Mubin Shaikh - The Toronto 18 Terrorism Investigation & Related News

A new generation of political Islamists steps forward

2012-01-21T13:42:00.000-08:00

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/muslim-brotherhood-other-islamists-have-changed-their-worldview/2012/01/10/gIQAZgjoEQ_story.html

A new generation of political Islamists steps forward

By Olivier Roy, Published: January 20

Olivier Roy is a professor at the European University Institute in Florence and the author of “Holy Ignorance.”

Everywhere, the Muslim Brotherhood is benefiting from a democratization it did not trigger. There is a political vacuum because the liberal vanguard that initiated the Arab Spring did not try, and did not want, to take power. This was a revolution without revolutionaries. Yet the Muslim Brothers are the only organized political force. They are rooted in society, and decades of opposition against authoritarian regimes gave them experience, legitimacy and respect. Their conservative agenda fits a conservative society, which may welcome democracy but did not turn liberal.

Under these circumstances, the ghost of a totalitarian Islamic state is raised, with the specter of imposing sharia and closing the short democratic parenthesis. But such an outcome is unlikely.

The Islamists have, in fact, changed: They are more middle-class “bourgeois,” and they benefited from the liberalization of local economies during the last decades of the 20th century, especially in countries with no oil rent. The Islamists have also drawn lessons from the failure of ideological regimes and from the success of Turkey’s AKP party. They are no longer advocating jihad and understand geostrategic constraints, such as the need to maintain peace, even a cold one, with Israel. Realism is the starting point of political wisdom.

The Islamists have been elected with a clear agenda: stability, good governance and a better economy. If they have been able to reach a larger constituency than the hard-core supporters of sharia, it is precisely because they can combine such a reformist agenda while talking about religion, values, identity and tradition. The Nahda party won the majority of the votes cast at the Tunisian consulate of San Francisco, although Tunisian expatriates in Silicon Valley are not known for their Islamic fundamentalism.

This mix of technocratic modernism and conservative values is their brand, and to turn their back on multipartism and legalism would alienate a large portion of their constituency, at a time when they have no means to confiscate power. They have neither military forces nor oil wealth to bypass the people: They have to negotiate and deliver. Their electorate wants stability and peace, not revolution.

They are stepping into a new political landscape: a democracy, although a fledgling and fragile one. The only way to maintain their legitimacy is through elections. Even if their pristine political culture is not democratic, they are formatted by the democratic landscape, much as the Roman Catholic Church ended up accepting democratic institutions. But it will take time.

Another important change, if we refer to the “revolutionary” period of the 1970s and 1980s, is that the Muslim Brothers do not monopolize Islam in the public sphere. In fact, the religious revival that has engulfed Arab societies led to a diversification and an individualization of the religious field. Religious state institutions such as Al Azhar, so recently discredited, are regaining autonomy after so recently being discredited. Al Azhar’s dean, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayyeb, openly spoke in favor of democracy and of separating religious institutions from the state. A new phenomenon is the decision of the Salafis, an ultraconservative Sunni sect, to establish political parties. On the one hand they will push for a more Islamic agenda, trying to outbid the Muslim Brothers on Islam, but this will force the Brotherhood to clarify its own position and to find a way to distance itself from the call for sharia.

To do that, the Muslim Brothers have to turn purely Islamic norms into more universal conservative values — such as limiting the sale and consumption of alcohol in a way that is closer to Utah’s rules than to Saudi laws and promoting “family values” instead of imposing sharia norms on women.

In the coming months the hot issue in Egypt, beyond the status of women, will be religious freedom. Not in the sense that Coptic Christians will have less freedom to practice — there were a lot of limitations under the so-called secular dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak — but in defining religious freedom as not merely a minority right but an individual human right, implying the right to convert from Islam to Christianity.

The issue is institutionalizing democracy, not promoting liberal policies. Democracy could take hold only if it is based in well-established values. Liberalism does not precede democracy; America’s Founding Fathers were not liberal. But once democracy is rooted in institutions and political culture, then the debate on freedom, censorship, social norms and individual rights could be managed through freedom of expression and changes of majorities in parliament. However, there will be no institutionalization of democracy without the Muslim Brothers.

Homegrown Terror Summit at the White House

2012-01-19T08:12:00.000-08:00

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/obama-administration-police-chiefs-violent-extremism_n_1212697.html

*** President Obama showing how its done. A WONDERFUL approach and initiative that will work FAR better than pretending this can be done without the Muslim community. Only one question: where do I sign up? :) *** MS

WASHINGTON — State and local law enforcement officials convened at the White House on Wednesday for a daylong discussion about how police can maintain the trust of their communities while identifying and preventing violent extremism and homegrown terrorism – an effort the administration considers critical to national security.

It's a delicate balance, as the violent extremism that has erupted across the U.S. in the past few years has been motivated by an ideology, whether a violent interpretation of Islam or white supremacist beliefs. Ideologies in and of themselves are not illegal. But police now find themselves struggling with identifying the ideologues who plan to commit violence among the many others who hold similar beliefs but have no intention of hurting anyone.

"Where do you draw the line between what they say and what they do," Cambridge, Mass., Police Commissioner Robert Haas said in an interview during a break. Police can't be seen as violating the trust they've built in local communities to ferret out information that potentially could prevent an attack, he said. Haas was one of the 46 senior federal, state and local law enforcement officials who participated in the event that was closed to the public.

The conference marked the first time the Obama administration hosted a meeting with so many of the nation's top law enforcement executives on how to counter violent extremism.

"The important role of local law enforcement is a key part of the administration's approach to countering violent extremism in the homeland," President Barack Obama's counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan, said. "Law enforcement officials work with communities every day and understand how to build partnerships to address this tough challenge."

There has been an uptick in attempted attacks by Americans and other legal U.S. residents in the past few years, prompting the Obama administration to place a priority on finding ways to stop this type of violence. The administration rolled out a thin strategy last year that put local communities – not Washington – in charge of countering violent extremism in the U.S.

Analysts from the FBI, Homeland Security Department and National Counterterrorism Center studied 62 cases of homegrown violent extremists and identified basic similarities that might help local law enforcement better understand and detect threats. The warning signs identified for police include someone joining a group advocating violence, receiving support from a network that plans attacks or seeking out charismatic leaders who encourage violence. An overview of the findings was shared with the AP.

In the 62 cases reviewed, the subjects increasingly spoke out against the government, blamed the government for perceived problems and did so in a way that caught the attention of other people in their communities, according to the senior counterterrorism official who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the private White House event. Subjects became active on the Internet to espouse extremist views. And in some cases, the subjects purchased weapons, ammunition or explosive materials.

Analysts also found that a person's origin, ethnic background and socioeconomic status are not good indicators for potential violent extremist activity, the senior counterterrorism official said.

That finding is key, as the FBI came under fire last year for some controversial training sessions that focused on Islam and portrayed it as a violent religion. And the New York Police Department also has been criticized for singling out Muslim communities and collecting information about their daily lives, in some cases without any indication of criminal activity.

The White House has encouraged law enforcement to reach out to Muslim communities to build relationships, insisting that these communities are partners in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, law enforcement has stepped up investigative efforts to stave off attacks.

In the decade since the September 2001 attacks, New York government officials have done just that: They've met with Muslim leaders, exchanged cellphone numbers, attended religious services, dinners and teas, and spoken at community meetings. As the only U.S. city that al-Qaida has successfully attacked twice and continues to be the target of terror plots, New York also has the most aggressive local police department investigating terrorism, and this duality of missions has caused tension in the city's Muslim communities, where many people have lost trust in the police and wonder whether they are partners in the fight against terrorism or terror suspects.

While the White House conference did not broach the issues between the NYPD and New York's Muslim community, the consistent message was that police can't violate public trust, Haas said. Communities that have solid relationships with the police feel empowered to come forward with tips about suspicious activity, Haas said.

"We don't want to be seen as taking a step back and violating that trust that we have with folks," he said.

Radicalization and U.S. Muslims

2011-11-20T20:16:00.000-08:00

Radicalization and U.S. Muslims

Interviewee:	Mark Fallon, Senior Vice-President at the Soufan Group, former Special Agent for Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Interviewer:	Jonathan Masters, CFR Associate Staff Writer

March 11, 2011

http://www.cfr.org/counterradicalization/radicalization-us-muslims/p24354

Amid the debate over the threat posed by homegrown Islamic terrorism in the United States, a central aspect is the nature of the Islamic community's cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. Mark Fallon, a thirty-year veteran of federal law enforcement and counterintelligence, says the Muslim community has provided a "significant level of cooperation" in combating terrorism, and worries that the rhetoric from some critics risks alienating a population that "needs to be part of the solution." He says the process of radicalization, or "violent extremism," is usually a function of conditions highly personal to the subject, rather than ideological. Fallon sees engagement with the Muslim community as an essential tool in countering violent extremism.

Radicalization seems to have become a politically loaded buzzword. Could you discuss what the concept means and its significance for law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals?

I prefer violent extremism versus radicalization, because every radical isn't a violent extremist, and every violent extremist may not be a radical. There is a bit of differentiation, as we found in a global study of released terrorists. We found that there are some useful tactics people use around the world that are helping to curb the number of candidates going down the path of violent extremism. And as it pertains to the United States, there are a number of things that we can learn from some of these efforts. One strategy is, and it's something that law enforcement has done for years, community-oriented policing. What police around the globe have learned is that unless you engage the communities and the stakeholders in a coordinated approach to go after crime, and this is crime, your efforts are going to be very challenging. A more aware and educated police officer or agent, who understands and is trained in community-engagement strategies, can certainly go a long way in curbing violent extremism. And actually, the trend of American Muslims engaging in violent extremism is on a downslide right now.

In other words, Muslim radicalization is declining?

The Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, which is a research center with Duke University and the University of North Carolina, published a February 2011 study on Muslim American terrorism and they saw that in 2009, forty-seven Muslim Americans were arrested for terrorist-related crimes. In 2010, that number dropped more than half, to only twenty. In addition, they found that the Muslim American community is very engaged in trying to help law enforcement thwart terrorism. Tips from the Muslim American community were the source of information that led to the prevention of a potential terrorist plots in forty-eight of the 120 cases involving Muslim Americans that they studied. Those are rather significant statistics. So it's a mischaracterization to claim the community is not cooperating.

How are we doing as a nation in terms of deploying this community-policing strategy?

It depends on where you look. We studied some of the strategies in the United Kingdom and in Singapore and some other countries. But in the United States, there are efforts underway in the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. There are new efforts in Minnesota with al-Shabaab and the Somali crisis. But there are also efforts in Detroit with its highly concentrated Muslim population, as well as in New York with NYPD. What we lack, however, is a comprehensive, coordinated strategy that's really based on outcomes. So far, most of the strategies we've turned over to the enforcement agencies are because of the counterterrorist umbrella. Unfortunately, having been a member of that community, when you have a hammer, everything seems to look like a nail. So I don't think we can rely exclusively on these enforcement agencies to coordinate these strategies. We need a comprehensive, multi-discipline approach. And globally, that's where you see more. In the United States, we seem to have limited this to what we're doing with Homeland Security, the FBI, and others. But if we take a fresh look and seek to understand first, and we seek to enhance the knowledge that we have, we can do much better.

What's your characterization of Representative Peter King's hearings on radicalization?

I worry they will have a polarizing effect. Listening to some of the rhetoric, it certainly appears that some of the outcomes may have been pre-judged. I've heard King talk about events that people spoke with him about almost a decade ago--and he's utilizing that to look further. I believe that we need to take a harder look and study this problem. I'm not sure congressional hearings are the best method to do so. I'm afraid it will help polarize the people who are actually assisting law enforcement and who need to be part of the solution. If you look at data from the post- 9/11 database of the Muslim Public Affairs Council [a service organization working for the civil rights of Muslim Americans, and the integration of Islam into American pluralism], they found that the Muslim community helped and assisted law enforcement in 75 percent of all al-Qaeda related plots since December 2009--a remarkable number. This study demonstrates there's a significant level of cooperation out there, and that's just the cooperation that's on the record.

Are the factors for radicalization in the United States different from those in other Western countries, or from Muslim countries?

From the standpoint of the human condition, we all have behaviors and we're all molded by our environment, but the one thing that we found everywhere is that the trigger that turns someone to violence is a very personal one and is usually based on local conditions. The global environment is used to recruit these people, but it's generally some local condition or individual event in that person's life that turns them. It wasn't about ideology; it wasn't about theology; it was about identity. We talked to a wide spectrum of former terrorists--from members of the IRA to Jemaah Islamiyah and Ali Imron, one of the Bali bombers who killed 204 people. In that wide range of groups, sometimes many decades apart, we still found that the decision to pursue violence is generally based on some local factor.

What's the relationship between deradicalization and disengagement?

In our study, we looked at what the different disengagement strategies were when someone was released from prison, and we found that people do not necessarily have to fully abandon their beliefs or deradicalize. They can still believe that something should be a certain way as long as they don't commit violence or criminal acts to further those beliefs. So that's the real key. Once you have loss of property, loss of life, damage to property, where these people are taking action--that's where the problem is. So, the key is getting them to disengage from activities, particularly violent activities.

What's our policy in the United States?

Our study focused on programs abroad, but the U.S. approach appears to be similar to that of France. France relies more on heavy intelligence, on a law enforcement model. Unfortunately, the United States has not put the type of emphasis that it probably needs to on the preventative end of things. Law enforcement can intervene with "sting" operations and so forth, but that's when folks are already heading down a path of violence. The concern is that you might alienate some members of that community. The UK and other countries have a different approach. When they see someone heading down this path, they have intervention strategies, they have education strategies; they can introduce a counter-narrative to the propaganda used by recruiters. They take a more comprehensive approach and a more multidiscipline strategy. Countries like Singapore, they engage the family, they engage the community, and they have folks who help counter the religious argument. So depending on where you go, different countries have different strategies. We found that actually talking to the disaffected population, not alienating them, but having a community-oriented approach and giving individuals the ability to actually talk through their issues was very productive.

Where would you like to see disengagement go in the United States?

One of the first things we need to do is enhance our knowledge development at the state and local levels. It's local police officers who live in these communities and who have a pulse of what's going on. They're at the front lines and are the ones the families of extremists are going to come to. In our research, we went into mosques and community centers, and interviewed the people. They all shared the same concerns, whether it's jobs, education, parenting, and so forth. In some cases, we actually spoke to terrorists, and they indicated a susceptibility to dissuasion from violence if you catch them at the right time. So what we have to implement are comprehensive strategies so we can give members of these communities the ability to divert these hopes when they're headed down the wrong path, and before it's too late.

Feds willing to expand CSIS mandate

2011-11-16T07:12:00.000-08:00

*** FINALLY! MS ***

What started as speculation a week or so ago, is now cemented as fact: The Harper government is willing (maybe eager) to expand the mandate of CSIS to include intelligence gathering in foreign countries.

The media has been exploring this possibility which the National Post’s(itls) John Ivison says will likely cause “great wailing and gnashing of teeth” from Canada’s Opposition parties, and from CSIS’ watchdog, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which worries about CSIS dabbling in anything except domestic issues.

Now that SIRC’s boss, oncologist Dr. Arthur Porter, has resigned over his curious relations with a notorious international lobbyist and his ties with the President of Sierre Leone, the way is clear for change.

In fact, Canada needs to modernize its security service, which has had to evolve from mostly detecting and neutralizing Soviet espionage during the Cold War, to dealing with terrorism (which is an international phenomenon as well as a domestic concern) and increased intelligence (spying) activities of China.

The record of CSIS has not been without controversy.

Until CSIS came into being in 1984, after the McDonald Commission lambasted the RCMP Security Service and recommended that intelligence and police work be separate and independent entities.

Until CSIS, RCMP Security had been pretty effective at keeping track of KGB and GRU elements intent on spying and subverting Canada. RCMP Security was always crippled because successive governments in the 1950s through the 1970s (mostly Liberal) were reluctant to prosecute spies.

Instead, Soviet spies were usually sent back to the USSR -- a policy that frustrated RCMP counter-intelligence officers, who were more effective than people realized, had only politicians not interfered.

Things turned sour for the RCMP during the Trudeau years, when the PM declared the Soviet Union was a “friend,” and that the KGB performed duties similar to those of the RCMP. Nonsense, but that was Trudeau.

Arguably the biggest gaffe the RCMP made in the ‘70s was removing the country’s most experienced counter-intelligence chief -- civilian Jim Bennett -- as a suspect Soviet “mole.”

For the next 20 years Bennett was under a cloud, until cleared and given an apology in Parliament and modest financial compensation for the error. The “real” mole turned out to be the late Sgt. Gilles Brunet, son of deputy RCMP Commissioner J.J. Brunet (the first head of Security and Intelligence) and therefore above suspicion. Brunet’s tombstone is decorated with a carved martini glass.

CSIS was mostly a collection of amateurs when it took over security obligations from the RCMP. It notably screwed up in the inquiry into Air India bombing that killed 329 (280 of them Canadian citizens), when CSIS inexplicably destroyed some interview tapes. The RCMP complained that CSIS gathered information by illegal means that could not be used in court.

That was then, this is now.

CSIS is still essentially a defensive intelligence organization, even though it is popularly (and misleadingly) referred to as a “spy” agency.

One of the problems RCMP Security always had with allies, was that it had no espionage service. The British had MI6 (spying) and MI5 (Security), while the U.S. had the CIA (overseas spying) and the FBI (domestic security). The RCMP was a one-armed security intelligence service – no spying or espionage, so little to trade for information.

Contrary to some views, the CSIS Act enables the agency to collect security intelligence anywhere in the world that threatens Canada. It is not supposed to dabble in “foreign” intelligence – political or economic activities -- that don’t threaten or apply to Canada.

This may be changing. Already CSIS has tried, with limited success, to alert the government to Chinese intelligence gathering and subversive activities within Canada – and has been publicly criticized for warning that some Chinese-Canadians in government jobs may be controlled by Beijing.

Also, Chinese subversion among Chinese communities in Canada worry CSIS, but tend to be ignored by government -- especially vulnerable minority governments. Falun Gong supporters (practicing non-political, benign meditation) routinely document China’s subversion in their ranks. With a majority government, perhaps Conservatives will now take heed.

Former diplomat Charles Burton has remarked on suspicions that Chinese employees of the Canadian embassy in Beijing work for the Chinese security forces. Wow! That’s news? Of course they do!

When the RCMP was in charge of security, they not only caught Soviet diplomats indulging in espionage, but periodically caught Canadian staff at our embassies being coerced, blackmailed or bribed into espionage.

Today, terrorism is the greatest international threat to Canada and the West. If CSIS needs to expand and coordinate with friendly intelligence agencies, It should be encouraged to move in this direction. CSIS is Canada’s front line defence against terrorism.

It was CSIS, remember, that warned the Chretien government two years before 9/11 it could identify 50 terror groups in Canada, involving 350 operatives. The Chretien government dismissed the report -- and cut the CSIS budget.

CSIS has matured considerably from its beginnings.

It’s our frontline weapon in a silent war, and finally a Canadian government seems to realize it. If it’s not already too late.

Norway Terrorist makes first appearance in court

2011-11-14T18:10:00.000-08:00

* "I am a military commander in the Norwegian resistance movement," he said, and began to question the legitimacy of the court before the judge interrupted him. As in previous hearings, he admitted carrying out the attacks - in which 151 people were also injured - but denied the terror charges. <-- almost EXACTLY what Violently Extreme Jihadists say but instead using terms familiar to them ("I am a soldier of Allah ... " - ALSO accompanied by "I don't accept the legitimacy of this court" ... ) - archenemies YET look how similar they behave ... -- MS *

Norway's Anders Behring Breivik in open court hearing

Journalist Anne Leer said Anders Breivik had no problems looking straight at the survivors of the massacre

The man who confessed to killing 77 people in Norway in July has made his first public appearance in court.

As in previous hearings, Anders Behring Breivik refused to plead guilty - this time in front of his victims' families, survivors of the attacks and reporters.

The 32-year-old right-wing extremist has been in custody since the 22 July attacks in Oslo and at a youth camp on the island of Utoeya.

The date of his trial has been set for 16 April, pending psychiatric tests.

The court extended his period in custody for a further 12 weeks but the judge agreed to gradually relax the conditions of his solitary confinement.

Announcing the trial date, Oslo district court clerk Geir Engebretsen said it depended on whether ongoing psychiatric tests concluded he was fit for trial.

'Calm and professional'

Around 120 people were allowed into the Oslo courtroom, while hundreds more watched the proceedings via video links in overflow rooms.

Journalist Anne Leer who was in the courtroom said the atmosphere had been tense and strange.

Breivik wore a dark suit and appeared very calm and professional. He looked over at those present as he entered the courtroom, she said.

"I am a military commander in the Norwegian resistance movement," he said, and began to question the legitimacy of the court before the judge interrupted him.

As in previous hearings, he admitted carrying out the attacks - in which 151 people were also injured - but denied the terror charges.

'Nervous and weakened'

He has said in earlier hearings that the massacre was "necessary" to save Norway and Europe from Muslims and multiculturalism.

One of those who witnessed his shooting spree on Utoeya was 20-year-old Bjoern Ihle from Oslo.

"He aimed at me on Utoeya island. That was the last time I saw him," he told Reuters news agency after the hearing.

"It is good to see he was powerless, which he was not then... He looked nervous and weakened."

The police had requested that Breivik address his remand hearings via a video link from prison, but this was rejected by Norway's supreme court on Friday, allowing his court appearances to be held in public.

Breivik has admitted that, disguised as a police officer, he planted a car bomb that exploded close to government offices, killing eight people.

He then drove to the island of Utoeya where the ruling Labour Party's youth movement was hosting a summer camp.

In a shooting spree that lasted more than an hour, he killed 69 people - mostly teenagers.

The attacks have traumatised Norway, which is seen as one of the most politically stable and tolerant countries in Europe.

Angry over spying, Muslims say: 'Don't call NYPD'

2011-11-14T10:23:00.000-08:00

http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_6716/contentdetail.htm?full=true&contentguid=IMHSO0pZ&detailindex=3#display

NEW YORK (AP) - Fed up with a decade of police spying on the innocuous details of the daily lives of Muslims, activists in New York are discouraging people from going directly to the police with their concerns about terrorism, a campaign that is certain to further strain relations between the two groups.

Muslim community leaders are openly teaching people how to identify police informants, encouraging them to always talk to a lawyer before speaking with the authorities and reminding people already working with law enforcement that they have the right to change their minds. Some members of the community have planned a demonstration for next week.

Some government officials point to this type of outreach as proof that Muslims aren't cooperating in the fight against terrorism, justifying the aggressive spy tactics, while many in the Muslim community view it as a way to protect themselves from getting snared in a secret police effort to catch terrorists.

As a result, one of America's largest Muslim communities - in a city that's been attacked twice and targeted more than a dozen times - is caught in a downward spiral of distrust with the nation's largest police department: The New York City Police Department spies on Muslims, which makes them less likely to trust police. That reinforces the belief that the community is secretive and insular, a key reason that current and former NYPD officials cite for spying in the first place.

The outreach campaign follows an Associated Press investigation that revealed the NYPD had dispatched plainclothes officers to eavesdrop in Muslim communities, often without any evidence of wrongdoing. Restaurants serving Muslims were identified and photographed. Hundreds of mosques were investigated, and dozens were infiltrated. Police used the information to build ethnic databases on daily life inside Muslim neighborhoods.

Many of these programs were developed with the help of the CIA.

At a recent "Know Your Rights" session for Brooklyn College students, someone asked why Muslims who don't have anything to hide should avoid talking to police.

"Most of the time it's a fishing expedition," answered Ramzi Kassem, a law professor at the City University of New York, who supervises an advocacy organization that does such community presentations. "So the safest thing you can do for yourself, your family, and for your community is not to answer."

