Qaeda threat.
Mr. Hitar says the military operations, no matter how successful, won't accomplish much unless they are backed by a program to change the ideology al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers in the country.
"Force alone is not enough to defeat al Qaeda," says Mr. Hitar. He says his program rehabilitated approximately 340 former militant Islamists. "We must have a program of religious dialog. This must be a top priority, as it is the best way to cure the wrong ideas."
U.S. and Yemeni officials agree that some sort of rehabilitation program could be attractive. A credible program here could make it easier to eventually transfer the 100 or so Yemeni detainees still at Guantanamo Bay.
One solution being discussed by U.S., Saudi and Yemeni officials is the construction of a high-security facility in Yemen to receive repatriated Guantanamo detainees, according to U.S. and Saudi officials.
Both Washington and Saudi Arabia, Yemen's largest donor, have balked at paying for such a facility in Yemen. That is mainly because of fear of political fallout if such a facility were to become seen as a new Guantanamo Bay in the Middle East, according to U.S. and Saudi officials.
Such a facility, if realized, could incorporate a rehab program modeled off a similar program Saudi Arabia has run for years.
The Saudi program also uses the Quran to argue against extremism. But it has a trump card: Riyadh gives participants substantial financial assistance to help them readjust into society.
The economic issue is key to Yemen's challenge in shutting down al Qaeda -- not just in re-educating militants, but in preventing militancy. Yemen's weak central government, with its limited financial resources, has embittered many residents of the country's impoverished, rugged tribal regions, and al Qaeda has leveraged this resentment to expand its thriving network of militants.
Mr. Bahri, the former bin Laden bodyguard, says he joined Mr. Hitar's program in 2002 to escape a jail swollen with militants.
He says the theological discussions that the program used to dissuade participants from extremism were "weak."
Mr. Bahri says he had a genuine change of heart about condoning violence -- a philosophical evolution that he says happened independently from Mr. Hitar's program.
He says he waited four years before he received a government stipend promised to him upon leaving jail, after he agreed not take up arms again. He says that he never received promised government assistance in dealing with the psychological problems of adjusting to normal Yemeni life.
Don't dismiss deradicalization; it saved me from going down the wrong path and it is a very important tool - one among of a number of tools we should have in the toolbox. MS ***
FROM: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126299677407522423.html?mod=rss_whats_news_us
SAN'A, Yemen -- As Yemeni security forces mobilize against al Qaeda, Hamoud Al Hitar, minister of Islamic Endowment, is advocating what he says is a better way of curing the country of its Islamist militants: rehab.
Mr. Hitar ran a government-sponsored militant-rehabilitation program from 2002 to 2005, with mixed results. He says he successfully pacified hundreds of militant Islamist detainees by using the Quran to teach the fallacies of extremist ideology.
U.S. officials, however, criticized the program's effectiveness after American forces in Iraq started detaining some Yemeni graduates.
Nasser al Bahri, a management consultant who was once a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden and spent more than a decade in the ranks of al Qaeda, was a graduate of Mr. Hitar's program. He says a beefed-up program could do good, but the version Mr. Hitar ran was ineffective -- in part because many fellow prisoners pretended to have changed their ways simply to be let out of jail.
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has recently asked for more international assistance in its military fight against terrorism, as well as financing to build a secure facility for terrorist suspects and a rehab program for those willing to join.
Washington this month said it will double aid to Yemen to combat terrorism, in the wake of the alleged attempt to down a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day. The alleged attempt has been linked to the Yemen-based branch of al Qaeda.
For now, President Saleh is relying heavily on his military options. Yemeni forces launched two major military attacks against multiple, suspected al Qaeda strongholds across the country on Dec. 17 and Dec. 24. Government officials say those operations were based on intelligence showing that al Qaeda had prepared eight suicide attacks against foreign and Yemeni targets in San'a, the capital.
Yemeni officials have said at least 30 al Qaeda members died and scores more were arrested in the two December attacks.
This week, Yemeni forces launched what U.S. officials called a successful antiterrorism operation that allowed Washington to reopen its embassy, which had closed for two days because of an al Qaeda threat.
Mr. Hitar says the military operations, no matter how successful, won't accomplish much unless they are backed by a program to change the ideology al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers in the country.
"Force alone is not enough to defeat al Qaeda," says Mr. Hitar. He says his program rehabilitated approximately 340 former militant Islamists. "We must have a program of religious dialog. This must be a top priority, as it is the best way to cure the wrong ideas."
U.S. and Yemeni officials agree that some sort of rehabilitation program could be attractive. A credible program here could make it easier to eventually transfer the 100 or so Yemeni detainees still at Guantanamo Bay.
One solution being discussed by U.S., Saudi and Yemeni officials is the construction of a high-security facility in Yemen to receive repatriated Guantanamo detainees, according to U.S. and Saudi officials.
Both Washington and Saudi Arabia, Yemen's largest donor, have balked at paying for such a facility in Yemen. That is mainly because of fear of political fallout if such a facility were to become seen as a new Guantanamo Bay in the Middle East, according to U.S. and Saudi officials.
Such a facility, if realized, could incorporate a rehab program modeled off a similar program Saudi Arabia has run for years.
The Saudi program also uses the Quran to argue against extremism. But it has a trump card: Riyadh gives participants substantial financial assistance to help them readjust into society.
The economic issue is key to Yemen's challenge in shutting down al Qaeda -- not just in re-educating militants, but in preventing militancy. Yemen's weak central government, with its limited financial resources, has embittered many residents of the country's impoverished, rugged tribal regions, and al Qaeda has leveraged this resentment to expand its thriving network of militants.
Mr. Bahri, the former bin Laden bodyguard, says he joined Mr. Hitar's program in 2002 to escape a jail swollen with militants.
He says the theological discussions that the program used to dissuade participants from extremism were "weak."
Mr. Bahri says he had a genuine change of heart about condoning violence -- a philosophical evolution that he says happened independently from Mr. Hitar's program.
He says he waited four years before he received a government stipend promised to him upon leaving jail, after he agreed not take up arms again. He says that he never received promised government assistance in dealing with the psychological problems of adjusting to normal Yemeni life.
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