New York Republican Rep. Peter King said this kind of reaction from the Muslim community is "disgraceful."

Muslim groups have previously organized educational programs around the country describing a person's legal rights, such as when they must present identification to a police officer and when they can refuse to answer police questions. A California chapter of a national Muslim organization posted a poster on its website that warned Muslims not to talk to the FBI. The national organization ultimately asked the California branch to remove the poster from the website.

In New York, the AP stories about the NYPD and internal police documents have outraged some Muslims and provided evidence of tactics that they suspected were being used to watch them all along. These disclosures have intensified the outreach campaigns in New York.

A recently distributed brochure from an advocacy organization at the City University of New York Law School warns people to be wary when confronted by someone who advocates violence against the U.S., discusses terror organizations, is overly generous or is aggressive in their interactions. The brochure said that person could be a police informant.

"Be very careful about involving the police," the brochure said. "If the individual is an informant, the police may not do anything ... If the individual is not an informant and you report them, the unintended consequences could be devastating."

Sweeping skepticism of police affects community relations at all levels of law enforcement on a wide range of issues, not just the NYPD's counterterrorism programs. Interactions with a real terror operative could go unreported to law enforcement out of an assumption that the operative is actually working for the NYPD. A victim of domestic abuse or street violence may not trust the police enough to call for help.

Retired New York FBI agent Don Borelli said intelligence gathering is key to police work, not just in terrorism cases. But he said it can backfire when people feel their rights are being violated.

"When they do, these kinds of programs are actually counterproductive, because they undermine trust and drive a wedge between the community and police," said Borelli, now a security consultant with the Soufan Group.

Kassem said the activists' presentations are intended to "inform citizens about their legal rights when law enforcement comes to their doorstep." He said the goal is not to dissuade citizens from contacting authorities when they have concerns about a crime.

Since the 2001 terror attacks, the NYPD, city government officials and federal law enforcement have spent years building relationships with the New York Muslim community, assuring many Muslims that they are considered partners in the city's fight against terrorism. But in some cases, community members who have been hailed as partners and even dined with Mayor Michael Bloomberg were secretly followed by the NYPD or worked in mosques that the department had infiltrated, according to secret NYPD documents obtained by the AP.

"There's not a reference here to the fact that New York is the No. 1 target of Islamic terrorists, that the NYPD and the FBI have protected New York," King said, referring to one of the recent brochures about detecting police informants.

King, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, has held a series of hearings about the threat of radicalization within American Muslim communities and the level of cooperation members of the community provide to law enforcement. Muslim and civil rights advocacy groups have decried the hearings and pointed to terror cases around the country in which members of the Muslim community helped law enforcement foil plots.

New York Muslim community groups say they've held dozens of meetings for people who are worried about police surveillance and the NYPD's counterterrorism programs. In one instance, an audience of college students watched as a law student played out the role of a police informant and another played the role of the person the informant was targeting. The goal was to teach people to spot informants.

"Stay away from these people. That's one of the most powerful things you can do," said Robin Gordon-Leavitt, a member of an advocacy organization Creating Law Enforcement Accountability and Responsibility.

At another meeting, organized by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, students watched a film of two actors portraying FBI agents talking their way into a young Muslim's home and interrogating him. At the meeting, students were warned not to speak with police even if their parents, imams or Muslim clerics urge them to cooperate.

"You'll even hear imams saying, 'As long as I obey the law, I have nothing to worry about.' But that's not how it plays out on the ground," said Cyrus McGoldrick, CAIR New York's civil rights manager.

CAIR has had a strained relationship with law enforcement and was named an unindicted co-conspirator in a terrorist financing case.

The Muslim community wants an independent commission to investigate all NYPD and CIA operations in the Muslim community.

___

*** What failure of "outreach" looks like. Ten years after 9/11 - 5 years after the Toronto 18 case and STILL the efforts to really bridge the divide are woefully inadequate. I wonder who we should blame first if - God Forbid - an attack was successful. VERY frustrating knowing that so much needs to be done but not govt. and not Muslim community are doing enough. MS ***

Shabab urges attacks in Canada

2011-11-04T11:38:00.000-07:00

http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/10/30/new-al-shabab-message-urges-terrorist-attacks-against-canada/

Al-Shabab suicide bomber urges terrorist attacks against Canada

Abdurashid Abdulle/AFP/Getty Images/Files

Islamist fighters loyal to Somalia's Al-Qaida inspired al-Shebab group perform drills near Mogadishu in February 2011

Stewart Bell Oct 30, 2011 – 9:47 AM ET | Last Updated: Oct 31, 2011 9:54 AM ET

TORONTO — The al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab released an audiotape Sunday it said was a message from a Somali-American suicide bomber who struck an African Union base in Mogadishu this weekend, killing 10.

The English-language message specifically called for terrorist attacks in Canada and said it was a duty for Muslims to fight for Islam, urging listeners not to “just sit around and be a couch potato and just chill all day.”

“My brothers and sisters, do jihad in America, do jihad in Canada, do jihad in England [and] anywhere in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in China, in Australia – anywhere you find kuffar [infidels],” it says.

“Fight them and be firm against them.”

The message appears to be the latest attempt by Al-Shabab to incite Western youths. Canadian authorities are investigating as many as 20 Canadians who are suspected of having joined the Islamist extremist group.

On March 29, police arrested a man at Pearson airport as he was allegedly leaving Canada to join Al-Shabab. Mohamed Hassan Hersi, 25, faces two terrorism-related charges but was released on bail.

A prominent Somali-Canadian leader told a U.S. congressional committee in Washington earlier this year that Canada was not doing enough to tackle the poisonous ideology of extremists.

“This dangerous and constant anti-Western narrative is fed to them by radicals in our community who do not hesitate to use these vulnerable youth as gun fodder in their desire to establish a base for the al-Qaeda terrorist group in Somalia,” Canadian Somali Congress president Ahmed Hussein testified.

Canada outlawed Al-Shabab last year due to concerns it was recruiting young Somali-Canadians. In one high-profile case, six youths left Toronto in 2009. An extremist website later reported one of them, a University of Toronto student, had been killed in battle.

National Post
sbell@nationalpost.com

*** The current policy of govt. to not work with members of the community will be one of the reasons why such an attack would be successful. National security agencies are doing as much as they can but no one can do it alone. MS ***

Obama – The Giant-Killer in Chief

2011-10-23T19:55:00.000-07:00

Obama – The Giant-Killer in Chief

October 21st, 2011 - by Rich Cooper

When he was running for the presidency in 2007-08, there were not so subtle whispers and inferences made about whether a not-even-one-term U.S. senator from Illinois with no significant executive or security experience was up to the task of being Commander in Chief in a post-9/11 era. His biggest opponent at the time, then NY Sen. Hillary Clinton, put out a blistering television ad questioning whether Sen. Barack Obama had the mettle to handle a 3AM phone call to the White House from somewhere in the world where a crisis was occurring. More than three years later, there have been a number of all hours phone calls that President Obama has had to deal with. He’s not only shown he can handle them, but he has something else to point out – one helluva body count.

For as hard as his full-throated detractors may like to infer that President Obama is a weak-kneed leftist without the cojones to defend America and keep her secure, on his watch he’s taken out more than his share of bad guys. Through the use of SEAL Team Six, UAVs and other strategic military and intelligence assets, he’s sent an impressive list of bad guys to their ultimate judgment. These aren’t just any bad guys though – they include names like Osama Bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, as well as any number of other al Qaeda types. After the recent events in Libya, I guess it is only fair that we add Moammar Qaddafi to that list.

While the U.S. role in the final take down of Qaddafi may have been limited to an unmanned Predator drone that flew in support of French air forces, Gadhafi made his exit in this life on Obama’s watch and direction. That’s not insignificant. The man referred to as the “mad dog” of the Middle East by President Reagan survived multiple U.S. airstrikes in the 1980s but also numerous other assassination attempts during his 42-year bloody reign.

For as muddled and disjointed as the Obama Administration’s Libya incursion policy of “leading from behind” may have been, Qaddafi is dead and that’s a metric no other U.S. President can attest to during their term of office.

While there are no public trophies President Obama can hang in the Oval Office (e.g., the stuffed and mounted heads of Bin Laden et al.), the way President Teddy Roosevelt might have done more than a century before to display the big game he had taken down so as to impress foreign dignitaries, Members of Congress or other visitors, Obama has become a big game hunter himself. Any efforts to infer that he has not taken to the more militaristic side of his 24-7 job ring absolutely hollow.

There is plenty to debate about the President’s leadership abilities in multiple other areas, but in this facet of his job, his critics in this area of his job performance look very small and at times, very petty. Obama has the ultimate metrics that Reagan, Bush, Clinton and Bush would have loved to have had but don’t.

Call it luck, fortune or fate, but if I were one of the remaining despotic leaders left holding onto power with increasingly slippery hands (e.g., Syria’s Assad, Yemen’s Saleh, etc.), an exit strategy to some remote corner of the world with a suitcase full of cash that prevented an angry mob from dragging my battered and lifeless body through the streets might not be a bad idea. Furthermore, if I’m Vladimir Putin or some other world leader, I might be looking at Obama a tad differently than I had before given his 2011 streak.

All of these facts paint Obama as a sort of “giant-killer in chief” and have to make the leftist MoveOn.org and kumbaya-swaying “let’s all have peace” crowd go out of their minds. The man they saw as the anti-war, peace-nik messiah has learned to channel his inner Rambo and Dirty Harry and not take any prisoners when it comes to the big game prizes. The Nobel Committee that awarded Obama its coveted Peace Prize has to be further bewildered because the guy they honored for not being George W. Bush has killed the very guys that George W. Bush and other U.S. Presidents didn’t get.

For the far right-wing crowd, they are just as bewildered. The guy they thought was a puffed up wussy has crossed names off the bad guy list with increasing ease. In the security game, those are some impressive metrics and can’t be ignored, regardless of how you feel about the man or his policies. They are all a part of history and when the final chapters on this era are written, it will be Obama’s name directly associated with the demise of people the world is far better without.

Al-Shabaab – A Looming Threat

2011-10-06T14:20:00.000-07:00

Somali soldiers fire during fierce fighting with al Shabaab forces Photo From: AFP/Getty Images

October 5th, 2011

Al-Shabaab – A Looming Threat

By Paul Cruickshank, CNN Terrorism Analyst

The assassin was dropped off into the bitter cold by a taxi near the home of his target in Aarhus, Denmark's second largest city. His task for the night of January 1, 2010 was simple: kill Kurt Westergaard, the Danish cartoonist responsible in 2005 for a controversial depiction of the Prophet Mohammed. Armed with an ax and a knife, the would-be killer approached the front door and shattered the glass, setting off an alarm which alerted Westergaard and police to the intrusion. Westergaard grabbed his five-year-old granddaughter and rushed with her to a specially built safe room before the killer could reach them. When the police arrived minutes later the assassin lunged at them with his weapons but they managed to overpower him by firing shots into his left hand and right leg and then took him into custody.

The man they arrested - Mohamed Geele, 28, a Somali who first moved to Denmark in 1995 and who this February was convicted of the attack - was no amateur homegrown terrorist. He had already been under observation for an extended period of time by Danish security services because of his suspected close links to the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab. Even though the Somali group distanced itself from the attack in the hours after the attack, Danish investigators established that Geele had close ties to Al-Shabaab and senior al Qaeda leaders in east Africa, and had emerged as a hard-nosed player in the group during time he spent in Kenya in the 2000s.

The investigation indicated that what Western counter-terrorism officials had long feared had indeed become a reality. The Somali militant group – in control of more than half the war-torn east African country – had embraced al Qaeda's global Jihad and was now actively plotting attacks in the West.

Swedish authorities are investigating whether Al-Shabaab had any connection to four men arrested in Gothenburg on September 10 who were allegedly plotting to murder Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks at an art gallery in the city. Three of the suspects were Swedish residents of Somali descent and one was of Iraqi descent. According to Swedish and U.S. counter-terrorism sources, it is possible the suspects were merely inspired by Al-Shabaab propaganda.

In November 2010 Al-Shabaab explicitly threatened Vilks in a propaganda video subtitled in English and Swedish. "We will catch you wherever you are," said Abu Zaid Sweden, a Swedish-Somali member of the group who was filmed in the stands of a dilapidated sports arena with bursts of gunfire audible in the background. "In whatever hole you are hiding – know what awaits you – as it will be nothing but this: slaughter," as he simulated slitting his throat. He also urged Al-Shabaab's supporters in the West to join them in Somalia and to carry out an attack on Vilks if they could. "If you can kill this dog called Lars Vilks then you will receive a great reward from Allah," he promised them.

Western Reach

Such messages are especially concerning to Western counter-terrorism officials, because Al-Shabaab's propaganda, amongst the most sophisticated and savvy of any Jihadist group, has resonated amongst a small but significant fringe of the 1.5 million Somali diaspora community. Radicalized Somalis have been implicated in a string of terrorism cases in the United States, Canada, the UK, Australia, and across Europe.

But it is in Scandinavia that counter-terrorism officials have recently had most cause for concern. In the 1990s an open-door policy by Nordic countries led to tens of thousands of Somalis refugees from the war-torn country settling across Scandinavia, many of them in Denmark and Sweden. It has been a difficult process integrating them into mainstream society and a radical fringe has emerged in violent opposition to the West.

There is perhaps nobody who has more closely tracked Islamist militancy in the Somali community in Scandinavia than Michael Taarnby, one of Denmark's leading experts on Al-Shabaab and a Research Associate at the University of Central Florida. He has conducted extensive field research in Scandinavia and Somalia over the last decade and the trends he sees concern him profoundly.

"There is a significant radicalization problem in the Somali Diaspora community in Denmark and Sweden," Taarnby told CNN, "and intelligence services have very little understanding of what's going on-recruiting informants has been an uphill battle because Somalis don't trust them to protect them."

Taarnby says that well informed sources in the Somali diaspora community tell him that there are around 300 to 800 hardcore Shabaab sympathizers in Denmark out of a total Somali population of 18,000. "These hardliners have been harassing Somalis who do not share their view and just want to get on with their lives. There is nasty infighting going on," he told CNN.

Taarnby says that the attempted assassination of Kurt Westergaard woke up many in the Somali community to the threat of Islamist extremism. But he says their efforts have not yet turned the tide of young Somalis being indoctrinated by Al-Shabaab's propaganda videos. "Those attracted are usually quite young - there's the usual issue of a clash of cultures - of being stuck between east Africa and Scandinavia and not knowing where they belong," Taarnby told CNN.

Some young radicalized Somalis are gravitating away from mainstream Somali mosques to mosques associated with radical preachers attended by hard-line Islamists of all stripes. "There's a lot more cross-fertilization going on in radical circles," Taarnby told CNN, "and this may explain why an Iraqi was arrested along with the Somalis in Gothenburg."

Unlike al Qaeda or its affiliate in Yemen – which in recent years have only been able to recruit Western militants after they have already traveled to Jihadist fronts on their own initiative – Al-Shabaab has recruiters directly working for it in several Western countries who not only are trying to persuade young Somalis to join the group in Somalia, but are also facilitating getting them there, according to Western counter-terrorism officials.

In recent years an estimated 40 young Somalis have been recruited from the United States in this manner, many from the Minneapolis area where there is a sizable Somali community. Dozens of others have been recruited from other Western countries. Somalis living in Canada have grown so fearful of youngsters being recruited that that some have reportedly started hiding their children's passports.

"For young Somalis it is culturally difficult to refuse to meet someone with status in the community, especially if they are linked to organizations in the homeland and have combat experience. Some of these young Somalis are also adventurous and want to be Jihadist James Bonds. The recruiters lure them in by making fighting with Al-Shabaab sound like an adventure with friends with some shooting of AK-47s." Taarnby told CNN.

Militant Pipeline

An organized facilitation network transports Western recruits into Somalia, says Taarnby. Most arrive in Kenya's capital, now home to a quarter million Somalis, where Al-Shabaab has an extensive presence. There they are housed in safe houses for around a month and then transported in 4-by-4 pickup trucks northwards across the lightly patrolled border into Somalia. What happens when they arrive in Somalia, he says, is less clear.

But what is plain, he says, is the reality facing many Western recruits is very different from the message they hear in Minneapolis or Malmo. Unlike local fighters, Al-Shabaab commanders do not have to worry about alienating clan leaders if they send them off to carry out suicide bombings, says Taarnby. A significant proportion of Western recruits, he says, have taken this path. According to Taarnby, several Westerners objecting to becoming cannon fodder have later been found with bullets in their head, like a group that recently arrived from Canada.

Some of the western volunteers are valued by Al-Shabaab, according to Taarnby, because they are more educated than most Somalis and have technical skills in short supply in the country - for example in operating computers. One Western jihadist in particular - Omar Hammami, a 27 year old Syrian-American from Alabama - rose to a prominent position in the group.

Somalia experts believe that recruits from the diaspora have been crucial to the evolution of Al-Shabaab from a gun-totting militia to a political force in Somalia.

Taarnby says it's unclear what level of training Shabaab's Western recruits receive in Somalia. Most of the group's rank and file recruits receive only very rudimentary fire-arms training. Taarnby says there is no clear evidence that Western recruits are getting the sort of bomb-making training that al Qaeda has provided Western militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

"In some terrorist training camps, AQ-affiliated foreign fighters led the training and indoctrination of the recruits," the U.S. State Department warned in an August 2011 report on terrorist trends in Somalia in 2010. Somali experts say the group operates at least two large camps in Somalia on which there is little open source information.

Counter-terrorism officials across the West are now worried that the group may use Westerners for attacks back in their home countries. In July, Homeland Security Committee Chairman Peter King stated that "Al-Shabaab now has more capability than ever to strike the U.S. homeland," adding that "as many as two dozen Muslim-Americans with Al-Shabaab - who in many cases were trained by top al Qaeda leaders - remain unaccounted for."

British authorities warned in July, "Over the past 12 months, the threat to UK interests from terrorists in Yemen and Somalia has significantly increased. People from the UK are also travelling to these countries to engage in terrorist-related activity; some are returning to the UK to plan and conduct terrorist operations."

Setbacks in Somalia

In July, after an offensive by Somali and African Union forces, Al-Shabaab started pulling fighters away from central Mogadishu and have since vacated most neighborhoods of the city. The withdrawal has been seen as turning point in the struggle against Al-Shabaab in the country. For years a fragile transitional federal government (known by its acronym TFG) and AMISOM, the African Union's peace-support forces, had been boxed into just a few city blocks of the seaside capital by Shabaab fighters. A failed offensive by Al-Shabaab earlier in the year in which hundreds of its fighters were ordered to launch suicidal frontal charges had left the group weakened.

Al-Shabaab, however, has far from given up designs on the capital. On Tuesday a truck filled with explosives barreled into a government complex in the heart of Somalia's restive capital killing dozens in an attack authorities have blamed on the militant group.

Taarnby's sources in Mogadishu tell him that Al-Shabaab are still active in two or three neighborhoods in the capital, and that they will likely regroup and return. Reports of increased in-fighting amongst factions that had united to push out Al-Shabaab have not been an encouraging sign.

And the militia still has tight control over most of central and southern Somalia, where it controls the strategically and commercially vital port of Kismaayo, from where it collects lucrative customs tolls and fees.

The famine in Somalia, which has been most acute in southern Somalia, appears however to be starting to take a toll on Al-Shabaab. There are reports of rising anger against the group in the south because of the group's refusal to let in international aid. According to Somali experts the famine has also hurt Al-Shabaab's bottom line by making it more difficult for the group to raise money within Somalia. According to U.S. authorities the group raises most of its income internally and has in recent years raised $70-100m per year from taxation and extortion, according a report released by the U.N. last July.

The 2008 designation by the U.S. of Shabaab as a terrorist group has also reduced remittances sent to the group from overseas, according to Somalia analysts. Western counter-terrorism agencies have also cracked down on financial donations by Western-based sympathizers of the group. On Monday Amina Farah Ali, a 35 year old American-Somali woman, went on trial in Minneapolis charged with trying to send the group $11,000 she had raised by soliciting money door to door and through teleconferences. She is the first of twenty individuals charged with fundraising or recruiting for Shabaab in the FBI's long-running investigation in Minnesota to go to trial.

The revenue Shabaab receives from Somali pirates has been exaggerated by some, Taarnby says. Though the group takes a cut when it can from the estimated $150m in ransoms and illicit revenue obtained by pirates each year operating off the Somali coast, there is no clear evidence the group has ever become directly involved in piracy or is directly cooperating with pirates.

There are also reports of in-fighting between Al-Shabaab commanders who disagree over the need to continue taxing southern Somalis during the famine. Historically Al-Shabaab commanders from the north have been less sensitive to the needs of locals in the south than their southern counterparts and are viewed by locals as foreigners, according to Somalia analysts.

Al-Shabaab has won few friends in territory that it controls. Unused to governing, it has resorted to brutally imposing Taliban-like restrictions on the local population, alienating many. A popular backlash against the group in the south - along the lines of the Anbar awakening in Iraq – is a real possibility, according to Somalia analysts. While there are reports that the group has opened several of its own aid camps and has been cooperating with charities from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the famine appears to have significantly dented its support.

According to Ken Menkhaus, an American expert on Al-Shabaab, and the author of the 2004 book "Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism," the militia group reached the peak of its power in 2008 and has been in decline ever since. "Their draconian interpretations have appalled Somalis," he told a conference organized by the New America Foundation in April, "Whole clans have taken the decision to distance themselves from Al-Shabaab."

Global Jihadist Ambitions

Some experts believe that setbacks for Al-Shabaab in Somalia may make the group more likely to plot attacks outside Somalia, including against the West - in frustration and in a calculated attempt to boost their recruitment and prestige. "They are more dangerous when weak and their weakness now worries me. I think it's in their interest to regionalize or globalize the conflict," Menkhaus stated.

In July 2010 the group carried out a trio of deadly bombing in Kampala, Uganda killing more than 70 - its first attack outside Somalia, in retaliation, it claimed, for Uganda's deployment of peace support forces in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab's loose structures makes it difficult for counter-terrorism agencies to decipher its global terrorist ambitions. Somalia analysts say the militia is a messy constellation of different factions with differing agendas, and no one leader is in absolute control.

"It's difficult to know how to rank Al-Shabaab as a threat. It's not clear how serious they are about attacking the West and what sort of networks they really have. There are too many unknowns and that's what really scares counter-terrorism officials in Europe," Taarnby told CNN.

At his presentation at the New America Foundation, Menkhaus identified three main strands within Al-Shabaab: those seeking to establish an Islamist state, those who saw the country as a base for global jihad, and a third group that had degenerated into feeding off the war economy and favored the status quo.

For years, the leading light of the global Jihadist faction was Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, a Kenyan al Qaeda terrorist wanted for years for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. According to Taarnby, Jihadist websites have also boasted he was the al Qaeda operative who orchestrated a failed surface-to-air missile attack on an Israeli passenger jet in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002. His death in a shootout in Mogadishu in June was a big blow to the Somali group's capabilities to carry out complex operations outside the country. "He was the gatekeeper to al Qaeda Central and was believed to have an extensive network across east Africa, including safe houses," Taarnby told CNN, "and the question is who can now replace him?"

Al Qaeda itself has struggled to establish a base of operations in Somalia. In the 1990s Osama Bin Laden's group made a concerted effort to build up operations there but found Somalia a difficult place to navigate because of its complex tribal structures and the chaotic situation on the ground, realities which have changed little since then.

Taarnby believes recent setbacks for the group may make it more cautious in plotting terrorist attacks against the West. "They need to re-organize, they need to respond to the famine, they need to respond to the fact they've been evicted from Mogadishu - they may not want to get too adventurous right now," Taarnby told CNN, "they are more likely to focus on 'do-ables' like the attack in Kampala or assisting Nigerian group Boko Haram."

Regional Expansion

This would mean the group in the short term could be focusing more on expanding its operational reach in Africa. Nigerian newspapers have reported that the suspected planner of Boko Haram's deadly suicide car bomb attack on a UN building in Abuja in August recently received training with Al-Shabaab in Somalia. According to Taarnby, Al-Shabaab bomb-making capabilities took a leap forward around 2009 after al Qaeda in Iraq operatives shared their technical expertise with the group. "The same devices being used in Iraq started turning up in Mogadishu. Around 80% of AMISOM's deaths have been from such devices," he told CNN.

Western counter-terrorism officials have recently expressed concern over cooperation between Al-Shabaab and other militant groups in Africa. In September the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) warned that Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM )were trying to more closely synchronize their efforts to launch attacks on U.S and Western interests, but had yet to show a significant capability to launch attacks outside their homelands.

In recent weeks Al-Shabaab has been linked to two kidnappings of Westerners in northern Kenya, indicating that elements of the group may be intensifying their efforts to target Westerners in east Africa. On Saturday ten Somali gunmen kidnapped a French woman from her home in a resort in northern Kenya early Saturday, near where a Briton was seized and her husband killed last month, according to Kenyan authorities, who blamed Al-Shabaab.

One of the most disturbing scenarios of all, according to Taarnby, is if cooperation deepens in the coming months between Al-Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP) in Yemen, just a short distance across the Arabian sea.

For some time Western counter-terrorism officials have been concerned about an emerging alliance between the two groups. Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a Somali citizen captured by U.S. forces in April and interrogated aboard a U.S. navy ship for two months before being taken to New York to face terrorism charges, had been in direct contact with Anwar al Awlaki and had attempted to broker a weapons deal between the groups according to the indictment in his case. Warsame has pleaded not guilty.

There have been unconfirmed reports that hundreds of Somali fighters have taken part in recent fighting in the south of Yemen after making the short trip over the Arabian Sea and disembarking at ports under Islamist control.

According to Taarnby both AQAP and Al-Shabaab have a strong interest in deepening cooperation. "The Yemenis have all the guns you could dream of, and also funds from donors in the Gulf, but what AQAP needs if they want to establish an Islamic emirate is manpower. The Somalis have this in abundance but what they need is weapons and cash."

"If such an alliance took root, the Horn of Africa would really then be a new front in the global war on terrorism," Taarnby told CNN. In recent months the United States has stepped up its ability to launch drone attacks in Somalia and Yemen, killing senior AQAP cleric Anwar al Awlaki in a drone strike Friday.

The Threat to the West

Taarnby expects the group to carefully weigh the cost and benefit of launching terrorist plots against the West. "They know their fundraising and recruiting network in the Somali diaspora will take a blow if they launch an attack." Taarnby says that Al-Shabaab's cost-benefit calculation is illustrated by the fact it has not launched any attacks in Nairobi. "They could easily tear apart Nairobi but they've done nothing there at all because they realize this is their golden egg," he told CNN.

With regard to Scandinavia, Taarnby believes the group has decided that assassinating the cartoonists would provide a sufficient boost to the group's prestige to be worth such a backlash. "The cartoon controversy really agitated Shabaab. They go on about them much more than any other Jihadist group. They are really carrying the torch on this –it's possible Somali militants in Scandinavia channeled their anger back to the group in some way," Taarnby told CNN.

Menkhaus, the American expert on Al-Shabaab, agrees that there are constraints on Al-Shabaab when it comes to launching attacks in the West because any international law enforcement crackdown which affects powerful Somali interests and which further reduces the flow of remittances will likely see a violent reaction against the group. "In that case they won't have to worry about what we do to them but what the Somali people will do to them," Menkhaus stated, "and I think that's one of our great advantages in trying to outflank this group."

Defeating Al Qaeda With Pizza, Cookies, and the Koran

2011-10-06T12:03:00.000-07:00

Defeating Al Qaeda With Pizza, Cookies, and the Koran

The story of FBI interrogator Ali Soufan is a rebuke to Bush-era torture policy and ongoing Islamophobia.

By Adam Serwer on Tue. October 4, 2011 3:00 AM PDT

Screen shot: "The Black Banners"

What is the best way to break a terrorist? Waterboarding? Stress positions? What about pizza, ice cream, or sugar-free cookies?

The most surprising element of former FBI interrogator Ali Soufan's memoir, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda, is how receptive terrorists are to food. When Soufan takes L'Houssaine Kherchtou, an Al Qaeda fixer, out for pizza, Khertchou tells him he's "not an Al Qaeda guy anymore." Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, who helped facilitate the bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi in 1998, spills the beans after being plied with cookies and Meals Ready to Eat. Tariq el-Sawah, captured at Tora Bora and currently detained at Guantanamo Bay, has a fondness for ice cream. And in the desperate hours immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Soufan wears down the diabetic Abu Jandal, a former bodyguard for Osama bin Laden, with sugarless cookies, establishing that Al Qaeda was indeed responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

There are other levers Soufan uses, of course, to get information out of his subjects. Khertchou is furious over bin Laden's refusal to pay for his wife's cesarean section. Owhali is overwhelmed by the quality of information the FBI has assembled. Abu Jandal, despite his fondness for bin Laden, is shocked at the scale of the attacks—particularly after Soufan manipulates him into believing that hundreds of Yemenis died in the assault on the towers. Soufan also exploits regional resentments between Al Qaeda members; the "Gulf Arabs" were frequently resentful of Egyptian members' superior influence and financial benefits, to the point that Al Qaeda would divide into Egyptian and Gulf teams for their Friday soccer games. Soufan leverages their ignorance of the Koran and uses their fidelity to extremist ideology to manipulate them into talking.

Because Soufan played a key role in investigating Al Qaeda's most successful strikes against the United States, from the East Africa embassy bombings to the 9/11 attacks, his account reads a bit like a first-person version of Lawrence Wright's The Looming Tower, a definitive book on bin Laden's terrorist movement in which Soufan figures prominently. A Lebanese immigrant and self-identified "fraternity boy," Soufan applied to the FBI armed with knowledge of Arabic, Islam, and the Middle East that would make him a crucial part of the bureau beginning in the late 1990s. His reliance on traditional methods of interrogation put him at odds with the brutal tactics implemented by the Bush administration after 9/11.

In 2009, having since retired, Soufan came forward as a key opponent of torturing suspected terrorists. Through newspaper op-eds and congressional testimony, he argued that torture was useless, and that the Bush administration had claimed credit for intelligence he himself had acquired without torture in order to retroactively justify its tactics. Soufan, who writes his book that he preferred Bush over Gore and identified with the "strong national security approach to the GOP," quickly became a target for the political right because of his opposition to torture. Soufan's criticism of the CIA, meanwhile, is reportedly the reason for the book's lengthy redactions of information that is already public knowledge.

In The Black Banners, Soufan tells this story in more detail than ever before—complete with the Brechtian amateurism of the psychologists who insist, even as their "enhanced interrogation techniques" fail, that torture will work if only they can torture a little bit more. Soufan asserts that useful information extracted from key Al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah was acquired by Soufan prior to Zubaydah's being waterboarded 83 times. He also points out that alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed, despite being waterboarded 183 times, didn't just manage to withold information about the courier who ultimately helped the Obama administration find bin Laden's secret compound; he also managed to keep secret "ticking time bombs" in Spain, Britain, and Indonesia—all places struck by Al Qaeda plots that KSM likely knew about.

Soufan's story also serves as a rebuke to the Islamophobic "Shariah panic" that has gripped the right wing of the Republican Party since Bush left office. Support for torture and the blanket fear of Muslims have similar intellectual roots: Both presume that Muslim extremists are unflappable warrior-monks whose commitment to brutality is matched only by their encyclopedic knowledge of the Koran. Soufan writes of the prostitute-seeking, liquor-shot-pounding extremists that he was surprised "how morally corrupt (in Islamic terms) some al-Qaeda members are." Soufan notes that while "they could quote bin Laden's sayings by heart," in many cases they were largely ignorant about theology. "I knew far more of the Koran than they did," he writes.

The Islamophobes in particular blast their critics for failing to grapple adequately with the details of Al Qaeda's brand of Islamic extremism: Know your enemy, they admonish. Which is ironic, because theirs is a mantra Soufan shares. "People ask what is the most important weapon we have against al-Qaeda," he writes, "and I reply, 'knowledge.'" Soufan is talking about the extremists' unique and flawed Islamic theology, but he's also referring to their petty jealousies, personal foibles, and past histories. Treating every terrorist as a mere drone in a massive Muhammadan hive mind misses the point. "Each detainee is different, knows different things, and has different triggers that will get him to cooperate."

The title of the book stems from a hadith popular among Islamic extremists: If Muslims see an army rising from the historic region of Khurasan in Central Asia marching under the black banners, they should join them. The idea is that this army will defeat the enemies of Islam in an apocalyptic final battle. Yet despite its popularity among extremists, scholars consider the hadith to be of "questionable origin." Like all religious extremists, Al Qaeda's embrace of rigid textualism is selective.

Soufan describes many instances in which he uses his knowledge and a savvy rapport to exploit the personal foibles and intellectual weaknesses of his subjects. He kneels down to pray with Mohammed al-Qahtani, who was originally meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers. He engages Al Qaeda propagandist Ali al-Bahlul in a theological debate whereby he shames Bahlul into giving up information. And Soufan's encyclopedic knowledge of Al Qaeda helps him keep Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, one of the planners of the USS Cole bombing in Yemen in 2000, talking. Shocked by how much Soufan knows, and unwilling to believe an Arab Muslim could be an FBI agent, Quso convinces himself that Soufan is an Islamist double-agent. "I saw you in Afghanistan!" Quso exclaims. "Maybe," Soufan says. Quso starts bragging about his exploits, assuming he isn't telling Soufan anything he doesn't already know. He doesn't realize how much he's giving away.

The story of America's most famous Arab American FBI agent couldn't come at a more poignant time, with the FBI fighting off institutionalized Islamophobia in its own ranks. A recent spate of stories from Spencer Ackerman at Wired exposed training that portrayed Islam as inherently violent, and mainstream American Muslims as terrorist sympathizers. FBI agents were being taught that the more religiously observant Muslims are, the more likely they are to be terrorists—a ridiculous proposition, especially when one considers that the 9/11 hijackers went out of their way not to be observant so as not to draw suspicion.

Soufan's story, implicitly an example of the triumph of American pluralism, nevertheless underscores the degree to which the FBI has largely failed to produce more Ali Soufans.

"Having grown up in a country pulled apart by sectarian discord, I had come to appreciate the greatness of the United States and admire the ideals that had created the nation," Soufan writes, remembering having to huddle with his parents as bombs exploded in his old neighborhood in war-torn Lebanon. "To those of us who have filled the alternatives, they are filled with meaning." This is why families like Soufan's have always come to the United States. Scores of America's Muslims have similar stories—and yet agents like Soufan remain uncommon. Last year, Lawrence Wright said in a conversation about his book that there were eight Arabic speaking agents in the FBI on 9/11, and still only nine now. In fact, as Wright told The Economist in 2010, "If Ali Soufan tried to work in the FBI now, he probably couldn't get security clearance."

Towards the end of the book, Soufan recounts an incident that occurred shortly before his retirement from the FBI in 2006. At a gala in New York City, a reporter asks FBI Director Robert Mueller, "Where do you see the future of the FBI?" Mueller points to Soufan and says, "That is the future of the FBI." It's a prophecy that, sadly, still shows little sign of coming true.

*** Putting aside the lofty rhetoric of populist anti terrorism, I guess the powers that be, just don't want to win against radicals and terrorists. MS ***

During famine - Shabab decides to bomb people

2011-10-05T09:26:00.000-07:00

http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20111005/ap_on_re_af/af_somalia_explosion_23

Somali militants vow to up attacks after bombing

By ABDI GULED and MALKHADIR M. MUHUMED, Associated Press – 56 mins ago

MOGADISHU, Somalia – Al-Qaida-linked militants threatened more terror attacks that will "increase day by day" after a suicide bomber killed 72 people. Mourners transported coffins atop cars Wednesday to funerals for those who perished in al-Shabab's deadliest bomb attack in Somalia.

A truck loaded with drums of fuel exploded Tuesday at the gate of a building housing several government ministries in a busy street in the capital where tens of thousands of famine victims have fled. The attack came more than a month after most al-Shabab fighters melted away from Mogadishu amid a pro-government offensive, and showed that the insurgents remain a severe threat.

"At this time, when the country is in the midst of a worsening humanitarian crisis, the terrorists could not have attacked the Somali people at a worst time," Information Minister Abdulkadir Hussein Mohamed said.

Al-Shabab spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage identified the suicide bomber as Somali student Bashar Abdullahi Nur. He said the attack was a warning to those who thought the group had left Mogadishu for good in August.

"We wish to inform the Muslim people that the campaign against infidels will be back-to-back and by God's grace will increase day by day and will increase in the coming hours," Rage said. "I will give a good tiding to the infidels: You will face big and broad blows."

In a prerecorded farewell interview with al-Shabab radio station, the bomber said: "It will be a big blow to the heart of the enemy."

Tuesday's thunderous blast covered the city in dust more than a half-mile (800 meters) away and left blackened corpses sprawled amid burning vehicles and dozens wounded. Somalia's Ministry of Health said in a statement Wednesday that 72 people had been killed and more than 100 were wounded, including 38 still in serious condition.

"May Allah put them in hell," one Somali woman sobbed as a young man tried to comfort her. She then collapsed near the coffin of her dead son that was placed by a sandy grave.

Sadiya Omar, who lost her husband in Tuesday's bombing, left the scene of the funeral before he was interred, saying it was more than she could bear.

"The world will get no peace while killers like al-Shabab are still here," she cried, her tears dripping through her black veil.

President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed declared three days of mourning and vowed late Tuesday that his government would put in place security measures to avert future bombings.

"I'm sure the crime they committed against the Somali people will not go unpunished," Ahmed said of the al-Shabab militants. "God will punish them and the government will take appropriate measures to save the Somali people from those dangers."

However, Ahmed's government does not have sufficient troops or police to secure the capital city, and neither does the more than 9,000 strong African Union peacekeeping force that supports his regime.

Somali expert Ken Menkhaus said in a recent interview that al-Shabab's withdrawal from the city would overextend the AU forces, exposing the government's inability to hold and govern territory and allowing the militants to mount hit-and-run attacks.

The head of the African Union peacekeepers appealed for more troops in August to secure Mogadishu following the al-Shabab's withdrawal. Maj. Gen. Fred Mugisha said that since the withdrawal, his forces cover a larger area and risk being overstretched. He said the deployment of 3,000 extra troops authorized by the U.N. Security Council should be hastened.

Tuesday's blast killed students and their parents who were gathered around a notice board to learn about the result of scholarships offered by the Turkish government.

"It shows their barbarism and how hell-bent they're to hit the public where it hearts most," he said. "We can certainly say their ideology is directed at annihilating Somali people. What they're targeting is the education."

Mugisha, the commander of the African Union Mission to Somalia force, known as AMISOM, said the attack targeted several Somali government institutions.

Al-Shabab said it was striking government officials and foreigners — referring to AU peacekeeping troops.

The U.N. Security Council called the attack a "heinous crime." In Washington, White House press secretary Jay Carney said it was a "despicable and cowardly act."

Somalia has been mired in violence since 1991, plunging the country into a chaos that sprouted militants and piracy off the coast of Horn of Africa nation.

___

Muhumed reported from Nairobi, Kenya. Associated Press writer Anita Snow at the United Nations contributed to this report.

Minn. woman facing Somalia terror case arrested

2011-10-05T09:15:00.000-07:00

*** They refused to stand for the judge on WHAT religious grounds, exactly? There is no such thing - see it for what it is: contempt. MS ***

MINNEAPOLIS — A Minnesota woman accused of funneling money to a terrorist group in Somalia was handcuffed and removed from a courtroom Monday when she refused to stand for the judge hearing the case.

Amina Farah Ali, 35, was taken away as jury selection was to begin. Ali and another defendant, Hawo Mohamed Hassan, are accused of raising thousands of dollars to fund the movement of fighters and money from the U.S. to Somalia.

Ali’s attorney, Dan Scott, said she declined to stand on religious grounds, but Chief U.S. District Judge Michael Davis ordered marshals to arrest her. Davis had issued an order last week that all parties would follow the rules of courtroom decorum after Ali refused to stand at an earlier hearing.

It wasn’t immediately clear when Ali would return to the courtroom.

She and Hassan, 64, both U.S. citizens of Somali descent, were among 20 people charged in Minnesota’s long-running federal investigations into recruiting and financing for al-Shabab, which the U.S. considers a terror group with ties to al-Qaida. Investigators believe at least 21 men left Minnesota — home to the country’s largest Somali community — to join al-Shabab.

**FILE** In this photo from Aug. 5, 2010, Hawo Mohamed Hassan (left) and Amina Farah Ali, both of Rochester, Minn., leave U.S. District Court after appearing at a hearing in St. Paul, Minn. The two women are accused of funneling money to a terrorist group in Somalia, and are the first to go on trial in Minnesota’s years-long federal investigation into the recruiting and financing of al-Shabab. (Associated Press)

Though others have pleaded guilty to related charges, the women are the first to go on trial.

Ali and Hassan maintain their innocence, saying they were collecting money and clothing for refugees. But prosecutors allege the women went door-to-door and held teleconferences to solicit donations for the fighters. In one of those recorded calls, investigators allege, Ali said to “forget about the other charities” and focus on “the jihad.” In others, both women speak with the leader of a militia allied with al-Shabab, and Ali gets updates on the fighting.

Both women, of Rochester, are charged with conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Ali also faces 12 counts of providing such support for allegedly sending more than $8,600 to the group from September 2008 through July 2009. Hassan faces three counts of lying to the FBI.

Each terrorism count carries a 15-year maximum prison sentence. The trial is expected to last about two weeks.

Underwear Bomber on trial

2011-10-05T09:05:00.000-07:00

http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/10/the-underwear-bomber-goes-to-trial/246092/

Andrew Cohen - Andrew Cohen has served as chief legal analyst and legal editor for CBS News and won a Murrow Award as one of the nation's leading legal analysts and commentators.

In Detroit on Tuesday jury selection begins in federal district court in the case styled United States v. Abdulmutallab. You probably know the criminal defendant better by his international nickname, the "Underwear Bomber," a mocking yet evocative sobriquet that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab picked up nearly two years ago when he was apprehended aboard a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines plane trying to set off an explosive device he had concealed in his pants.

As a matter of law and fact the Abdulmutallab case is about as one-sided as a criminal case can be. Alleged co-conspirator Anwar al-Awlaki may be dead and gone, but there are all the people on the plane who witnessed what the defendant did on December 25, 2009. Also, prosecutors will show jurors, on videotape, a controlled demonstration of the explosive device-- ka-BOOM!-- the defendant was said to be trying to detonate from his seat. And Abdulmutallab reportedly upon arrest was only too happy to announce his devotion to al-Qaeda, which our dutiful law enforcement officials were only too happy to transcribe.

The defense? In US v. Abdulmutallab, the defendant is representing himself, like Zacarias Moussaoui did during his sentencing trial in Virginia and like Khalid Sheik Mohammed did when he went (briefly) on trial at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It's an al-Qaeda thing, evidently, to preclude your infidel lawyer from standing up for you in court. (It is evidently not an al-Qaeda thing to preclude your "stand-by" lawyer to file smart briefs in court. Abdulmutallab may make an opening statement next week in his own behalf. But his infidel lawyers-- on court-appointed stand-by to ensure the legitimacy of the trial-- have honorably protected his interests in pretrial motions).

They say that any defendant who hires himself as attorney has a fool for a client. Perhaps that explains why Abdulmutallab has acted so often like such a jackass during pre-trial proceedings. He's reportedly sat in court with his feet on the defense table, shouting "Osama lives" on more than one occasion. And he's refused to stand up in court for the entrance each session of U.S. District Judge Nancy Edmunds, a well-respected appointee of the first President Bush, who surely will earn her modest salary this month shepherding the 24-year-old Nigerian defendant through to verdict.

Judge Edmunds has a tough path to navigate. She has to allow Abdulmutallab to speak out on his own behalf without allowing him to do what he's desperate to do; turn the trial into a zoo. Moussaoui tried to do the same thing during his 2006 sentencing trial but U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema schooled him with a blend of judicial power and motherly firmness. I bet you a steak dinner that Judge Edmunds already has been in touch with Judge Brinkema about how to handle an unwieldy al-Qaeda defendant during a jury trial. The two judges are part of an exclusive club, after all.

And I bet you that Judge Edmunds will be able to control Abdulmutallab for the course of the trial. He's got the same balancing act that she does, when you think about it. If he goes too far in disrespecting the court or the country, he runs the risk of being kicked out of his own trial. It's an extraordinary remedy but trial judges have been known to relegate criminal defendants to a cell where they can view the proceedings via closed circuit. If that happens to Abdulmutallab, he'll lose his audience and his voice. And, let's face it, that's all he has right now.

Like my ol' pal Kenneth Starr just wrote in the Times, it is a crying shame that there are no television cameras in federal courts. If there were cameras in US v. Abdulmutalallab, the cynics on Capitol Hill who don't trust American judges and juries to handle terror cases would learn the most important unlearned lesson in terror law since the Twin Towers fell: the more people see of these al-Qaeda suspects the less scary they become. The more the spotlight shines upon them, the less monster-like they appear. Moussaoui was a joke by the end of his trial. If Abdulmutallab doesn't sit up straight and behave he'll be a joke, too.

If the American people (and every member of Congress) were to watch able to watch the coming Abdulmutallab proceedings, or just pay close attention to them from afar, it is quite likely the debate over civilian trials for terrorists would change forever. Here's a suspect who was given a Miranda warning and yet the sun did not fall from the sky!. Here's a terror suspect who wasn't treated like an "enemy combatant"-- and he's still almost certainly going to spend the rest of his life at the Supermax prison facility in Florence, Colorado!

Critics of civilian trials for suspected terrorists-- men like Sens. John McCain and Lindsay Graham-- are afraid that public trials for men like Abdulmutallab will become marketing tools for al-Qaeda. History tells us, however, that the opposite is true. Richard Reid, the shoebomber, was schooled in Boston by Chief U.S. District Judge William Young. Moussaoui was tamed by Judge Brinkema. Jose Padilla's jury in Miami barely had time for a cup of coffee before it convicted him.

Who are we kidding? This young man, Abdulmutallab, who couldn't light his underwear on fire when his life depended upon it, is not the next Marx or Lenin or Mao or Bin Laden. He's not going to be a recruiting poster for a reeling al-Qaeda network. If he were able and willing to succeed in this task, his feet wouldn't already have been on the defense table and his shirt would always be buttoned in court. In-court insolence toward the American justice system is neither new nor effective. And yet it's all Abdulmutallab has mustered so far.

The smartest thing America could do for its public relations efforts in the Arab world would be to televise this guy's trial. It would make Abdulmutallab look more like a criminal than a soldier; more like a young punk than a learned tribune of some hoary oath. If only we could figure out a way to do an instant poll in the Middle East for the moment after Abdulmutallab screams out "Osama lives" or "al-Awlaki is alive" in court. We shouldn't be afraid of public trials for men like this; we should be proud of such moments. We should seek them out. They make us look bigger and the defendants look smaller.

Maybe Abdulmutallab's style of trial work-- part Perry Mason, part your sullen teenage kid-- will put to rest the silly notion that al-Qaeda defendants have some preternatural strength to hypnotize jurors and the youth of the Arab world. Perhaps this coming trial will prove to the country that it is making an avoidable mistake by not allowing the Obama Administration to treat al-Qaeda defendants like other suspected criminals. Perhaps not. If a trial occurs away from television, does anyone see or hear it?

*** Excellent article - I favour public prosecutions as well; we're dealing with criminals, so let's treat em like they are and not whisk them away out of sight out of mind and give them the illusion of importance. MS ***

Awlaki / Khan deaths will not weaken AQAP: West Point

2011-10-05T08:48:00.000-07:00

http://www.gsnmagazine.com/article/24667/al_awlaki_khan_deaths_won%E2%80%99t_weaken_aqap_says_army_

Mon, 2011-10-03 10:34 AM

By: Mark Rockwell

Marib, Yemen

The deaths of Anwar Al Awlaki and Samir Khan in a drone strike on Sept. 30 was a tactical victory for the U.S., but hardly a fatal blow to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), said a study released on Oct. 3 by the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center.

The study -- produced over the last year by the center, addresses the underlying causes for AQAP’s operations in Yemen -- said the deaths of the two men wouldn’t affect the organizations’ operations or its desire to attack U.S. interests.

The center’s extensive study, A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen, said Al Awlaki and Khan were far less relevant players in explaining AQAP’s resiliency in the country where the group is holed up.

The attention paid to AQAP’s English-speaking, publicity-seeking members has come at the expense, it said, of a deeper understanding of the group’s local strategy and operations. The 177-page report deals with the details of history, local politics, tribal relationships and other factors that drive AQAP, which some have called the most imminent terror threat to the U.S.

”While it is too soon to tell whether either Al Awlaqi or Khan will be replaced by other English speaking propagandists, policymakers will need to carefully consider the repercussions of their deaths from a broader strategic perspective, one that looks beyond imminent threats against the U.S. homeland and includes AQAP’s operations in Yemen,” it said.

“This report attempts to disaggregate the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from the sources of instability surrounding it by exploring the group’s strategy, tactics and objectives from the Yemeni perspective,” it said. “This shift in analytical lens, from the global threat to the local context, is essential for understanding how the country’s most prominent violent jihadist group has managed to persist for nearly five years,” it said.

Understanding AQAP from a local perspective, it argues, is the only way to understand “the constraints and opportunities shaping the group’s ambitions both inside and outside Yemen.”

This study focuses on Yemen’s eastern governorates, often described as Yemen’s most tribal and an epicenter of AQAP activity. The study examines the Marib and al-Jawf tribes and is the result of twelve months of research conducted in Yemen, including fieldwork in the governorate of Marib. The author of the study used a network of contacts and dozens of interviews with tribal leaders and tribesmen. Those interviews, he said, “suggest that although tribes have long been cited as a primary resiliency mechanism for AQAP, the group enjoys no formal alliance with tribes in either Marib or al-Jawf.”

“Likewise, there is ample evidence to suggest that, contrary to popular analysis, the group’s strength and durability does not stem from Yemen’s tribes,” said the study.

“In all aspects of AQAP’s operations, the group’s current leadership has demonstrated uncommon strategic discipline and an ambitious capability to expand its operations beyond Yemen’s borders, first to Saudi Arabia and most recently to the United States,” it said.

However, it said, while its successes have been tied to canny local leadership, the concentration of that leadership in such a small pool could be AQAP’s greatest weakness.

“The most direct way to reduce the group’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the United States at home, lies in removing those Yemeni leaders responsible for the group’s operational coherence: Nasir `Abd al-Kareem `Abdullah al-Wahayshi, Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Raymi, Muhammad Sa`id Ali Hasan al-’Umda and `Adil bin `Abdullah bin Thabit al-`Abab,” it said.

Al Wahayshi was AQAP’s leader during its first attack on two U.S. oil facilities in Yemen in 2006.

*** The West Point study is here: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/CTC_False_Foundation2.pdf ***

ANWAR AWLAKI KILLED

2011-10-05T08:42:00.000-07:00

http://www.nationalpost.com/opinion/columnists/Assassination+best+option/5503169/story.html

Christopher Hitchens, Slate.com

Probably because it mainly provides the kind of short-term cinematic satisfaction that characterizes the Hellfire terminus, the flashy ending of al-Qaeda's main media star has only led to the reopening of some pressing questions about the nature of the jihadi menace. It has also forced us to confront the idea of words as weapons, and the relationship between ideas and actions, in a world of conscienceless criminal violence that operates without employing any code or precedent of its own.

To phrase the essence of the problem succinctly, you are perhaps more likely, as a reader of this column, to be blown up at work or play, or on the way to work or play, by a "homegrown" or "lone-wolf" or "self-starter" fanatic using whatever explosive or incendiary tools may lie to hand, than you are to die at the hands of al-Qaeda or the Shabab or any of their shifting surrogates. In the same way, it is at least as likely that a local operative will emerge from the American suburbs to commit one random and unpredictable act as it is that - as sometimes has happened - a fanatic will leave our shores and take himself to Somalia or Yemen or Afghanistan. And so we have the figures of Maj. Nidal Hasan, unsheathing his weapon at Fort Hood to yell "God Is Great!" or Faisal Shahzad rigging his SUV to explode in Times Square or, at one more remove, Farouk Abdulmutallab stuffing his underwear with combustibles and (rather too easily, given his record) boarding a flight to Detroit.

It doesn't seem strictly accurate to use the "lone wolf" designation in all these cases, because a potent influence on the loner can be a homegrown counsellor or advisor, who speaks the vernacular and has also lived in "the belly of the beast." In the recent past, Anwar al-Awlaki has been the classic and most successful instance. His evolving contact with Hasan, for example, seemingly walking him through all of the stages that lead up to the granting of religious permission to shoot at will, was quite systematic. There were times when Awlaki was working under our very noses, propagandizing in Virginia and elsewhere from the context of an existing mosque (and so far getting into the swing of things that he attracted FBI notice by transporting ladies of the night across state lines, which is how we might have come to know him).

But he had not himself, at that stage, fully pupated himself into a committed Salafi jihadist. So now we have the phenomenon of an American citizen, able to whisper directly into the ears of people living here, but until recently being able to do so from a geographical location where our laws cannot reach him. There is no precedent, however remote, for a legal and moral challenge of this kind, let alone for a political or military one.

Since this dilemma will be with us for some time, may I recommend a recent booklet that offers the most background to the emergence of this fascinating and frustrating enemy. Called As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad, it is published by the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. (Its author, I should proudly make haste to add, is my son.) The booklet explores the tradition of English-speaking Salafi agitators working in the West, a tradition that is longer and more ramified than many people think, but I find myself more absorbed by the aspect represented by the late Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American who until he died in the same Hellfire attack was the editor of Awlaki's glossy magazine Inspire. Some will remember this unique online publication for its jeering, upbeat reports on the extreme cheapness of the print-cartridge bombs that were loaded from Yemen onto planes bound for our shores (the manufacturer of these bullets may also have died in the same attack), or the upbeat cover story on how to make bombs on your own mama's kitchen table. While other martyrdom tactics were being used on faraway battlefields, said Khan not long ago, and even while Osama bin Laden was being removed from the chessboard, the idea of homegrown attacks on U.S. soil was moving "into fifth gear."

In a rhetorical way, this mirrors bin Laden's obsessive distinction between operations against India, say, or Iraq, and spectacular assaults on "the far enemy" or the prestige and security of the United States. To his last days, he argued even with his own lieutenants for a renewal of the second type of warfare. But it also raises a much less grand image: that of the pathetic amateur and misfit who can commit perhaps one limited act of vicious spite against his neighbours or coworkers or even passers-by.

I think it is important to watch for symptoms of sheer degeneracy like this - picknose wannabe murderers lurking in their parents' basement - because there is evidence that such things (like the use of small children to carry suicide bombs) arouse revulsion even among those who otherwise wish us ill. It also dramatically reduces the caliber of recruit. On the other hand, and too little remarked, such tactics do something that is worth the price of a good deal of high explosive. They annihilate trust and confidence. Do you really want, next to you at boot camp, a man who prostrates himself five times a day? Should one say anything about the man with the beard in the next seat? Is a mosque in town the next development you truly welcome in the spirit of "inclusiveness" and "diversity"?

Slow and sidelong cultural erosions of this kind can do incalculable harm. And they can also be horribly and cheaply self-replicating: Some people will "overreact" to a spectre of Islamism however slight, and this will offend the man who is only trying to meet his prayer obligations, and then a whole machinery of supposed grievance and redress clanks into action. Meanwhile, those who orchestrate this little carnival of mayhem and social corrosion are able to do so from areas that are beyond our legal jurisdiction but within our military reach, and to taunt us while doing so.

As we engage with the horrible idea that our government claims the right to add its own citizens to a death list that is compiled by methods and standards unknown, we must concede that no government on Earth faces such a temptation to invoke what I suppose we could call a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. Those who share my alarm at the prospect of this, and of the ways in which it could be abused, are under a heavy obligation to say what they would do instead.

***MS: Good riddance. ***

PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN AMERICA

2011-08-12T17:38:00.000-07:00

http://intelligence.house.gov/hearing/preventing-violent-radicalization-america

In December 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder told journalists that the terrorist threat had changed from “foreigners coming here to… people in the United States, American citizens”. A number of independent studies have confirmed this assessment. One of the most recent – published by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University – showed that “nearly half” of the 175 cases of Al Qaeda related homegrown terrorism since September 11, 2001, occurred in 2009 and 2010.

...

Last September’s report by the National Security Preparedness Group, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, concluded that the lack of a coherent approach towards domestic counter-radicalization has left America “vulnerable to a threat that is not only diversifying, but arguably intensifying”.

...

selected points from the testimony:

• There isn’t a simple template or formula that would explain how people radicalize. Radicalization involves many steps and stages at which the process can be stopped or reversed. They are opportunities for prevention, which can (and should) be harnessed by policymakers.

• Unlike counterterrorism, which targets terrorists, counter-radicalization is focused on the communities that are targeted by terrorists for recruitment. The aim is to protect, strengthen, and empower these communities, so they become resilient to violent extremism.

• Counter-radicalization is a policy theme, not a single policy. It is delivered through a multitude of channels. The range of relevant activities is potentially unlimited, but typically involves: messaging; engagement and outreach; education and training; and capacity-building.

• None of the instruments of counter-radicalization are coercive. Counter-radicalization is not primarily a law enforcement tool. Law enforcement, however, has a role to play. It represents a “bridge” between counterterrorism and counter-radicalization, and helps to inform both.

• Governments need to be careful in choosing community partners. Outreach efforts should reflect communities’ diversity, and distinguish between “engagement” and “empowerment”.

• Policymakers need to respect the values embodied in the Constitution. This means countering extremist narratives in the “market place of ideas”, and refraining from “adjudicating intra-religious affairs”.

• Counter-radicalization in America must account for the diversity and attitudes of American Muslims. Approaches will need to be varied, and should seek to capitalize on Muslims’ commitment to the American Dream.

• Very little training is aimed specifically at counter-radicalization. DHS and DoJ offer counterterrorism and cultural competency training for their staff. They also provide training grants for state and local governments.

• Communication with Muslim communities must include an “ask”. If the government believes that American Muslims have a unique role to play, it shouldn’t be reluctant to say what it is.

• Al Qaeda’s ideology should be challenged as well as contested. The government’s current efforts focus on contesting Al Qaeda’s ideology by contrasting the positive vision of equal citizenship, religious freedom and shared aspirations with Al Qaeda’s claim that being Muslim is incompatible with being an American. Especially in smaller settings, rather than only offer a competing vision, it may be appropriate to challenge the group and its ideology directly and aggressively.

• Government should be careful not to meddle in religious debates. While government should rebut the claim that devout Muslims can’t be loyal Americans, government pronouncements about the character of Islam or the “true” meaning of religious concepts – however well intentioned – are not credible, nor do they do justice to complex theological debates. It is not for the U.S. government to decide what Islam – or any other faith – is, and what it is not.

• The policy of refusing to name the ideological underpinnings of Al Qaeda is contrived and counterproductive, especially when educating law enforcement officers and other officials. Police officers, FBI agents, and prison guards should be taught how to distinguish between the faith practices of ordinary Muslims and the murderous ideas of “violent Islamist extremists.”

• Counterterrorism and counter-radicalization must be separate. None of the agencies that are mainly concerned with counterterrorism should be seen to play a dominant role in counter-radicalization.

• Outreach efforts should reflect the diversity of Muslim communities. Government mustn’t rely on religious interlocutors alone to convey its message to American Muslims.

• Officials need to understand the difference between engagement and empowerment. The government should seek to maintain open lines of communication with a wide array of community groups, but recognize that not all groups are appropriate government partners.

As a minimum, government partners should be committed to (1) upholding the Constitution of the United States, and be consistent in (2) expressing their opposition to acts of terrorism and (3) the killing of Americans anywhere.

• More training needs to be offered on engagement, outreach, and cultural competency. Such training should be available to police and “civilian” officials at all levels of government.
Community Policing

• Government must recognize the limits of community policing. Community policing is an important element of generating trust, but it is not a substitute for counter-radicalization.

Above all, the government must be persistent. Building resistance to Al Qaeda and its narrative will not occur overnight, and it will require the government to review how well counter-radicalization policy is being implemented and improved over a long period of time. Congress and the American public have an important role to play in ensuring the government’s commitment to challenging and countering radicalization never wavers. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, making America safe from terrorism is a “generational challenge”, and “the American people are entitled to expect their government to do its very best” in meeting it.

-----

SEE ALSO the testimony by John C. Gannon - BPC National Security Preparedness Group Member - Former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence - Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council ...

*** I have reproduced it below ***

Opening Statement of John C. Gannon
to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and CI (THACI) Subcommittee

27 July 2011, 3:00 p.m.

Madame Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I retired from the Intelligence Community (IC) nearly 10 years ago, but have remained involved with it ever since. In my career, I held senior positions including CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. After retirement, I worked in the White House Transition Planning organization for the Department of Homeland Security, heading the team for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. I subsequently served for two years as the staff director of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security and briefly as the first staff director of the permanent Homeland Security Committee.

Since government retirement, I have served voluntarily on various research committees and task forces supporting US intelligence agencies, including on counterterrorism. I am currently a sector president of BAE Systems, which provides products and services to customers including the US defense and intelligence communities. From all these experiences, I have observed the performance of the IC in recent years with keen interest, though I clearly no longer qualify as an insider. My comments, therefore, should be seen as informed impressions rather than authoritative assessments, but hopefully they will be helpful in any case.

I am a member of the National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), which sponsored the study on preventing violent radicalization ably conducted by Peter Neumann. I was pleased to provide comments to Dr. Neumann during the research and drafting phases. I regard the finished paper as a constructive, insightful contribution to the evolving debate today on counter-radicalization in the United States. The paper is finished, but the national debate will continue for some time.

I would identify five key judgments in the report:

• Today, we benefit from many commendable government and non-government counter-radicalization initiatives at the Federal, state and local levels. They need, however, to be better coordinated, more sharply focused, and increased – especially at the local level.

• The successful targeting by foreign-based terrorist groups of vulnerable US communities, while not an epidemic, is a serious and growing problem that needs
[2]
to be addressed with greater urgency at every level of government and community.

• Counter-radicalization, which defies easy definition, relates to multi-front policies to prevent recruitment of individuals to violence. These broad-based policies are directed largely toward vulnerable communities with influence on potential recruits. They are not law-enforcement policies aimed at recruited terrorists. Counter-radicalization is not counter-terrorism, though, if and when successful, it should reduce the terrorist threat.

• Federal, state and local policies to promote counter-radicalization are interconnected, but the greatest impact is at the local level where government, law enforcement, and non-government groups have the greatest potential to understand community strengths and vulnerabilities, to develop constructive partnerships, to promote open dialogue and otherwise to prevent radicalization. Many promising local initiatives, however, appear to be seriously under-resourced and their performance across the country is uneven.

• US Muslim communities may be the most targeted by foreign terrorists today, but there is no basis for an “us against them” approach to this disparate and diversified US population. Negative generalizations about US Muslims, from leadership at any level or location, can lead to isolation of these communities and are clearly counterproductive to needed outreach, engagement, and capacity building for counter-radicalization. <<-- EXACTLY !!!

• There are lessons to be learned from foreign counter-radicalization experiences, but the US will – and should – continue to develop its own model based on the preponderant role here of local government and community, on our preference for decentralized government, and on our historic commitment to civil liberties.

I will make four personal comments based on my professional experience that go beyond what the reports states, while not contradicting it.

• The number of known homegrown terrorists since 9/11, while growing in recent years, is relatively small. But the urgency is big. In the era of IT-driven globalization, small groups of terrorists can move people, finance, and information (including destructive know-how) across borders as never before. Minor actors can do catastrophic damage!

• Still, it is important to recognize the positive aspect of the small numbers. I believe this is testimony to the bedrock commitment of most Americans to our Constitutional freedoms and democratic way of life. If you or I hear about a terrorist conspiracy, we call the local police. We don’t aid and abet the terrorists. In my CIA career, this was not the case in many countries I analyzed on a day-to-day basis at different times in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia. It is not the case among Arab peoples fighting for their freedom today. The trust between people and local government in the United Stated, including law enforcement, is the global gold standard.

Any policy or activity that erodes that traditional confidence within local communities weakens our counter-radicalization efforts. Our Constitution is our strongest instrument against radicalization, not an impediment. This is not fanciful rhetoric for me. It is the revelation from a career of assessing the rest of the world.

• I would build on the passing reference the report makes to the impact of perceived US foreign policy to terrorist narratives. Long before 9/11, we heard Al Qaeda protest US support of repressive regimes in the Middle East. What we have observed over the past year, however, is US sympathy toward Arab populations who are now dying in growing numbers to remove those corrupt and repressive regimes. The Arab protesters, who have lost their fear, are demanding political rights and economic opportunity in the 21st century, not – as Osama bin Laden would have it – calling for restoration of a 16th century Islamic Caliphate. Surely, all of this should freshen the narrative for America’s counter-radicalization policies.

• Finally, it is clear enough that our counter-radicalization efforts today, along with those of our European counterparts, are focused on the threat from extremist Muslim ideologues. In recent decades, however, we also have experienced violence at the hands of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma, militias and cult groups in our western states, and a range of “radical groups” in the “anti-establishment” era of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, hostile foreign governments have continued to target and recruit many once-loyal Americans to betray their country. There has to be benefit for the future in a broader study of the factors that impel people to cross the line to violent extremism – or that prevent them from doing so. We still have a lot to learn.

Thank you Madame Chairman. I would be pleased to take any questions or comments you may have.

NO MORE TURBAN BOMBS SAYS KARZAI

2011-08-12T17:36:00.000-07:00

http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/canada-in-afghanistan/Clerics+urged+prevent+turban+bombs/5232999/story.html

Afghan president urges clerics to discourage turban bombs

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan – Afghan President Hamid Karzai met recently with members of the country’s clerical councils to get their assistance in persuading insurgents not to hide explosives in suicide bombers' turbans or in other religious or cultural symbols.

The Taliban, however, appear to have responded by hiding a bomb in a mosque in Kandahar province.

In the last five weeks, suicide bombers have killed the mayor of Kandahar and a senior cleric in the city with small amounts of explosives hidden in their turbans. In both cases, the bombers grabbed their victims before triggering the explosives.

It is believed to be the first time turbans have been used in suicide attacks.

A man’s turban has important religious and cultural significance and it is considered dishonourable to touch it.

Karzai met with clerics this week and pleaded with them to use their influence on the Taliban and other insurgents to dissuade them from using cultural or religious garments to hide explosives.

In the past, insurgents have also used burqas to hide explosives because male guards normally will not search a woman.

“President Karzai believes the clerics have a lot of influence over Afghan society,” Hamed Elmi, a spokesperson for the president, told The Gazette.

He said Karzai believes that suicide bombing and the use of the turban as a bomb “dishonour Afghan society and the Afghan people in the eyes of the world.”

Karzai encouraged the clerics to return to their mosques and preach against suicide bombing and the use of cultural attire in this insurgency war, Elmi added.

In Kandahar City, however, the Taliban have already shown their contempt for the clerical council by killing one of their senior clerics with a turban bomb. So the influence of these clerics, who support the Karzai government and often counter the extreme orthodoxy of the Taliban, is questionable.

In a possible response to Karzai’s meeting with the clerics, the Taliban appear to have hidden an anti-personnel mine inside a mosque in Zharay district in Kandahar province.

Coalition forces discovered the bomb on a shelf in the mosque Wednesday while searching for a “roadside bomb facilitator and attack planner operating in Kandahar City” who had targeted government officials, according to a statement by the International Security Assistance Force joint command.

The forces withdrew from the mosque to discuss with local leaders how “to properly neutralize the mine without harming the mosque,” the ISAF said in the statement.

Discussions continue.

* What?! no more turban bombs?! Oh well - I guess its back to Mosque bombings, IED'S that maim children, cutting of noses and limbs and let's not forget the acid pack: now available in family size. :s *

NORWAY TERRORISM

2011-07-26T16:42:00.000-07:00

We were warning about the dangers of such Islamophobic hate mongering for a long time because we know what comes from such rhetoric. My heart is with the victims and surivivors - God bless them all with recovery. Amen.

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1030394
^Canadians stunned at inclusion in confessed killer’s manifesto

*People like Salim Mansur should not be so shocked - when you go on and on about how its just bad bad bad - whaddya think people will come bearing - flowers? How interesting that the other issue is of Muslim prayer in schools & its the SAME kind of targetting and demonization occurring right now against Muslim kids in the TDSB and Islam in general. The irony is lost only on those who choose not to see it.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/25debate.html?_r=1
^Killings in Norway Spotlight Anti-Muslim Thought in U.S.

*The killings in Norway “could easily happen here,” he said. The Hutaree, an extremist Christian militia in Michigan accused last year of plotting to kill police officers and planting bombs at their funerals, had an arsenal of weapons larger than all the Muslim plotters charged in the United States since the Sept. 11 attacks combined, he said.

http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/07/25/277631/breivik-influenced-by-american-islamophobes/
^Breivik Was Influenced By American Islamophobes Behind ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ Hysteria

*These are people will blood on their hands now. Deny all you want - it won't help.

There is just so much already written on this but my comments are as such: The attacks in Norway were the result of the type of Islamophobia being perpetuated on a daily basis on FB, blogs, Fox News, the Tea Party - even members of public office. If you still think that Islamophobia is a figment of the imagination - go and talk to the ghosts of the dead in Norway. STOP THE HATE or perish in it - there is no middle ground.

Summit to fight extremism draws cheers, jeers

2011-07-08T14:31:00.000-07:00

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1016394--summit-to-fight-extremism-draws-cheers-jeers

DUBLIN—For a conference organized by Internet giant Google, the final few moments were decidedly old school.

There were flip charts, Sharpies, stickers and even a Sesame Street video about Big Bird being bullied.

But make no mistake, the three-day summit to fight violent extremism organized by Google Ideas, a new “think tank/do tank,” was not an elementary affair.

Think of it as a sexy academic conference probing the roots of radicalization with a room of more than 200 Hollywood-worthy tales.

Tuesday began with a panel featuring former Colombian president Alvaro Uribe Velez on stage with a former FARC members and a documentary filmmaker who had been taken hostage in 2003 while a jungle-trekking backpacker.

It was followed by a “mother-to-mother” chat between Aicha el-Wafa, whose son is the so-called “20th hijacker” Zacarias Moussaoui, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton professor and former U.S. State Department Director of Policy Planning.

El-Wafa’s story alone, without the infamy of her son’s tale, silenced the room. “Sadly I was born in a country where a woman is a woman, a second class citizen,” she said of her upbringing in Morocco, where she was forced to marry at 14.

Her first baby died, as did her second, and her husband was physically abusive and targeted their four children. The beatings continued even as they moved to France, she told Slaughter.

But El-Wafa said she sought shelter, divorced, found work as a seamstress and gave Moussaoui and his siblings the best upbringing she could. She didn’t realize her son had grown bitter as a teenager as he was called a “dirty Arab,” or that there was a void in his life that radical Islamists had filled.

“I never really looked further. I wish I had,” she told the crowd. “I’m cross with myself. I didn’t know.”

The day Moussaoui chastised her for not covering her head with a scarf, they parted ways after she retorted: “If you’d rather have a headscarf than a mother, I’m sorry.” Then listening to her son in court proselytized about his hatred for the U.S. and Jews, she said she wanted to shake him and say, “Snap out of it.”

“But,” she told the crowd, “he had been caught up.”

Finding out how to stop youths from being “caught up” — whether they are drawn to violent Islamic extremism, Neo-Nazism or street gangs — was the theme of the conference, co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and Tribeca Film Festival.

Canada’s Mubin Shaikh, no stranger to the spotlight, also took the stage Tuesday on a panel titled: “Deformed Social Network.”

Shaikh had flirted with radical Islamic ideology himself before agreeing to work undercover for Canada’s spy service and federal police force to infiltrate a group of Muslim youths plotting to bomb Toronto targets in 2006.

He was a crowd favourite here as he explained how members of radical groups insulate and protect themselves with righteous armour.

“But the armour can be pierced,” he said. “You’re dealing with human beings, you’re not hacking into machines. You’re getting into people’s hearts and minds.”

So how do you do that?

This is when the arts and crafts — and a little funding — came into play. During afternoon “team sessions” (not open to the media) the delegates separated into groups and devised projects targeting youths.

A website for interpretations of the Qur’an akin to Wikipedia?

A program to develop wristbands and dog tags that preach against violence, imprinted with URL directing them to positive websites?

In the end, the three winning ideas sketched out on large pads of paper and voted most promising by the number of Google Ideas stickers affixed by other participants, were awarded a total of $60,000 in development funds from outside sponsors.

There was little doubt the event had created considerable buzz. But some participants who specialize in Islamic radicalization — the most high profile issue at the conference, even if street gangs likely take more lives — questioned if the summit’s mandate was too broad or if ideas discussed here could affect change.

“You cannot compare Islamic extremists to skinheads who come from abusive homes and terrible childhoods,” one participant scoffed privately.

Those outside the conference, looking in were more vocal in their criticism. Will McCants, former Senior Adviser for Countering Violent Extremism in the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, argued that the ideas generated here are not new.

“I can assure you governments around the world have considered and tried proposals like those put forward at the conference,” he said in an interview.

“They are often poorly resourced and cannot prove they have prevented radicalization . . . They can also cause more harm than good, like making Muslims feel they are a security risk.

“Holding conferences that say ‘See, Muslim radicals are like non-Muslim radicals’ only heightens the stigma. In some ways, preventing radicals from committing crimes does much less harm than trying to make sure they do not become radicals in the first place.”

Council on Foreign Relations’ senior fellow Ed Hussain and author of bestseller The Islamist, admitted he also had reservations coming into the conference, but came away with a different perspective.

“It’s interesting to hear skinheads say they were just as paranoid about the global Jewish conspiracy as Islamist extremists are,” he said in an interview. “White supremacists and Nigerian Christian militia wanted to kill every Muslim they found on the surface of the earth. It was like holding a mirror up to one another.”

Searching for a radical solution to Islamic extremism

2011-07-08T14:25:00.000-07:00

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1014887--searching-for-a-radical-solution-to-islamic-extremism

Watching Mubin and Moe discuss the extremist ideology that is luring young Muslims into far-flung conflicts or pushing them to violence at home is like viewing a tennis match on fast forward.

An idea is lobbed, slammed back and rallied for a bit, and then the point is made.

Although they speak in low tones, their enthusiasm and waving hands are drawing the curiosity of other diners in the downtown Toronto café.

Most Canadians know Mubin Shaikh, the outspoken police insider who infiltrated a group plotting in 2006 to blow up Toronto’s downtown.

Fewer would know Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, or Moe, a 37-year-old, Somalia-born Canadian who has experienced the frontlines of Mogadishu’s relentless war.

They didn’t know each other until recently. Nor did they know Kamran Bokhari, a Pakistan-born, U.S.-raised and -educated analyst with an American private sector intelligence firm whose Mississauga home is so elegantly decorated by his wife that a television design show will feature it this fall.

This trio makes up the Canadian delegation attending an unconventional international gathering in Dublin, Ireland starting on Sunday.

The Summit Against Violent Extremism (SAVE), to be held over three days in a country that is no stranger to sectarian conflict, is the coming-out party for Google Ideas, a new “think tank/do tank” led by former U.S. State Department adviser Jared Cohen.

Co-sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations and the Tribeca Film Festival, the summit has been designed to probe why young people turn to violent extremism.

Organizers have spent six months convincing as many as 90 “formers” — past members of violent groups ranging from neo-Nazis to Islamic extremists to Latin American street gangs — to come together with a hodgepodge of academics and analysts from around the world.

They will join the “survivors” — victims of violence or terrorist attacks. This includes Canadian Amanda Lindhout, who was kidnapped alongside a photographer in August 2008 in Somalia and held in harrowing conditions for 15 months. The aspiring freelance journalist and Australian Nigel Brennan were finally released after a reported $600,000 ransom was paid.

Cohen said in an interview with the Toronto Star this week that he hopes for an “intellectual collision” to help identify the root causes of radicalization.

“I wouldn’t have brought all these people together if I didn’t believe there was a compelling hypothesis,” said Cohen, who worked under both the Bush and Obama administration.

The three Canadians are eager to share their varied experiences and offer advice, but as they departed on Saturday night they also had their own question — why did they have to travel overseas to be heard?

Mohamed says he is frustrated by what he regards as Canadian apathy over the problem of at-risk youths. He says he decided to go public with his story last year in the National Post in the hope of helping to stop Somali youths from being recruited to Mogadishu.

Authorities believe as many as 20 young Somalis have been lured from Canada to join the Shabab, which was designated a terrorist organization in Canada last year. Two Toronto women, one of whom was attending university and whose departure shocked her family, left in February. Sources in Somalia’s transitional government told the Star one is now believed to be training at a Shabab camp.

Mohamed, who has political science degree from Brock University and studied law in Australia, works as a Rexdale security guard and struggles to pay rent. He said the media attention about his story prompted a phone call from a government official, but his later attempts to follow up with Canada’s Public Safety Department went nowhere.

Meanwhile, NATO had tapped him for advice and he was flown to bases in the U.K. and Germany to talk about Somalia’s piracy and insurgency.

Bokhari is not looking for work — he is too busy with his job at STRATFOR, a Texas-based global intelligence company, and finishing his book on radical Islamic thought. But Bokhari feels passionate about Canada and says he too has reached out to various high-level political connections suggesting that more needs to be done.

“I hear back, ‘Yes we need to do something,’ ” the 42-year-old said in an interview at his home this week. “Then there’s nothing. No follow through.”

Bokhari believes there is general reluctance in Canada, both within Muslim communities and at the federal government level, to talk openly about the problem.

“Muslim communities have failed to adopt such measures because they lack a counter-terrorism ethic,” he wrote in a 2006 paper for the Muslim Public Affairs Journal. “Part of this can be explained as a function of their current siege mentality, where the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dialectic. But on the other hand, a lot of this has to do with many Muslims’ inability to distinguish between sentiments of Muslim solidarity and the dire need to view Muslim terrorists as enemies of the community.”

Shaikh’s grievances have been more public. After the Toronto 18 case, he says, he wasn’t prepared for the backlash from many Muslims who regarded him as a traitor. He was also frustrated by what he says is a lack of support from the RCMP, his former employer. Last month, a document released through WikiLeaks revealed that Shaikh had been place on a U.S. no-fly list for “terrorist-related activity,” alongside the names of the convicted terrorists his work had helped lock up. Shaikh says CSIS is looking into correcting it.

It’s an example of why there is mistrust between Muslim communities and authorities here, Shaikh argues. “In effect, what they’re telling the community is swim out to reach the bridge. That’s not how you build bridges.”

He, too, wants to see a more comprehensive program developed by Muslim leaders, with government backing. “There’s this idea that we’re going to arrest and spy this problem away,” said Shaikh. “And if you think that’s what going’s to happen, I have news for you: it doesn’t work like that.”

On Thursday, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced a new, five-year program to combat terrorism while commemorating the 26th anniversary of the Air India bombing. The $10-million initiative will focus on anti-terrorism research and conferences, a press release stated.

It’s certainly not the first attempt to address the problem in the 10 years since 9/11. Check any of the government’s websites that deal with security issues, and there are details on various initiatives launched by Public Safety, the RCMP and Canada’s spy and border services.

The RCMP’s policy is one of cooperation, spokesperson Sgt. Greg Cox stressed in an email to the Star. Success is “measured not just by how many incidents are prevented, but in the way violent extremism is countered in our communities before it is too late.”

But during more than a dozen interviews over the past month with members of both Canada’s Muslim communities and government officials, many said the gap between the community and security agencies has narrowed only slightly in the decade since 9/11. Some pointed to a cultural disconnect and the Conservative government’s emphasis on law enforcement rather than addressing the problem before it becomes one.

Solutions tend to be Ottawa-directed, rather than community-initiated with government support, many said.

Others point to a climate of distrust and how good intentions are sometimes hampered by a lack of coordination among government departments, or by diplomatic red tape.

Take, for instance, the Somali Canadian National Council’s disappointment this month when it tried to bring Ugas Abdirahman, considered royalty in Central Somali and an influential speaker, to a local conference on radicalization and Somalia’s conflict.

Based in Nairobi, he travels often to speak, and a letter of support from Etobicoke North MP Kirsty Duncan was included in his visa application.

But Canada’s High Commission in Nairobi denied entry on the grounds that Abdirahman’s travel history and “purpose of visit” did not convince officials that he would leave Canada at the end of his trip. “He has everything back in Nairobi,” said Abdi Hashised, executive director of the Somali Canadian National Council. “He is an important leader and elders would be listening to him and they could bring the message to the youth. Our credibility is on the line right now with this. They’re disrespecting him and us, the whole Somali community.”

Cohen says this problem — a disconnect between government agencies and individuals or communities — is not unique to Canada and is one of the issues he hopes the Dublin summit will address. “I think what the Canadian (delegates) may find is that there are people around the world who have had similar experiences to them.”

‘Change from within’ is a message often repeated by those who work in the field of de-radicalization or counter-extremism in Canada’s Muslim communities. “If you do it from outside it’s always going to be seen as a foreign imposition — ‘Oh, they’re going to change my religion for me,’ ” Bokhari said.

He described it thus recently in one of his papers: “What needs to be done is to alter the settings of the Muslims’ viewfinder so that they can appreciate alternative discourses without feeling that they are being led away from Islam.”

Bokhari is a long way from the days when, as a student in New York in the early 1990s, he “flirted with Islamism.”

“I was at the City College of New York when I bumped into Hizb-ul-Tahrir (HT),” he said of the days when he attended lectures by members of the now outlawed group.

Then, as an undergrad student in Missouri, he briefly became interested in the newly created, British-based Al Muhajiroun, which was essentially an offshoot of HT. Identified at one point as the group’s “spokesperson,” he received one media inquiry before he drifted away from the group in 1998, when their message became increasingly violent and anti-American.

“One journalist called me up and said, ‘I want to meet bin Laden,’ ” he recalled. “I said, ‘He’s not here in Springfield, Mo.’ ”

But that brief glimpse at the group’s recruiting methods and his understanding of youthful curiosity has helped inform his years of research into the problem since.

Mohamed’s and Shaikh’s experiences are more recent, and both say the key lies in countering the jihadi narrative and perception that the “War on Terror” was essentially a “War on Islam” declared after 9/11.

“Either we leave it and it further devolves into us-versus-them mentality or we actually do something about it,” said Shaikh. “And that involves government really reaching out to communities.”

Mohamed has been on both sides of the war in Somalia. He hails from a politically connected family and immigrated to Canada as a teenager to live with his aunt, after his mother had died in a house fire. He grew up in Rexdale with Somali singing sensation K’Naan. “I used to walk him to school,” he laughed.

In 2004, Mohamed returned to Africa to campaign for his cousin, Hussein Aidid, who was running for president. Aidid lost the election but became deputy prime minister, and Mohamed stayed to serve as his political secretary.

But three years later, when Ethiopian troops backed the unpopular transitional government to oust an Islamic insurgency — largely regarded now as a foreign policy blunder with disastrous consequences — Mohamed switched sides to join the Shabab.

When Ethiopian troops withdrew in 2009, Mohamed left Somalia too. Shortly after, the Shabab pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda.

Mohamed is hoping to make contacts in Dublin who can help him kick-start programs in his own community, since he says he has received greater cooperation from international authorities.

“They know,” he said, “that we need people who can walk the walk and talk the talk.”

Ex-skinhead, former Islamic radical open summit against extremism

2011-07-08T14:23:00.000-07:00

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1015907--ex-skinhead-former-islamic-radical-open-summit-against-extremism

DUBLIN—There was a time when Maajid Nawaz and T.J. Leyden would have never been in the same room, let alone share a stage and handshake.

Nawaz was a British leader of the Hizb ul-Tahrir, a radical Islamic organization that recently made headlines for its alleged infiltration of Pakistan’s army.

Leyden was an American neo-Nazi skinhead by the time he was 14 and member of a racist transnational gang.

Together, they kicked off an unusual conference Monday morning — the Google-sponsored “Summit Against Violent Extremism” — which aims to uncover the roots of radicalization.

Among the 250 guests in the eclectic crowd were former extremists, victims of terrorist attacks, academics, analysts and intelligence specialists.

Aicha el-Wafi, the mother of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called “20th hijacker” sat at a table near Carie Lemack, whose mother died on American Airlines Flight 11 when it crashed into New York’s World Trade Center.

A former member of the Indonesian-based Darul Islam described how he reformed his ways to become a restaurateur.

“I transferred from fighting with an AK-47 to frying crispy duck,” Noor Huda Ismail said in an interview, laughing.

Most panelists said there was no one event, or epiphany, which made them abandon their violent extremist groups, or join in the first place.

And they agreed that it is the early process of recruitment, when potential members are young and looking for acceptance, that should be the focus on figuring out how to steer the next generation away from criminal or terrorist organizations.

“Too often we don’t focus on that youth aspect. It’s because we’re used to seeing violent extremism broken up into different silos — this is a gang issue, this is religious extremist issue, this is a violent nationalist issue, this is a violent right wing extremist issue,” said Jared Cohen, the 29-year-old founder of Google Ideas, a new “think tank / do tank” and main organizer of the summit.

Cohen had worked with the U.S. State Department under the Bush and Obama administrations on issues of radicalization and urged the group to view the threat of extremism “holistically.”

Remarkably for such a diverse group, many of whom were former avowed foes, there was little tension. The only detectable moment came during a panel moderated by Amanda Lindhout, the aspiring Canadian journalist who was held hostage in Somalia for 460 days, and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, who left Toronto to fight with Al Shabab during Ethiopia’s invasion in 2008.

Lindhout had asked Mohamed how he justified the deaths and injuries of civilians while a part of the Somali group, but instead he spoke of the political motivations as to why he went to fight with the Shabab.

Following their panel, Sahsa Havlicek, executive director at the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue, asked if maybe this interaction exemplified “the one conceptual limitation” of the summit.

“It’s a very different thing dealing with extremism in a democratic environment not at war, to dealing with extremism in the context of conflict where you have a near civil war,” she said.

“I think we’re mixing apples and pears here in a slightly dangerous way.”

Others asked why Google was wading into what most view not only as a complex, but politically fraught issue.

Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt said he was growing “impatient” with those who wondered how his company would benefit financially from this endeavour.

“Maybe Google has a little extra time to try to encourage a discussion about important problems . . . The best thing for us as a business to do is absolutely nothing. If we do absolutely nothing, we don’t get criticized,” he said in an interview with the Toronto Star.

He was asked if there was a perceived responsibility to act due to the Internet’s influence in recruiting youths — such as the wildly popular online preaching of U.S.-born Yemeni Anwar al Awlaki that motivated among others, the members of the Toronto group convicted of a 2006 terrorism plot.

“That’s a good question,” he said. “We have not framed it that way, so this is not in response to something, but perhaps we do have a responsibility and this helps explore that.”

Former violent extremists sign up for Dublin summit

2011-06-23T17:24:00.000-07:00

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2011/0321/1224292709542.html#.TgPASkK1Kjs.facebook

JAMIE SMYTH, Social Affairs Correspondent

FIFTY FORMER violent extremists, including neo-Nazis, Islamic fundamentalists and drugs gang members, are to attend a summit in Dublin co-hosted by Google’s new “think/do tank”, Google Ideas.

The technology company has teamed up with the US think tank Council on Foreign Relations to hold the “Summit Against Violent Extremism” from June 26th to 29th.

Victims of terrorism, diplomats, academics, civil society organisations and the private sector will take part in the summit, which aims to generate new and innovative ways to address the threat posed by radicalisation.

“This is our [Google Ideas] first public event and part of the reason why we are doing this is that radicalisation is a really tough challenge that we face,” said Jared Cohen, director of Google Ideas.

He said Dublin was chosen as the location because of its positive experience of dealing with violent extremism in the Northern Ireland peace process. It is also centrally located for participants, who will travel from all over the world to attend, he said.

The Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation has been asked to share its experience in working with former paramilitaries in Northern Ireland at the summit.

“Symbolically Ireland’s experience with violent extremism has been one that we have seen has proven to be important,” said Mr Cohen.

Several former radicals, who have renounced extremism and are now working to prevent radicalisation, have signed up for the summit. They include TJ Leyden, a former neo-Nazi who has set up a foundation to combat bigotry; Maajid Nawaz, a former member of the Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir; and Susan Cruz, a former member of one of the most notorious Latino gangs in the US.

Ms Cruz said the idea that the children who join the drugs gangs in the US are different to those children attracted to religious extremist groups, and who end up as suicide bombers, was wrong. “They may dress different[ly], their language may be different but fundamentally deep down inside the child that joins a gang is the same child that joins a militia or an extremist religious group . . . they are all looking for the same things,” said Ms Cruz, who works with children to steer them away from violent gangs in the US. Shot and imprisoned when she was a gang member in Los Angeles, she said she hoped the summit would find solutions to help children stay away from extremist groups and provide hope that people can change.

Google is interested in the way technology is used by extremist groups to recruit members and by pro-democracy demonstrators in North Africa and the Middle East.

*** I will be a speaker for Idea 6: Deformed Social Network: to get involved in a radical group, you have to talk to certain people (recruiters, fellow members, etc.). But who do you have to stop talking to? This panel explores how the radicalization process encourages and is itself encouraged by social isolation. Panelists will explore both how people’s social networks evolve through the radicalization and deradicalization process, as well as the role of technology in getting kids into and out of radical groups. MS ***

Osama bin Laden's Death: Obama's Biggest Mistake?

2011-06-18T09:08:00.000-07:00

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/05/04/former-pakistan-intelligence-chief-hamid-gul-rails-against-killing-of-bin-laden.html?cid=outbrain:external&obref=obnetwork

Former Pakistan Intel Chief Hamid Gul warns that, far from a triumph, Osama bin Laden’s killing was a strategic blunder for the U.S.—and the consequences will be dire, he tells Ron Moreau.

Few people know and understand jihadis as well as retired Pakistan Army Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul. From 1987 to 1989, at the height of the struggle of the Afghan and Arab mujahideen against the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan, Gul headed Pakistan’s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI). Then, he worked closely with his CIA counterparts funneling weapons, delivering money and providing advice to fighters. In the intervening years, however, Gul became a strong advocate for the Taliban—and before 9/11 even for Osama bin Laden, whom he met back in 1993 in the Sudan.As a result, Gul, who is now 74, has been accused of being a “political ideologue of terror” (by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in the pages of Newsweek) and of even advising and assisting the Taliban’s war against U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the Kabul government.

“For the past five to seven years [bin Laden] had receded into history. They should have allowed him to die naturally. He was a sick man … He is going to be a bigger menace for the U.S. because his legend will live on.”

In an interview with The Daily Beast immediately following the killing of Osama bin Laden, Gul argues that the U.S. would have been smarter to let the head of al Qaeda just fade into history. “The U.S. made a huge mistaking killing him,” Gul says. “For the past five to seven years he had receded into history. They should have allowed him to die naturally. He was a sick man.” Now as a martyr he will even be more dangerous. “He is going to be a bigger menace for the U.S. because his legend will live on.”

Gul flatly denies that the ISI was harboring bin Laden or that it actively supports al Qaeda. “The ISI-al Qaeda connection is very farfetched,” he says. “That’s nonsense and bunkum.” He believes the intelligence failure should be shared equally by ISI and the CIA, not just the Pakistanis. “This is a failure that should be shared by the American intelligence agencies as well because they have superior intelligence (gathering) resources.” He says, “So this is a very unfair tirade against the ISI.”

Gul believes Pakistanis will soon start demanding that Pakistan seriously review its policy of cooperation with the U.S. and perhaps demand their government and army withdraw from participating in the war on terrorism. “Now it is time to call it off, or at least seriously review our cooperation with America.”

More excerpts from the interview:

-On the fallout from bin Laden’s death: We will see more anger and more activity because I think he was a drag on al Qaeda. They had to hide him and finance him. Now that he is out of the way I think their hands will not be so much tied. They will be more active and will have more motivation driving them. So I think there is going to be a greater reaction from the jihadis.

-On a new bin Laden legend forming: The fact is Osama had virtually vanished from people’s memories, especially in the wake of this popular Arab uprising. Now Osama’s death and the myth that’s building about how he stood up, went to the roof and personally brought down one of the helicopters, will energize people. That’s the antithesis of Saddam Hussein who was pulled out of a rat hole and humiliated. The Arab psyche suffered a great setback on account of that. Now those deep scars are going to be repaired because of the actions of this man (OBL.) This is the kind of stuff that folklore is made of. If they had followed him for the past year they should have let him live on and used other techniques to eliminate him.

-On celebrations in the U.S. following bin Laden’s death: America has made a huge mistake in rejoicing over his death. I was aghast as seeing Hillary Clinton’s statement foreshadowing a harder line toward the Taliban. Previously she was saying we will talk to the Taliban but now she has come back to square one saying they will have to put down their weapons. Instead of trimming his sails Obama is trying go harder, faster. They seem to be upbeat and now want to go for the kill (against the Taliban.)

-On charges that the ISI was harboring him: All the blame for this is being dumped on the ISI. Let me tell you one thing. The CIA and FBI and all the other Western intelligence agencies say that the ISI was deliberately harboring him. That’s nonsense and bunkum. The ISI never had any connection with al Qaeda. With the Taliban, yes. But even in my days (when I headed the ISI) we never had any contact with him. The ISI was not in contact with any Arabs, no Arab jihadis.

-On the CIA’s love for bin Laden in the 1980s: The CIA was singing the praises of Osama bin Laden. I heard from them that there is this prince who descended from the heavens and is helping the mujahideen. They used to romanticize him. This man had done a great deal. He was up in the frontlines and was wounded twice. He had tunneled into the mountainside where he stored all this weaponry. He built roads for the mujahideen to carry their weapons across the countryside. Each of the mujahideen groups supported and got money from him.

-On the ISI’s intelligence failure: The ISI had an intelligence failure. We should have known that these people (al Qaeda) had developed a pattern from Khaled Sheikh Mohammed to Abu Faraj al-Libi and others; they were all caught in the cities. The ISI, CIA, and FBI should have known that the places to look for them were not in the tribal areas but in the cities.

-On the setback to U.S.-Pakistani cooperation: The people of Pakistan are smelling a rat. Now we hear (Gen. David) Petraeus is going to start fighting a third theater of war inside Pakistan. So now the people of Pakistan are very alarmed. People are angry at the armed forces of Pakistan for having allowed these raiders to come through without being challenged. They are attacking the ISI. But eventually the anger will turn against cooperation with America. People will demand that this policy (of cooperation) should be reviewed especially in the light of this symbol of terrorism having been eliminated. Now it is time to call it (the war against terrorism) off or at least seriously review our cooperation with America.

Ron Moreau is Newsweek’s Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent and has been covering the region for the magazine the past 10 years. Since he first joined Newsweek during the Vietnam War, he has reported extensively from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

*** I feel for President Obama: Americans hate him for being Muslim and Muslims hate him for being American. ;) MS ***

Al Qaeda posts hit list of Americans online

2011-06-18T09:00:00.000-07:00

http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/al-qaeda-posts-hit-list-americans-online

Terrorists on al Qaeda web forum have posted a hit list of prominent politicians, military officials, and individuals in what government officials fear is an attempt to spur lone wolf attacks; on Ansar al-Mujahideen, an al Qaeda run website that is among the top ten outlets for distributing jihadi propaganda, terrorists posted a list that contains the names of Pentagon officials, defense contractors, Congressional members, and private individuals

Terrorists on al Qaeda web forum have posted a hit list of prominent politicians, military officials, and individuals in what government officials fear is an attempt to spur lone wolf attacks.

On Ansar al-Mujahideen, an al Qaeda run website that is among the top ten outlets for distributing jihadi propaganda, terrorists posted a list that contains the names of Pentagon officials, defense contractors, Congressional members, and private individuals.

In response, last week the FBI and DHS issued a terror bulletin listing potential targets that had been mentioned on the site.

Religious extremists began compiling the list after Adam Gadahn, the chief spokesman for al Qaeda, released a video message urging jihadists to take attack Americans and other infidels.

In the video, Gadahn mentioned how easy it was to purchase a weapon in the United States, citing Major Nidal Hasan, the gunman behind the Fort Hood massacre, as an example of a hero executed a successful attack.

Terrorists have been contributing to the list all week and are currently discussing which targets or leaders should be added to the list.

Officials believe that the list could be in retaliation for the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

A federal law enforcement official speaking anonymously to CBS News said that the chatter on the forum was largely aspirational and that no specific threat has emerged.

Another source speaking anonymously added that the forum seems to suggest a shift in philosophy within al Qaeda that prefers smaller attacks carried out by individuals acting as lone wolfs rather than the complex mass casualty attacks like 9/11.

*** This is why the NARRATIVE is so important - we talk about "winning hearts & minds" but we do NOTHING in support of it. Now, we're dealing with ideologues who are capitalizing on the fact that NO significant counter narrative exists. In fact, society is given them ammunition by constantly demonizing Islam any chance the lamestream media can get. HOW is it humanly sensible to counter the jihadist narrative that the West is out to destroy Islam by fuelling the narrative through constant demonization?

Quick: let's all act surprised when radicalization is deemed to be completely out of control - maybe that will deflect the fact that the blame lies with US in not doing anything about it. MS ***

Canadian's terrorism trial points to Pakistani double game

2011-06-11T15:49:00.000-07:00

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/06/10/f-vp-gillespie-pakistan-headley.html

Tahawwur Rana was on trial in Chicago on charges of supporting terrorism, but it was his best friend, David Headley, who grabbed the attention of the international media and, no doubt, the U.S. State Department.

Headley took the witness stand and blew the whistle on Pakistan’s covert support for terrorism. Headley is a U.S. citizen but, more importantly, an ethnic Pakistani super-patriot. He despises India and, like most Pakistanis, he passionately believes the disputed Kashmir region belongs to entirely to his native country.

At Rana's trial, Headley admitted he was a member of the violent Pakistani extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. Posing as a representative of Rana’s First World Immigration consulting company, Headley travelled to Mumbai five times between 2006 and 2008 to scout out targets for Lashkar’s Mumbai attackers.

Following the attacks he used the same cover story in Copenhagen. There, at the behest of alleged al-Qaeda operations chief Ilyas Kashmiri, he did surveillance on the Jylands-Posten newspaper. JP is the newspaper that once published controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.

Testifies against friend

Headley is a bona fide insider in the tightly knit world of Islamist terrorism and therefore of enormous interest to U.S. intelligence. To avoid the death penalty, he cut a deal with U.S. federal prosecutors. He would testify against his friend Rana in exchange for telling the FBI everything he knew about the fractious world of terrorism in Pakistan.

In dramatic testimony, Headley confirmed what the Indian government has long alleged and the government of Pakistan has long denied: the Lashkar attackers were trained, equipped and bank-rolled by Pakistan’s military intelligence agency — the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI — and, by extension, the Pakistani government.

Coming on the heels of the recent discovery that Osama Bin Laden for years hid in plain sight just a few kilometres from Pakistan’s elite military academy, Headley’s testimony has implications for Washington’s shaky foreign policy relationship with its erstwhile South Asian ally.

The CIA has been concerned for years that Pakistan is playing a double game – claiming to fight Islamist terrorist organizations in order to obtain billions in U.S. aid, while at the same time supporting and providing a safe haven for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The Institute for Conflict Management, a New Delhi-based think-tank that keeps a daily record of terrorist incidents in South Asia, alleges that at present there are 43 active terrorist groups. Some, such as Lashkar, receive support from the Pakistani military and members of the country’s wealthy Islamist anti-American elite, and some do not.

5 kinds of terrorist groups in South Asia

A study done recently by a U.S. government think-tank exclusively for members of Congress and obtained by CBC News sorts the groups into five categories.

Globally oriented groups such as al-Qaeda, Afghanistan-oriented militants such as the Quetta-Shura, led by the Taliban’s Mullah Omar, India- and Kashmir-oriented groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, violent sectarian militants such as the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Shabah, and domestically oriented militants that have turned on the Pakistani government.

Islamist extremism in Pakistan is a front-burner U.S. policy concern in Washington these days. Since Sept. 11 attacks, the U.S. has given Pakistan $20 billion in military and foreign aid. The quid pro quo was supposed to be that Pakistan would fight terrorism.

Headley’s testimony that the Pakistani military intelligence was behind the Mumbai attacks buttressed criticism from members of the U.S. Congress that Pakistan is playing a double game Pakistan’s under-the-table support for terrorist groups hinders the effort by the U.S. and NATO to defeat al-Qaeda and stabilize Afghanistan.

It also underlines a concern voiced by Canadian and American intelligence experts that young radicalized Muslim men from the West are trickling into remote militant training camps in Pakistan’s frontier provinces to learn terrorist tradecraft and will someday return to put their terrorist training to use at home. There are already examples.

Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin who, in May 2010, attempted to set off a crudely constructed car bomb in New York’s Times Square.

The Pakistan Taliban claimed responsibility. And when the leaders of the Toronto 18 were looking to get terrorism training, Lashkar-e-Taiba was the group they contacted.

Troubled relationship underscored

The congressional study says the recent revelation that al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden enjoyed apparently several years of relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan has led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of its deeply troubled bilateral relationship with Pakistan.

Congressmen on both sides of the House, according to the congressional study paper, are questioning the wisdom of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs being given to a nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner.

Even so, the study also concludes the U.S. cannot afford to throw its apparently double-dealing ally under the bus. If it did, China, or perhaps Iran, might be happy to step in and be Pakistan’s new best friend.

In addition, an important goal of U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 period is the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan that would combat religious militancy and help prevent another 9/11 style attack on the U.S. Since Pakistan is the epicentre of Islamist anti-Amerian militancy, the U.S. will have to stay engaged in Pakistan no matter how much it suspects its erstwhile ally is playing a double game.

Bill Gillespie is an award-winning CBC journalist who covered the trial of Tahawwur Rana in Chicago.

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW with Shareef AbdelHaleem

2011-06-07T12:12:00.000-07:00

http://www.globaltvbc.com/programs/16x9/This+Week+June+Conversation+with+Terrorist/4889508/story.html

Canada is not immune to the threat of terrorism. In 2006, we came dangerously close. A cell of home-grown terrorists was preparing acts of extreme violence when Canadian authorities infiltrated the group. That group became known as the Toronto 18. No member has spoken publicly - until now.

Shareef Abdelhaleem agreed to an exclusive jailhouse interview with the host of 16:9 The Bigger Picture, Mary Garofalo. We sat down with him at the Maplehurst correctional complex in Milton, Ontario shortly after he was sentenced to life behind bars with no chance of parole for ten years.

In this intimate conversation with a terrorist, Abdelhaleem explained how he went from a wealthy self-made man to a man RCMP called one of the “principal architects” of a frightening plan to attack Canada. He told 16:9 the change didn’t happen overnight.

“This is madness,” he said. “It is stupidity to think that I just woke up one morning and said, ‘You know I think I want to go kill 5 or 6 people today.’ You think that is what went on?”

In fact, Abdelhaleem told 16:9 his transformation took years. His family immigrated to Canada from Egypt when he was thirteen, settling in Mississauga. He told 16:9 his family was religious.

“The five standards of Islam were obeyed. Let’s put it that way,” he said. “Prayers had to be said.”

After university, Abdelhaleem started his own computer programming company. He was earning as much as $350,000 a year, driving a baby blue BMW convertible and living like a king. Until he met Zakaria Amara, the so-called ringleader of the Toronto 18 bomb plot.

“I sympathized with his points of view, you know the injustices that are happening to the east and to the Muslims,” Abdelhaleem told 16:9. “And these are not perceived injustices. They’re real.”

The plot included setting off one tonne ammonium nitrate bombs at three targets: the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Toronto offices of Canada’s spy agency, CSIS, and a military base in eastern Ontario.

Still, Abdelhaleem told 16:9 he doesn’t think death and violence were the group’s true aim.

“The point is not to hurt. The point is to actually keep casualties at a minimum - If not zero,” he said. “If by some chance someone could get hurt, right, it is a possibility but not a likelihood. What it is, is it’s a wake up call to western governments.”

That wake-up call was going to go all the way to Ottawa. The enraged group also allegedly planned to storm Parliament, holding MPs hostage and beheading them one by one until Canadian troops were pulled out of Afghanistan.

Fortunately, the group’s plans never made it that far. In June 2006, a dramatic police take-down ended the plot, intercepting the delivery of what the would-be terrorists thought were bomb-making materials. Across Toronto, the police made simultaneous arrests.

Abdelhaleem was among those arrested. He was later found guilty of participating in a terrorist group and of intending to cause an explosion. The judge said he showed no remorse. Abdelhaleem told 16:9 that’s not true.

“I did what I did because I was sucked into it,” he said. “I did have sympathy for the cause. If it wasn’t for that sympathy I would have gone to the police… I disagree with the labelling unremorseful. I am remorseful.”

At the same time, Adbelhaleem told 16:9 he believes Canada’s foreign policy makes our country a target for terrorist acts.

“Canada stopped being a neutral country with the ushering of our current government,” he told 16:9. “It is no longer neutral. It does back up the state of Israel which enslaves many Palestinians.”

For more of our exclusive jailhouse interview with Abdelhaleem and for our story on the men who say they can reach and reform even the most radical terrorists, watch 16:9’s season finale this Saturday.

© Copyright (c) Shaw Media Inc.

*** LEARN from these cases. KNOW how to counter the narrative, TREAT those who are affected by it - either through prevention (better than cure) or through incarceration (is it really a "cure" or does it just make things worse? Let's talk about it). Perhaps discussion on the death penalty for terrorism cases is what it takes to really make the point that terrorism is by its nature, a full frontal assault against the state and its legitimacy. Discussion is needed on SO MANY issues - threatening death alone may not serve as strong a deterrent and will not dissuade the more committed so clearly gaps still exist in the understanding of this threat even ten years after 9/11. MS ***

Why open these legal loopholes for terrorists?

2011-06-05T12:15:00.000-07:00

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8528386/Why-open-these-legal-loopholes-for-terrorists.html

Telegraph View: Judges must pay more attention to public safety, and less to legal technicalities

Should the Home Secretary have the power to exclude from entering the United Kingdom those people she has reasonable grounds for thinking pose a threat to the safety and security of the rest of us? Most voters think the answer to that question is "Yes". Our judges, however, disagree. Since they decide whether the law has been properly complied with, they feel they should have the last word on whether any individual should be deported in order to secure "the public good".

As we report today, the latest skirmish in that long conflict has ended in another defeat for the Home Secretary, who has once again been obliged to allow an individual believed to be involved in terrorism to remain at liberty here. The Court of Appeal ruled that a Tunisian identified only as "MK" must be allowed to stay in Britain while his appeal against deportation is heard: that process has so far taken nine months, and counting. "MK" has one conviction for a terrorism-related offence in Tunisia, and another for forging documents in Italy. There is evidence that he has been involved in "extremist radicalisation". That, however, did not carry any weight with the judges. They stated that the wording of the relevant statute "does not provide a power to exclude [an individual] in the limited circumstances contemplated". Poor drafting of the 2002 Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act, another of Labour's misbegotten legislative legacies, may be responsible: a large part of the ruling centred on the meaning of the word "while" in the phrase "while he is in the United Kingdom". Yet an issue as fundamental as whether or not an individual poses a threat to Britain's security should surely not be decided on so flimsy a basis. This is not the essence of the rule of law: it is the essence of pedantry.

It is important to be clear that the issue here is not whether the Home Secretary should have unfettered discretion to throw out whomever she chooses. The dispute is rather about how far the judiciary should be able to substitute their judgement for hers on the matter of whether or not public safety is compatible with the continued presence of someone believed to be involved in terrorism. We find it extremely difficult to understand why the judges cannot appreciate that, when the Home Secretary makes a determination that an individual's presence is not conducive to the public good, the decision has been made after careful consideration of all the relevant facts. There should be a presumption against overturning it – even if there is some interpretation of the statutes which suggests that she did not exercise her power precisely as conferred.

It is notable that Britain's judges appear to be alone in Europe in their determination to overturn decisions by government officials about the dangers posed by individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism. In France and in Italy, there is no question of someone whom the state wishes to deport being allowed to remain in the country because he has to be able to launch an appeal. Our present Government could no doubt introduce new primary legislation that would close the loophole – but while the judges maintain their present attitude, it is hard to believe that they would not find a way round it, and again allow suspected terrorists to stay in the UK. The judiciary has repeatedly demonstrated an alarming lack of awareness of the seriousness of the problem posed by terrorism. The safety of our country is too important to be left to their decisions.

* Don't think for a SECOND that extremists and terrorists would ever reciprocate the respect of the rule of law and due process. Those who have proven themselves committed to the complete destruction of the West DO NOT deserve the benefit of legal doubt but rather, deserve the full weight of the law upon their heads JUST as they would say of Shariah Law upon others. MS *

MI6 attacks al-Qaeda in 'Operation Cupcake'

2011-06-05T11:54:00.000-07:00

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8553366/MI6-attacks-al-Qaeda-in-Operation-Cupcake.html

British intelligence has hacked into an al-Qaeda online magazine and replaced bomb-making instructions with a recipe for cupcakes.

By Duncan Gardham, Security Correspondent

7:16PM BST 02 Jun 2011

The cyber-warfare operation was launched by MI6 and GCHQ in an attempt to disrupt efforts by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular to recruit “lone-wolf” terrorists with a new English-language magazine, the Daily Telegraph understands.

When followers tried to download the 67-page colour magazine, instead of instructions about how to “Make a bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom” by “The AQ Chef” they were greeted with garbled computer code.

The code, which had been inserted into the original magazine by the British intelligence hackers, was actually a web page of recipes for “The Best Cupcakes in America” published by the Ellen DeGeneres chat show.

Written by Dulcy Israel and produced by Main Street Cupcakes in Hudson, Ohio, it said “the little cupcake is big again” adding: “Self-contained and satisfying, it summons memories of childhood even as it's updated for today’s sweet-toothed hipsters.”

It included a recipe for the Mojito Cupcake – “made of white rum cake and draped in vanilla buttercream”- and the Rocky Road Cupcake – “warning: sugar rush ahead!”

By contrast, the original magazine featured a recipe showing how to make a lethal pipe bomb using sugar, match heads and a miniature lightbulb, attached to a timer.

The cyber attack also removed articles by Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and a piece called “What to expect in Jihad.”

British and US intelligence planned separate attacks after learning that the magazine was about to be issued in June last year.

They have both developed a variety of cyber-weapons such as computer viruses, to use against both enemy states and terrorists.

A Pentagon operation, backed by Gen Keith Alexander, the head of US Cyber Command, was blocked by the CIA which argued that it would expose sources and methods and disrupt an important source of intelligence, according to a report in America.

However the Daily Telegraph understands an operation was launched from Britain instead.

Al-Qaeda was able to reissue the magazine two weeks later and has gone on to produce four further editions but one source said British intelligence was continuing to target online outlets publishing the magazine because it is viewed as such a powerful propaganda tool.

The magazine is produced by the radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, one of the leaders of AQAP who has lived in Britain and the US, and his associate Samir Khan from North Carolina.

Both men who are thought to be in Yemen, have associated with radicals connected to Rajib Karim, a British resident jailed for 30 years in March for plotting to smuggle a bomb onto a trans-Atlantic aircraft.

At the time Inspire was launched, US government officials said “the packaging of this magazine may be slick, but the contents are as vile as the authors.”

Bruce Reidel, a former CIA analyst said it was “clearly intended for the aspiring jihadist in the US or UK who may be the next Fort Hood murderer or Times Square bomber.”

In recent days AQAP fighters have capitalised on chaos in Yemen, as the country teeters on the brink of civil war.

Tribal forces marching towards the capital, Sana'a, clashed with troops loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh for a third day running yesterday.

*** BRILLIANT!! :) ***

BIn Laden wives fight over who sold him out ...

2011-05-22T13:52:00.000-07:00

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/talk-of-who-betrayed-osama-bin-laden-sparks-a-harem-scuffle/story-e6frg6so-1226060643865

THE three widows of Osama bin Laden are turning on each other in custody, with two older Saudi women blaming a much younger Yemeni wife for leading US intelligence to their hideout.

"It's vicious," said a Pakistani official briefed on the interrogation of the widows.

"The older wives think the younger one tipped off the Americans or was tracked when she came to join him."

The al-Qa'ida leader was living with three wives when he was killed in Abbottabad three weeks ago. Until US investigators discovered his hiding place, it was not known whether bin Laden and his family were alive. Some reports suggested they had been killed in the US bombing of Afghanistan.e

Although the compound where bin Laden hid for five years was large, the three wives were all cooped up in the same house. The older two lived on the second floor and the youngest one on the top. Their husband alternated between them. Pakistani officials who have been debriefing the women portray life in the compound as an Islamic version of Desperate Housewives.

"It's a well-known fact that when you have two older wives and then this young one comes along half their age, they don't like it," said one.

The wives even dispute who tried to protect their husband in the raid. The youngest was reported to have attempted to save him, sustaining a bullet wound to her calf. But the older wives say they were the ones who rushed to shield him.

Their version appears to be corroborated by an account of the raid, given by US officials last week. They said that when the Navy SEALs reached the top floor, two women were in front of bin Laden, trying to protect him. One SEAL shoved them away, fearing they might be wearing suicide bomb vests.

Bin Laden's third and fourth wives, the older Saudi women, married him in the 1980s.

At 62, Khaira Husain Sabir is eight years older than her husband. Known as Umm Hamza, or mother of Hamza, she has a degree in Arabic and before their marriage in 1985 worked as a teacher of deaf children.

Siham Abdulla bin Husain, 54, known as Umm Khalid - mother of Khalid, a son who was killed in the raid - has a doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence, and taught Arabic. The two women converted a room in the Abbottabad compound into a classroom for Khaira's grandchildren.

Bin Laden's first marriage was in 1974 to his Syrian cousin, Najwa, when he was 17 and she just 15. Described by her sister-in-law Carmen bin Laden as "meek, submissive, highly religious and constantly pregnant", she had 11 children, the last one just before the September 11 attacks of 2001. His second wife, Khalifa, was a Saudi teacher who divorced him.

According to Najwa, who with her son Omar co-wrote a book, Growing Up Bin Laden, the original four had such good relations she called the others her "sister wives". A fifth marriage lasted only 48 hours. But the older wives resented Amal Ahmed al-Sadah, a Yemeni whom bin Laden married in July 2000 when she was 17. Even his mother was said to have told him off.

According to Najwa's account, he kept his wives behind walls from the start. Expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1991, they spent five years in Sudan, until the Khartoum government kicked them out and they travelled to Afghanistan. They lived on a mountainside in Tora Bora until the Taliban took power, when they moved to Kandahar. Apart from their time in Tora Bora, the wives always had separate houses or apartments. Bin Laden divided his nights between them.

"The joke in Pakistan is that bin Laden called in his location to CIA because he was being driven mad cooped up for five years with so many wives and children," said Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik.

Electricity bills seen by The Sunday Times show that the compound used hardly any power, just enough for lights and a small television that bin Laden kept in his top-floor bedroom. Even before going on the run, his wives found that their husband lived a remarkably austere life.

His first wife recounts how he refused to allow airconditioners or a refrigerator, even in the sweltering desert heat. She, her son Omar and her youngest children escaped Afghanistan in 2001 only days before the September 11 attacks. When the US responded by bombing Afghanistan, the al-Qa'ida leader fled to Tora Bora.

Pakistani officials said the wives crossed the border into western Pakistan. From there Khaira and Siham travelled by land into Iran. Amal made her way back to Yemen, where she gave birth to a daughter, Safiyah.

At some point bin Laden appears to have become lonely and summoned them all back. First to arrive was Siham - then Khaira and their son, Hamza, and then Amal.

"No one wants to hear it, but bin Laden is a very good family man," said Mike Scheuer, former head of the CIA's bin Laden unit.

It was a huge risk. While the CIA may have lost track of some of the wives in Iran, it seems likely Amal had been under surveillance since 2002, when she gave an interview to al-Majalla, a Saudi magazine in London.

"The agency and every conceivable agency were looking for them," said Glenn Carle, a former CIA official.

"It's not an implausible suspicion that someone who was outside could lead, either innocently or deliberately, to him."

The growing number of people living in the compound meant more food had to be ordered. The extra shopping may have raised suspicions. Malik said the youngest wife gave birth to twins this year in the Abbottabad hospital.

"Not using cellphone or internet, that's all sound professional strategy," said Carle.

"But living behind 18ft (5.5m) walls with large numbers of women and kids is not."

Some reports suggest the SEALs intended to take the wives with them but the crash of their stealth helicopter meant they did not have enough room. The youngest is now under guard in Rawalpindi military hospital and the other two in an intelligence service safe house in Islamabad.

Mubin Shaikh put on terrorism watchlist?

2011-05-19T01:44:00.000-07:00

YES it is true a number of articles have emerged on this story:

http://www.thestar.com/article/993475--walkom-csis-mistakenly-fingers-its-own-mole

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/05/18/mubin-shaikh-wikileaks.html

and my fav:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/us-border-chief-says-terror-threat-greater-from-canada-than-mexico/article2027713/

^ because its sums it up best:

“Clearly it’s a mistake,” Mr. Shaikh said in an interview. He argued that most people who are on watch lists belong on the lists, and that he has “compete confidence” in Canada’s ability to safeguard intelligence sources.

That's all it is folks. :)

Discourse: Islam as an ideology is a threat to Islam itself

2011-05-16T14:55:00.000-07:00

FROM: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/16/islam-ideology-a-threat-islam-itself.html

K.H. Mustofa Bisri, an influential Muslim cleric and a respected figure in Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Islamic organization, visited Brussels and Washington recently to launch the English edition of the book The Illusion of an Islamic State. Gus Mus, as he is popularly known, wrote in the epilogue to the book in that he advocated learning as a way of countering the threat of Islamic radicalism. While in Washington, he spoke with
The Jakarta Post’s senior editor Endy M. Bayuni about the threat from Islamic political ideology.

Question: You said Muslims must never stop learning as an effective way of countering radicalism. How is that so?

Answer: Life is a never-ending process of learning. Problems arise when people stop learning because they think they are already perfect and they see others as deviants. The Prophet said you never stop learning from the cradle to the grave. Fear of the West in the Islamic world and Islamophobia in the West develop because everyone stops learning. In the West, they see hard-liners setting the benchmark of what Islam stands for, not knowing that there is a large Muslim community (in Indonesia) that follows a different path
of Islam.

But going back to the Muslim world, many argue that too much learning of Islamic ideology among Muslims actually drives the radicalization process.

That’s not true. The better they understand their religion, the stronger their faith will be in their religion and they will not feel threatened by other religions. In fact, they will become more tolerant of others because of their strength. Those who don’t have such strength suffer from inferiority complexes. Out of fear, they begin to threaten others.

But the some of these radical ideologies originate from centers of Islamic studies.

They learn parts of Islam but not all. They study mostly fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and they think this is all of Islam. Fiqh is a small part. If you stop at fiqh, you approach God only in fear, you fear His reprisals. Religion also teaches love and akhlaq (virtues). Prophet Muhammad said he was sent not to do anything but to perfect the religions that already existed then. Like a constructed building, Islam is the last brick in the structure. Islam did not come to destroy everything and rebuild from the ground up. Fiqh ignores this aspect, and because of this, it emphasizes matters such as prayers, ablutions and giving alms. Religious instructions similarly focus on these matters. It hardly brings people closer to God.

How do you explain the rising intolerance in Muslim societies, including in Indonesia?

I say learn: Learn everything, learn the whole and not just certain parts. In pesantren (Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia) there was a time when they taught everything. Now they teach you to become specialists. Like doctors, instead of general practitioners, we have specialists. It’s the same in Islam. There are specialists of all kinds, in fiqh and others. In pesantren, they learn fiqh but they forget about tasauf (spiritual knowledge) and akhlaq.

So whatever happened to Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the two Islamic mass-based organizations that played an important role in moderating Islam in Indonesia?

NU and Muhammadiyah have become too comfortable as part of the establishment. With the emerging threats of intolerance and radicalization, they are waking up from their slumber. The good thing is they are now united in fighting this threat instead of fighting each other over fiqh. They are united on issues of the virtues and creed.

Your book discusses the threat of the ideology that seeks to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state. Yet Indonesia is nowhere near becoming one. So where is the threat?

When religion is turned into political ideology, it is a serious threat. Politicians like to use religion as a tool for achieving political goals. It’s like you’ve brought along God on the campaign trail. Because they lack self-confidence, they have to bring in God. The violent conflicts (between Muslims and people of other faiths) we are seeing in Indonesia are politically motivated. They have nothing to do with the religion. Some people, because of their economic conditions, are easily influenced by political slogans heavy in religious symbols.

So, you disagree with parties that use Islam as their ideology?

Islam is not a goal, it is a means to reach God. When you use Islam as political ideology, you are sowing conflicts that prevent people from reaching God. In the Middle East, they know it is dangerous to use Islam as a political ideology, so it is banned. Those who use Islam as ideology see themselves as better than others, and they see others as evil.

Endy M. Bayuni is currently a visiting fellow at the East West Center in Washington.

*** And you're trying to tell me WE can't exploit these principles HERE in North America? I refuse to believe we are that incompetent! MS ***

Islamic ideology is ‘more dangerous than terrorism’

2011-05-16T14:40:00.000-07:00

FROM: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/16/islamic-ideology-%E2%80%98more-dangerous-terrorism%E2%80%99.html

Endy M. Bayuni, The Jakarta Post, Washington, DC | Mon, 05/16/2011 10:51 PM | World

Amidst the euphoria over the killing of Osama bin Laden by the United States, a new book on Islam in Indonesia is cautioning Washington that an ideology that preaches hatred and violence is much more dangerous than the terrorist acts that Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network posed.

The Illusion of an Islamic State however makes it clear that Islam itself is “a blessing for all creation” (rahmatan lil-alamin) and that people in the West, as many Indonesians do, must make a clear distinction between Islam as a religion, which preaches peace and tolerance, and Islam as a political ideology, which preaches hatred and intolerance.

The book’s original Indonesian version was launched in 2009 as a common response from moderate Islamic groups to the growing threat of radicalism that comes from the use of Islam as a political ideology.

The work is a collaboration of scholars linked to the Wahid and the Maarif institutes, Indonesian organizations known for preaching tolerance and pluralism, and the US-based LibforAll Foundation, which was co-founded by the late former Indonesian president Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid and C. Holland Taylor.

The English translation of the book was recently launched in Washington and Brussels with seminars featuring Taylor and respected Indonesian Muslim scholar Mustofa Bisri from Nahdlatul Ulama.

The Washington launch at the Heritage Foundation was timely, as the US is struggling to find an appropriate policy for the Arab world in the wake of the Arab Spring and the killing of Bin Laden.

In Brussels, the launch was facilitated by the European Parliament and the Indonesian Embassy in Belgium.

“There is a tendency for Western governments to focus on terrorism. We believe that ideology is much more dangerous than bombs,” Taylor said in an interview prior to the launch.

He urged the West to look at moderate Islamic forces in Indonesia that not only have beaten back the extremist ideology associated with the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahabism, but were also able to reconcile Islam with values normally associated with modernity.

“The book contains a theological rejection of the politicized agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahabism, and it points a path through which Muslims in other parts of the world can adapt the benefits of the rule of law, civil liberty and modern society, while retaining their Islamic identity and adapting their understanding of Islam to live in a modern world, human rights, freedom and democracy,” he said.

Although the book looks at the battle among Muslims in Indonesia, Taylor says the West as well as the rest of the world could learn by turning to the teachings of Bisri and Gus Dur in dealing with the viral global threat of Islamic ideology.

“Fortunately there are prominent Muslim leaders with tremendous legitimacy, authority and courage who pointed the way, with this book, how to understand the threat of the ideology, and how to systematically counter it,” he said.

The Indonesian launch of the book sparked outrage particularly, from Hizbut Tahir Indonesia and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which were singled out by Gus Dur in his preface as the “enemies within the blanket”.

The English version of Illusion adds an entire chapter that reflects the controversy with statements from those who attacked and praised the book.

Noting that the Indonesian edition deprived Islamist political parties of a larger share of the vote in the 2009 elections, Taylor cautioned against complacency, given the international nature of the networks of those campaigning for Islamist political ideology and the large financial backing they enjoy.

“The nature of the extremists is that they keep on coming, keep on coming and keep on coming. The only way to stop this is to ultimately isolate, marginalize and discredit the ideology itself and the extremist movements through sustained long term campaign. It is not to be executed merely in one country, or one region, in the world, but globally,” he said.

*** YET still there is no attempt to incorporate the concepts herein into a larger national security framework - its akin to watching a massive snowball hurtle towards people and all the while, we're observing and taking notes of its dimensions but by the time we develop a response to the snowball as we first saw it - it has grown into something even more dangerous and we are still not as prepared for its impact. We'll have only ourselves to blame for this negligence. MS ***

BIN LADEN KILLED IN JOINT U.S.-PAK OPS

2011-05-02T00:46:00.000-07:00

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/05/01/us-obama.html

Osama bin Laden, the driving force behind the Sept. 11 attacks, is dead, ending a decade-long manhunt for the world's most-wanted terrorist, U.S. President Barack Obama announced Sunday night.

"I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda and a terrorist who is responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women and children," Obama said during a statement televised live from the East Room of the White House late Sunday evening.

The president said that he had met repeatedly with his national security team since August and that they received information that bin Laden was hiding in a compound in Pakistan. Then last week it was determined that the U.S. had enough to take action, he said.

"Today at my direction," Obama said, the U.S. launched a targeted attack against that compound in Abbottabad, which is about 150 kilometres north of Islamabad, and that bin Laden was killed in a firefight. The U.S. has his body, he said.

"Justice has been done," the president said.

U.S. officials said four helicopters carrying CIA paramilitaries and a Navy SEAL team attacked bin Laden's compound; an Abbottabad resident said the raid took place at 1:30 a.m. local time.

Following the attack, Pakistani television broadcast pictures of flames shooting from the roof of bin Laden's two-storey house in the night sky.

The development comes just months before the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center towers in New York and Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The four airplane hijackings orchestrated by bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization killed more than 3,000 people.

The attacks set off a chain of events that led the U.S. into wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq, and America's entire intelligence apparatus was overhauled to counter the threat of more terror attacks at home.

New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg said bin Laden's death will "bring some closure and comfort to all those who lost loved ones" on Sept. 11.

In New York City, celebrations broke out in Times Square and people began to gather at the site where the World Trade Center towers stood. The site is now a construction zone where a memorial and new tower are being built.

As news of bin Laden's death spread, crowds also began to gather outside the White House. After Obama confirmed the death, the crowd burst into chants of "U.S.A."

George W. Bush., who was president when al-Qaeda attacked the U.S., said the fight against terror continues "but tonight America has sent an unmistakable message: No matter how long it takes, justice will be done."

In Abbotsford, B.C., Prime Minister Stephen Harper noted that 24 Canadians died in the Sept. 11 attack. He said the death of bin Laden "secures a measure of justice for those Canadians and the their families."

"Bin Laden's death does not end the threat of international terrorism," Harper said. "Sadly, others will take his place."

Al-Qaeda was also blamed for the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa that killed 231 people and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 American sailors in Yemen, as well as countless other plots, some successful and some foiled.

*** GREAT NEWS and a hearty KUDOS to the CIA and SEAL teams (as usual). Even though terrorists remain ideologically driven and not personality driven - this will have a significant psychological effect - however, that may well translate into increased motivation of an already highly motivated adversary. GREAT NEWS but the war against AQ and its affiliates will continue - count on it. MS ***

WikiLeaks: Guantánamo Bay terrorists radicalised in London to attack Western targets

2011-04-26T11:45:00.000-07:00

FROM: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8472784/WikiLeaks-Guantanamo-Bay-terrorists-radicalised-in-London-to-attack-Western-targets.html

At least 35 terrorists incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay were sent to fight against the West after being indoctrinated by extremist preachers in Britain, secret files obtained by The Daily Telegraph disclose.

By Robert Winnett, Christopher Hope, Steven Swinford and Holly Watt 9:30PM BST 25 Apr 2011

Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza, two preachers who lived off state benefits after claiming asylum, are identified by the American authorities as the key recruiters responsible for sending dozens of extremists from throughout the world to Pakistan and Afghanistan via London mosques.

The leaked WikiLeaks documents, written by senior US military commanders at Guantánamo Bay, illustrate how, for two decades, Britain effectively became a crucible of terrorism, with dozens of extremists, home-grown and from abroad, radicalised here.

Finsbury Park mosque, in north London, is described as a “haven” for extremists. United States intelligence officials concluded the mosque served as “an attack planning and propaganda production base”.

The files will raise questions over why the Government and security services failed to take action sooner to tackle the capital’s reputation as a staging post for terrorism, which became so established that the city was termed “Londonistan”.

The documents show that at least 35 detainees at Guantánamo had passed through Britain before being sent to fight against Allied forces in Afghanistan. This is thought to be more than f

Of those, 18 were originally from abroad. The other 17 were British nationals or citizens granted residency here after claiming asylum, who were indoctrinated before being sent to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

The Government has paid millions of pounds in compensation and benefits to people regarded as highly dangerous by the US authorities.

Qatada, who was paid compensation under human rights laws for being “unfairly detained”, is described as “the most successful recruiter in Europe” and a “focal point for extremist fundraising [and] recruitment”. Hamza is accused of encouraging “his followers to murder non-Muslims”.

Four mosques in London and an Islamic centre are highlighted as places where young Muslim men were radicalised and turned into potential terrorists. Finsbury Park mosque “served to facilitate and training of recruits,” note the files, adding that it was “a haven for Islamic extremists from Morocco and Algeria.”

The Daily Telegraph, along with other international newspapers, is publishing details of more than 700 files on the Guantánamo Bay detainees obtained by the WikiLeaks website.

Earlier, this newspaper disclosed that dozens of terrorists held at the prison had admitted plotting a wide array of attacks against targets in Britain and America. However, it also emerged that more than 150 innocent people had been sent to Guantánamo.

Now, the key role that Britain and British-based preachers played in the lives of many of the Guantánamo detainees can be disclosed.

British intelligence services also provided information, including lists of suspected extremists seized from raids on Islamic centres, to the US military as it interrogated detainees. The information was passed on despite the Government publicly condemning the use of torture at Guantánamo. The leaked documents also reveal that:

• Sixteen detainees sent back to Britain are regarded as “high risk” by the US authorities and are liable to plan attacks against the West. However, they have been paid a reported £1 million each in compensation by the Government. For the first time, details of their alleged extremist activities, including travelling to Afghanistan to fight against British troops, are disclosed;

• The US government suspected the BBC of being a “possible propaganda media network” for al-Qaeda after details of a phone number at the broadcaster was found in the possession of several suspected terrorists. The number, which now appears to be disconnected, was thought to be for an employee of the BBC World Service, which was then funded by the Foreign Office;

• Terrorist recruits from across Africa and the Middle East flocked to London to claim asylum, often after travelling through other European countries;

• British taxpayers’ money was used to bankroll an Afghan politician who was sent to Guantánamo Bay after being exposed as an al-Qaeda aide. Mullan Haji Rohullah received more than £300,000 to destroy his opium crop – but he sold the drugs and kept the money from the Department for International Development.

• Four of the Guantánamo detainees were “British intelligence sources” who betrayed their paymasters.

• The last remaining British national at the prison is an al-Qaeda commander who directed terrorist forces in Tora Bora during the Afghanistan conflict. His family, who were previously allegedly paid directly by Osama Bin Laden, is thought to have received compensation from the Government.

The files help to explain American anger towards the British authorities, who have been regularly accused of failing to tackle radicalisation in this country.

The top-secret documents show how Muslim men travelled to European countries such as France, from where they obtained fake EU passports. They then crossed the channel to take advantage of Britain’s generous asylum system.

Extremist preachers radicalised the men at London mosques, showing them videos of atrocities committed against Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya.

According to one document, Finsbury Park mosque was “a key transit facility for the movement of North African and other extremists in London to and from al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan”.

They were flown to Pakistan and Afghanistan at the terrorist group’s expense, put up in special guesthouses and sent to the training camps. They were introduced to senior al-Qaeda figures including Bin Laden and taught to fight and make bombs. Wives were arranged for some terrorists and their families received generous payments.

The US government condemned the release of the Wikileaks documents. In a statement, the Pentagon said: “It is unfortunate that news organisations have made the decision to publish numerous documents obtained illegally by WikiLeaks concerning the Guantánamo detention facility. These documents contain classified information about current and former detainees, and we strongly condemn the leaking of this sensitive information.

“The WikiLeaks releases include Detainee Assessment Briefs (DABs) written by the Department of Defence between 2002 and early 2009. These DABs were written based on a range of information available then. Any given DAB illegally obtained and released by WikiLeaks may or may not represent the current view of a given detainee.

“The previous and current administrations have made every effort to act with the utmost care and diligence in transferring detainees from Guantánamo.”

Barack Obama, the US President, previously made a high-profile pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay facility and prosecute in the criminal courts those alleged to have broken the law.

However, the pledge has now been largely abandoned and the US authorities recently announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the most senior terrorist at the prison and the alleged mastermind behind the September 11 attacks, will be tried at a controversial military tribunal.

Mohammed, who was tortured more than 100 times, has admitted his involvement in dozens of plots, including plans to hijack aircraft and crash them into Heathrow airport, Big Ben and Canary Wharf, and assassination attempts against Pope John Paul II and former President Bill Clinton. He is among 15 so-called kingpins at the prison who are unlikely to ever be freed.

*** The West implements policies almost as if deliberately to sabotage itself: There is absolutely nothing wrong with making it a point to restrict or limit certain activities especially when collecting government funds. I would think its well within reason to suggest that Jihadist rhetoric in which one actively perpetuates the eventual destruction and collapse of the same govt. that is paying them such funds would qualify.

I hate to say it but the serious lack of subject matter experts will prove to be the undoing and the undermining of many policies with respect to national security and Islamist radicalizaton already in place and will, without doubt, sabotage the efficacy of future policies in the same regard. MS ***

Canadians can't turn blind eye to terrorism in own backyard

2011-04-03T17:02:00.000-07:00

Canadians are not capable of terrorism. We are the mild mannered and polite people of the Great White North who apologize to furniture when we bump into it.

Surely we are not a nation capable of producing people who are willing to kill innocents in the name of an ideology.

Reality, however, tells another story. There is a long, disturbing list of Canadians who have been arrested on terror charges both at home and abroad. Many have been convicted, Canadians with darkness in their hearts and violence on their minds: Members of the Toronto 18, Mohammad Momin Khawaja, Mohammed Jabarah among them.

Since August 2010 alone, five Canadians have been arrested on terrorism charges. Yet Canadians continue to delude themselves into believing that terrorism doesn’t exist here, that every arrest is an aberration and that Canada is somehow an island in a world of instability.

Every terror arrest is followed by the same howls of protest from naysayers who claim security forces have made a mistake and civil liberties have been trampled. The same naysayers refuse to believe that a murderous ideology has inroads in our great country.

Canadian security services and law enforcement face the same allegations hurled in the U.S. over the Patriot Act — despite the fact there is no evidence of anti-terrorism laws being abused in Canada. Canadian authorities have never conducted indiscriminate or wide-ranging terror arrests the way the United States did after 9/11. Arrests have been limited and judicious and the majority have resulted in convictions.

Yet apologists come up with excuses every time — until there’s a conviction, then they mysteriously seem to disappear and go silent until the next arrest.

Canada doesn’t need terror apologists, or people in denial about the danger that faces young Canadians. What we need are powerful counter-radicalization programs, communities that aren’t afraid to stand up to the people who are trying to corrupt them and continued great work by our security services.

The facts speak for themselves — terror groups such as al-Qaida and Al Shabaab are actively recruiting here in Canada. They are not only endangering our citizens here, they are trying to steal our youth by encouraging them to travel to far-off places to martyr themselves for a cause that achieves only destruction and bloodshed.

Foreign Wahhabist money is pouring into mosques in Canada, paying for extremist, firebrand preachers to visit and recruit vulnerable young Canadians. These recruiters target young people the same way street gangs and pimps select victims — they seek out individuals who are socially isolated, who don’t fit in well in their community and who are looking for a sense of purpose. Then they offer it to them.

With the Middle East in turmoil, this is easier than ever. Second generation Canadians are a favourite hunting ground for terror recruiters. Caught between traditional parents and modern Canadian ways, they feel disconnected, leaving them vulnerable to predators in spite of their liberal, democratic upbringing here in Canada.

The average young Canadian spends hours on the Internet surfing and watching videos and it’s something that groups like al-Qaida and Al Shabaab are cunningly exploiting. Slickly produced jihadi rap videos have the appeal of MTV paired with the beguiling promise of belonging to something larger than oneself and, frankly, being cool. It’s a siren song for a lonely young man spending hours on the Internet.

It’s a challenge for Canadian authorities to stamp out these jihadi videos because there are so many of them on the Internet, in so many locations, constantly being produced.

The toxic world of terror recruiting allegedly lured young Mohamed Hersi, a U of T graduate now facing terror charges, to leave a decent and safe life in Canada for a violent and desolate existence in Somalia. It’s time to stop living in denial.

— Stephenson will host The Daily Brief along with David Akin on Sun News Network

mercedes.stephenson@sunmedia.ca

*** STILL stating the obvious unfortunately. If you want PREVENTION then govternment should be putting money into agencies like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service NOT the Royal Canadian Mounted Police whose job is NOT to prevent but to "cure".

The fact we have no coherent national security policy on this issue - with all the arrests we keep hearing about - is NEGLIGENCE of the worst kind. It looks like we're still trying to play catch up - problem with that is: we will always be behind the curve.

MS ***

McCaul seeks to have cartels designated as terrorists

2011-03-31T16:59:00.000-07:00

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7498544.html

WASHINGTON -- In a potentially sweeping and politically charged escalation of the U.S. offensive against Mexican drug cartels, Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Austin, introduced legislation in Congress Wednesday to designate six murderous Mexican drug cartels "foreign terrorist organizations."

Such a designation by the State Department could expose Mexican drug traffickers and U.S. gunrunners to charges of supporting terrorism. McCaul spokesman Mike Rosen said it was the first time that a member of Congress had proposed the designation for the powerful Mexican drug gangs that have waged all-out war against Mexican security forces over the last five years, claiming nearly 35,000 lives.

McCaul, the former federal prosecutor and ex-deputy attorney general of Texas, unveiled the legislation as he raises his profile in Washington for a possible bid for statewide office. The next opening? The seat being vacated at the end of 2012 by U.S. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Dallas.

He's holding a hearing today in his subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee that's designed to elicit support from four high-level officials in the Obama administration for the legislation, which targets the Arellano Feliz, Beltran Leyva, La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas and Sinaloa and Gulf cartels.

More prison, or death

Cartels have used violence to seize political and economic control across parts of northern Mexico, with "spillover crime (resulting) in the abandonment of property and loss of security on the U.S. side of the border," said McCaul, chairman of the Homeland Security Committee's panel on oversight and investigations. "Mexican drug cartels are terrorist organizations, and this designation will provide the necessary tools to effectively advance the national security interests of both Mexico and the United States."

The proposal would enable prosecutors to levy up to 15 additional years of prison time on each conviction of providing "material support or resources" to the six cartels — and a federal death sentence if deaths resulted from the cartels' actions.

Mexican drug cartels may not be "driven by religious ideology" that propels other foreign terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida or Hezbollah, McCaul said. But the Mexican gangs are "using similar tactics to gain political and economic influence," relying on "kidnappings, political assassinations, attacks on civilian and military targets, taking over cities and even putting up checkpoints in order to control territory and institutions."

The proposed designation could become a lightning rod in the ongoing partisan struggle over whether the U.S.-Mexico border has been adequately secured against threats to national security.

A Chronicle story published Sunday, quoting a senior official with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, reported that not a single person who has unlawfully crossed the southwestern border into the U.S. has been charged with terrorism or carried out a terrorist act despite elected officials' expressions of concern over threatened terrorist infiltration.

The Department of Homeland Security had no immediate comment on McCaul's proposal.

The State Department lists 47 so-called "foreign terrorist organizations" - most of them with ties to al-Qaida, Iran or Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations. Others include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Peru's Shining Path and the Irish Republican Army.

To qualify for the designation, the State Department says an organization must have carried out terrorist attacks or "engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism."

The designation has served as "an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business," the State Department says. The designation enables various government agencies to coordinate punitive actions against the organizations.

'Be careful' about label

The label is not without controversy, however. The State Department, sensitive to the pressures facing Mexican President Felipe Calderon, played down terrorist activities in Mexico in its latest country-by-country evaluation of terrorism across the globe.

"No known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory," the State Department said in a 2009 report made public last August. "Cartels increasingly used military-style terrorist tactics to attack security forces. There was no evidence of ties between Mexican organized crime syndicates and domestic or international terrorist groups."

Sen. John Cornyn, R-San Antonio, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, also counseled caution about designating Mexican cartels terrorist organizations.

"Cartels are in it for one thing - money," Cornyn said. "To me, we need to be clear about what is happening in Mexico. We have got to be careful about the label because sometime those labels can create misleading impressions."

A senior official in the Mexican Embassy in Washington agreed.

"Labeling drug traffickers as foreign terrorist organizations is not a sound policy response because it could lead to resorting to the wrong toolbox and implementing the wrong strategy," the official said. "Let's call it like it is: truly violent, transnational organized crime, operating on both sides of our border, that pursue neither an ideological or political agenda but rather seek a simple but powerful objective: profit."

stewart.powell@chron.com

Alex Wilner: Canada grows its own terrorists

2011-03-31T08:40:00.000-07:00

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/03/31/alex-wilner-canada-grows-its-own-terrorists/

Since August 2010, five Canadian men have been arrested on charges of facilitating homegrown and international terrorism.

Hiva Alizadeh, Khurram Sher, and Misbahuddin Ahme were arrested in Ontario late last August. They stand accused of supporting terrorism in Afghanistan and of plotting attacks in Canada. In January 2011, Sayfildin Tahir-Sharif was arrested in Edmonton on charges of providing material support to terrorists conducting suicide attacks in Iraq.

And earlier this week, Mohamed Hersi was escorted off his Egypt-bound plane at Toronto’s Pearson International Airport. The twenty-five-year-old is accused of planning to join al Shabaab, an al Qaeda-linked jihadi organization active in Somalia and credited with dozens of attacks, including monstrous suicide attacks. Al Shabaab was proscribed by the Canadian government last year, making it illegal for Canadians to finance or support its efforts.

Some commentators are marking Hersi’s arrest as “a new kind” of terrorism case for Canada. After all, he was pulled off a plane allegedly on his way to join a foreign terrorist organization. For now, it doesn’t appear as though he posed a direct threat to Canadians.

He wasn’t constructing detonators in his basement, like Ottawa-native Mohammad Khawaja was. He wasn’t collecting bomb materials, like the Toronto 18 were. He didn’t acquire any firearms for use in terrorist attacks, as Toronto 18-member Ali Dirie did. And he wasn’t even disseminating propaganda on al Qaeda’s behalf, like Quebecer Said Namouh was. Instead, Hersi stands accused of actively seeking to join an illegal organization based half-way around the world.

But Hersi’s case is indeed deeply troubling. He isn’t the first Canadian who has allegedly sought to join a foreign terrorist organization, he’s just the first to draw such attention.

Since 9/11, dozens of other Canadians have facilitated terrorism overseas. Canadian Mohammed Jabarah is currently serving a US prison sentence for plotting an al Qaeda-sponsored attack on the American Embassy in Singapore. His brother, Abdel, died in a 2003 firefight with Saudi Arabian security officers battling al Qaeda’s local franchise. Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian currently on trial in the U.S., is charged with facilitating the bloody 2008 Mumbai attacks in India. The “Somali Six” haven’t been spotted since they disappeared from Toronto in 2009, apparently on their way to join al Shabaab. Canadian Mohamed Warsame recently pled guilty before a US court to providing support to al Qaeda. And just two weeks ago, the RCMP issued arrest warrants for Manitobans Maiwand Yar and Ferid Ahmed Imam, accused of having joined the Taliban in Afghanistan sometime in 2007/8.

These individuals join another fourteen Canadians who have been found guilty – as of March 2011 – of terrorism offences under Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act.

Like it or not, Canadians are self-radicalizing and facilitating terrorism overseas and at home. Despite having been born, raised, and educated in Canada, these would-be terrorists are radicalizing in our cities, are establishing networks with like-minded criminals, and actively seeking ways to participate in acts of terrorism. Hersi is just the latest case.

National Post

Alex Wilner is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Switzerland, and a fellow of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute of Canada.

Two different approaches to radicalism

2011-03-27T11:23:00.000-07:00

By CRAIG & MARC KIELBURGER | GLOBAL VOICES
Sun, Mar 27 - 4:53 AM

Earlier this month, a U.S. congressional committee heard Melvin Bledsoe share the story of his son’s conversion ("brainwashing," he called it) to Islamic extremism, before allegedly killing an American soldier outside an army recruiting station in Little Rock, Ark.

"One thing for sure: it will happen again," the Memphis, Tenn., father said of the 2009 tragedy.

The hearing was called by Rep. Peter King, chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, to discover "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response."

In all, seven people testified, and several were American Muslims — from a population of roughly 2.6 million. But none were mosque leaders. None represented major Muslim groups. The Council on American-Islamic Relations, the country’s largest Muslim advocacy group, was not invited.

But Bledsoe’s story was heard, a father’s personal tragedy was exploited, and Islam was equated with "brainwashing" and violence.

If King wants to examine responses to radicalization from the Muslim community — not, as his opponents have said, stage a public witch hunt targeting one religious group — we’ll introduce him to someone who could save him some trouble.

Rizwan Mohammad has been on a fact-finding mission in Canada. The 30-year-old McGill grad student of Islamic philosophy has been an anti-racism activist since age 15. He’s just wrapped up his biggest undertaking. With a group of 64 volunteers, Mohammad spent 22 months talking to 1,300 youth across the country, delving into the roots of isolation and radicalization in the Muslim community.

He arrived at a conclusion: "The less identity, the more violence," he said, quoting Marshall McLuhan.

The Muslim Youth Canada project, as it’s called, was an initiative of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women, funded by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. It set out to promote religious and cultural understanding, both within the Muslim community, and between Muslim and non-Muslim youth, with forums held in schools and community centres across Canada.

That meant sharing stories. Mohammad and his team interviewed young Muslims who felt isolated, socially and culturally. Some felt unfairly targeted by police officers. One girl spoke about what it was like to have non-Muslim women ask her about her hijab.

"Some people don’t want us here," one participant said.

Talk of radicalization led to a discussion of how youth define themselves—as Muslims, as local citizens, as Canadians. A proactive stance against violence, says Mohammad, is to foster a stronger sense of identity and civic engagement.

Muslims are one of the least likely faith groups to vote in Canadian federal elections, particularly Muslim women. But there’s more to civic engagement than party politics, Mohammad points out. Civic engagement is a citizen’s moral connection with their community. A stronger commitment to civic and social groups leaves youth less vulnerable to radicals preaching attacks on those communities.

Toronto lawyer Abdul-Basit Khan, who for eight years sat on the board of directors at the Council of American-Islamic Relations Canada, said civic engagement can arm young people with social and political tools to defeat those arguments, an important part of the solution. But rejecting religious violence should involve religious leaders, especially mosque leaders, says Khan: "Someone to say, ‘no, God doesn’t want you to do that.’ "

Mohammad suspects the government launched Muslim Youth Canada in search of "anti-radicalization," after the arrests of the Toronto 18. They wanted an antidote to whatever drove a diverse group of 18 individuals (a bus driver, a wealthy computer engineer, a high school dropout) to conspire to plant car bombs in Ottawa and Toronto.

It’s not just a matter of reacting to extremes, says Mohammad. The project, which produced a documentary film capturing interviews with youth, and written toolkit with discussion questions, tips on media literacy and volunteerism, is "a vehicle," he says," not just an end goal."

It shouldn’t stop here.

Peter King’s intention, he has said, is to "put aside political correctness and define who our enemy truly is." He’s using a public platform and the ensuing media circus to target one community, and the results are divisive, evoking a backlash of criticism instead of conversation.

Meanwhile, Canadian volunteers were sent to gauge the feelings of 1,300 Muslim youth.

The project hasn’t generated media frenzy. In fact, it’s received no mainstream media coverage. If it’s a response to radicalization we’re after, Melvin Bledsoe’s story shouldn’t be the only one we hear.

Craig and Marc Kielburger are co-founders of Free the Children.

*** Some of us know this stuff very well - no need for hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding to tell us again what we knew 15 years ago. On a positive note, the money is well spent on bridge-building initiatives but requires the involvement of policies targetting Mosques also to include within that sphere of influence; Imams and religious types who at least once a week, get the ear of thousands of Muslims - many with kids who can help keep an eye on them - reach out to them - bring them ...

Alas, I can say without hesitation - there is just no political will to undertake a comprehensive policy regarding Muslims and Radicalization - we're fine with our rhetoric and theatre but actual POLICY ... wake me up when we're there. :s MS ***

Former (FBI) Counterterrorism Chief Says Muslims Cooperate

2011-03-20T17:39:00.000-07:00

By Omar Sacirbey
Religion News Service

(RNS) A former FBI counterterrorism director on Tuesday (March 8) rejected allegations by the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee that Muslim Americans don't cooperate with law enforcement in terror investigations.

Rep. Peter King, a Long Island Republican, will open hearings on Thursday about Muslim radicalization that critics say unfairly singles out Muslims.

"I will tell you in no uncertain terms that the community has on multiple occasions come forward and assisted law enforcement," said Michael Rolince, who headed the Counterterrorism Division in the FBI's Washington field office between 2002 and 2005.

Rolince said the hearings and heated "rhetoric" from politicians attacking Muslims undermine that cooperation, and said smart counterterrorism strategy requires engaging with Muslim Americans.

"You talk to everyone and then you figure out who's going to be helpful, who's going to be harmful, and who's not going to be a factor," said Rolince, speaking in a conference call sponsored by Muslim Advocates, a civil rights group in San Francisco. "This is not easy. Anyone who thinks you can just snap your fingers and everyone's going to go along and understand both sides of the equation is in the wrong line of work."

Despite his criticism of the King hearings, Rolince said he hoped some good would come of the controversial hearings. "I think this is going to be a great conversation after the hearings," he said.

Muslim Advocates used the call to announce a new website, www.whatunites.us, where people are asked to sign a pledge "against fearmongering." Current signatories include 9/11 Families For Peaceful Tomorrows, the Sikh Coalition, the North Carolina Council of Churches
and the American Muslim Law Enforcement Officers Association.

*** Still waiting for that "conversation" to happen - which btw is a two-way process. If its gonna be one way only - that is, restricting the "conversation" to demonization - then it is not a conversation but a monologue. MS ***

Deterrence making a comeback to counter terrorism

2011-03-17T11:03:00.000-07:00

ZURICH, Switzerland, Mar. 17, 2011/ Troy Media/ – Two weeks ago, Canadians finally closed the book on the Toronto 18. Shareef Abdelhaleem, the last member of the homegrown cell to be sentenced, was given the stiffest possible punishment: life imprisonment.

Of the 14 Canadians recently convicted of terrorism offenses, four were sentenced to life and another four to prison terms of 10 years or more. With our courts sending a clear message that anyone thinking about facilitating terrorism in this country should expect to pay a heavy price, Canadians are joining other countries in rejecting the too-fashionable idea that deterrence doesn’t work against terrorists.

It was only last month, for example, that the U.S. military unveiled a new strategy, the first such review in seven years, in which the Pentagon began to take deterrence seriously again.

Can’t talk to a fanatic

Once the cornerstone of American foreign policy, deterrence theory fell on hard times after 9/11 seemed to substantiate claims that terrorists were undeterrable. You couldn’t have a rational dialogue, it was reasoned, with a suicidal fanatic. Only five years ago, U.S. President George W. Bush concluded that “unlike the Soviet Union, the terrorist enemies we face today . . . cannot be deterred.”

The new U.S strategy says deterring terrorism is both possible and necessary, and calls for a “whole-of-nation deterrence approach” that uses military, economic, and diplomatic tools.

The return of deterrence as a strategic option is welcome and provides Canada with lessons for its own counterterrorism strategy. Applying them, however, will require fresh thinking, a novel framework, and innovations in three areas: deterrence by punishment, by denial, and by de-legitimization.

The essence of deterrence is simple: persuade an adversary that the costs of taking an action outweigh its anticipated benefits. During the Cold War, for example, the threat of nuclear punishment – that is, retaliation – restrained state behaviour.

But deterring terrorism will require a different approach, one not reliant on retaliation, because terrorists typically lack a “return address” against which we might carry out such threats. Al Qaeda’s very statelessness, for instance, protects it from punishment.

One approach is to threaten state sponsors of terrorism to compel them to rein in their terrorist protégés. We’ve tried this before with some limited success. And when terrorists acquire state-like attributes – as in the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas – we might be able to threaten them directly. Otherwise, when states don’t control the territory upon which terrorists operate – as is the case with al-shabaab in Somalia – or when terrorists are truly transnational, threatening states will offer little deterrent benefit.

In such cases, threats of retaliation might be levied against individual terrorist leaders instead. Most leaders, however willing they are to send others to their deaths, are quite keen to survive personally. The threat of capture or elimination can diminish their desire to participate in and organize political violence, thus indirectly but effectively deterring even those members of the group who seek martyrdom. And, in the case of homegrown terrorism, stiff sentences like those handed down in Canada may well deter future would-be organizers of atrocities by clearly demonstrating both the risk and costs of getting caught.

Denial of opportunity primary weapon

Effective deterrence of terrorism also requires the use of a second strategy: denial of opportunities. Like everyone else, terrorists do measure the costs and benefits of any given course of action and, while they may regard their own death as a trivial cost or even a benefit conferring admission to paradise, diminishing the probability of an operation’s success without changing the costs makes it less attractive. To put it bluntly, a terrorist who thinks he is likely to miss his target is less likely to blow himself up.

In deterring terrorism, denial should be our primary weapon. By denying terrorists access to targets, introducing uncertainty into terrorism planning, and mitigating the consequences of attacks, we reduce the attractiveness of expending time, money and recruits in any given terrorist operation.

De-legitimization offers a third way to deter terrorism. It is easy to focus too much on material factors and overlook psychological and social ones. But community approval is a major motive for terrorists. Therefore, effectively challenging the ideologies used to promote violence raises the costs of participating in terrorism. Al Qaeda’s use of suicide bombers, for example, is legitimized by relying on religious decrees that justify the taking of one’s own life. But suicide is a blasphemous act, rejected by a vast majority of Muslims. Strengthening opinions that contradict al Qaeda’s justification for suicide terrorism might deter some individuals from taking part.

Deterrence theory has a lot to offer global counterterrorism efforts, including right here in Canada. Approached the right way, terrorism can and should be deterred.

Alex Wilner, a Fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and the ETH Zurich, won the Amos Perlmutter Prize for his article on deterring terrorism, recently published in the Journal of Strategic Studies.

Life in prison for Toronto 18 member Shareef AbdelHaleem

2011-03-04T09:17:00.000-08:00

http://www.thestar.com/news/article/948863--life-in-prison-for-toronto-18-member?bn=1

Jim Wilkes and Isabel Teotonio Staff Reporters

Shareef Abdelhaleem has been sentenced to life in prison with no parole eligibility for 10 years for his role in a homegrown terror plot.

The final sentence in the so-called “Toronto 18” case was delivered in a Brampton court Friday morning.

Abdelhaleem became involved with the group because he hoped to make money from a terrorist attack, and was among 18 people charged in the summer of 2006.

He was the right-hand man of Zakaria Amara, an Islamist extremist who masterminded a plot to blow up buildings in downtown Toronto and is now serving a life sentence.

Abdelhaleem testified in court that a friend-turned-police agent, who was recruited by the group to supply bomb-making chemicals, had lured him into the plot.

Charges were eventually dropped against seven of the accused. The remaining members of the group either pleaded guilty or were convicted after a trial and have all been sentenced.

Abdelhallem was convicted in January 2010, then argued unsuccessfully he had been entrapped.

Crown prosecutors had suggested a life sentence or a fixed term of about 30 years for the Mississauga man. The defence proposed a sentence of less than 20 years.

Throughout the trial, Abdelhaleem tried to minimize his role, saying he had tried to lessen the number of casualties by suggesting the blasts go off during the wee hours and had spoken out against placing against placing metal chips in the bombs.

He also claimed his role amounted to that of a “mailman,” passing messages and chemical orders between the agent and Amara.

However, court also heard evidence of Abdelhaleem taking initiatives to advance the bomb plot and his belief that he could profit from an attack by playing the stock market.

A psychological report entered as evidence during Abdelhaleem’s sentencing hearing sheds light on one of the more unusual individuals involved in the bomb plot.

Unlike his co-accused — university or college students who were motivated primarily by extremist ideology — Abdelhaleem was a computer engineer, who earned about $350,000 a year and cruised around in a BMW convertible.

He wasn’t religiously devout and attended mosque to “keep up appearances.” Instead, he was a playboy with a penchant for lavish spending on clothes and women, and an affinity for booze and drugs.

Abdelhaleem, who had no close friends, told a forensic psychiatrist that he participated in the plot partly because he didn’t want to be the “party poop” or “the guy who was left out.”

He told Dr. Hy Bloom that his motive for becoming involved was “mostly financial.”

But Bloom noted there were likely various motivating factors for Abdelhaleem’s behaviour. They included his extremist views, the fantasy of being recognized as a hero in the Islamic world and a need for peer acceptance and respect, which he feared losing if he extricated himself from the plot.

“Abdelhaleem’s sense of failure and chronic inability to please and earn the respect of his father may have contributed some threads to the (unconscious) fantasy of being respected and even glorified through a dramatic act,” Bloom noted in the report.

There was no evidence that Abdelhaleem has ever suffered from any major mental disorder or condition, Bloom wrote.

“There is, in fact, no specific psychiatric diagnosis to explain his behaviour,” he added.

How We Train Our Cops to Fear Islam

2011-03-03T11:55:00.000-08:00

***LONG but extremely valuable. btw - I suggest trainers who have field experience. :) MS ***

FROM: http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2011/1103.stalcup-craze.html

There aren’t nearly enough counterterrorism experts to instruct all of America’s police.
So we got these guys instead.By Meg Stalcup and Joshua Craze

On a bright January morning in 2010, at Broward College in Davie, Florida, about sixty police officers and other frontline law enforcement officials gathered in a lecture hall for a course on combating terrorism in the Sunshine State. Some in plain clothes, others in uniform, they drifted in clutching Styrofoam cups of coffee, greeting acquaintances from previous statewide training sessions. The instructor, Sam Kharoba, an olive-skinned man wearing rimless glasses and an ill-fitting white dress shirt, stood apart at the front of the hall reviewing PowerPoint slides on his laptop.

As he got under way, Kharoba described how, over the next three days, he would teach his audience the fundamentals of Islam. “We constantly hear statements,” Kharoba began, “that Islam is a religion of peace, and we constantly hear of jihadists who are trying to kill as many non-Muslims as they can.” Kharoba’s course would establish for his students that one of these narratives speaks to a deep truth about Islam, and the other is a calculated lie.

“How many terror attacks have there been since 9/11? Muslim terror attacks,” Kharoba asked the room. Silence. “Let’s start the bidding.”

“Over a hundred,” someone volunteered.

“I got a hundred,” Kharoba called back. Another audience member, louder now, suggested three hundred.

“Three hundred!” Kharoba declared.

“Over a thousand,” offered another voice in the audience.

Kharoba stopped the bidding. “Over thirteen thousand,” he said. “Over thirteen thousand attacks.” He paused to let the statistic sink in.

Kharoba belongs to a growing profession, one that is ballooning on the spigot of federal and state dollars set aside for counterterrorism efforts since the attacks of September 11, 2001. He is a counterterrorism instructor to America’s beat cops, one of several hundred working the law enforcement training circuit. Some are employed by large security contractors; others, like Kharoba, are independent operators.

Kharoba was born in Jordan, and he likes to intimate that members of his family are important tribal leaders. This lends a veneer of insider credibility to classroom remarks that might otherwise seem like off-color jokes. He showed the class some photographs taken in the Gaza Strip. “This is the Arab version of a line,” Kharoba told the students, gesturing to a photo of Palestinians rushing toward a passport agency. Then he showed a YouTube video of two uniformed men beating a nameless prisoner. “This is what Miranda rights are in the Arab world,” he said.

Fortunately for an adept American police officer, Kharoba said, jihadists telegraph their extremist intentions in altogether predictable ways. One only has to learn the signs. Take Mahmoud—Kharoba’s preferred name for a generic Muslim. Kharoba can tell whether Mahmoud is a Wahhabi (a member of a fundamentalist Islamic sect from Saudi Arabia) just by going through Mahmoud’s trash. There will be no pre-approved credit card offers, because interest is forbidden in Islam. There will be no brown wax fried-chicken bags, because fried chicken isn’t halal. For Kharoba, extremist Muslims are as easy to spot as American gang members.

“When you see a bunch of guys in red, what do you know?” Kharoba asked.

“They are Bloods,” responded the audience, many of whom deal with gangs regularly.

“When you have a Muslim that wears a headband, regardless of color or insignia, basically what that is telling you is ‘I am willing to be a martyr.’” There were other signs, too. “From the perspective of operational security, there are two things I am always looking out for: a shaved body and moving lips,” he explained. “Some of the Pakistani hijackers shaved their whole bodies in a ritual of cleanliness. If their lips are moving, these guys are praying. As they are walking through an airport, every second they’re going to be praying.”

America today is too politically correct to acknowledge the reality of Islamic fanaticism, Kharoba said. “Would Islam be tolerated if everyone knew its true message?” he asked the class. “From a Muslim perspective, do you want non-Muslims to know the truth about Islam?”

“No!” came the audience reply.

“So what do Muslims do?” Kharoba demanded.

“Lie!”

Kharoba strode forward to the front of the room, his voice slower now, more measured. “Islam is a highly violent radical religion that mandates that all of the earth must be Muslim.”

The class broke for lunch.

That afternoon, Kharoba offered more tips on how to detect violent Muslims. “You remember the Alligator Alley incident?” he asked.

He was referring to the events of September 13, 2002, when three Middle Eastern men at a Shoney’s restaurant in Calhoun, Georgia—one Jordanian, one Pakistani, and one Egyptian—were overheard talking about “bringing it down” to Miami. A nearby diner, one Eunice Stone, became alarmed and contacted the Georgia highway patrol. In what became a terrorist scare with national coverage, the police pulled the three men over on Alligator Alley, the long section of Interstate 75 that cuts west across Florida. For thirteen hours, the police combed the vehicle for explosives.

Kharoba projected a picture of Ayman Gheith, one of the arrested men, onto the screen. “The first thing is facial hair,” Kharoba said. “Do you see how the moustache is trimmed, and the beard is in a cone shape? It is very common to have this beard, and the moustache will always be the same, just like Muhammad.”

There is only one problem with the Alligator Alley case—a problem Kharoba never mentioned to the class. The incident was a false alarm. The “terrorists” turned out to be medical students on their way to a conference in Miami. They were innocent. After thirteen hours of interrogation, the police released them. Kharoba, however, taught the class that Ayman Gheith was a “textbook case” of Islamic fanaticism.

While his views are entirely his own, the fact that Kharoba is teaching this course at all reflects a sweeping shift in America’s official thinking about law enforcement and intelligence gathering. In recent years, the United States has become more and more committed to the idea of bringing local police forces into the business of sniffing out terrorists. In 2002, the National Joint Terrorism Task Force was set up to coordinate existing collaborative efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement. And since 2006, the Department of Justice has been developing a program called the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, through which local cops are meant to act as intelligence gatherers on the ground, feeding reports of suspicious activity to a network of data “fusion centers” spread out across the country. The system is scheduled to be up and running in all seventy-two of the nation’s fusion centers by the end of this year. But in order for the cops to play a role in counterterrorism, the thinking goes, they need to be trained. And that’s where Kharoba and his ilk—counterterrorism trainers for hire—come in.

The very idea of integrating local police into the nation’s counterterror intelligence efforts is a subject of debate among security experts. People at the highest level of law enforcement and intelligence—to say nothing of civil liberties groups—have concerns about the strategy. While the premise is perhaps intuitively appealing—particularly in a place like Florida, where several of the 9/11 hijackers took flying lessons—one danger is that the system will be flooded with bad leads. An increase in incidents like the mistaken arrests on Alligator Alley would only degrade police work, obscure real threats, and spoil relations between America’s cops and America’s Muslims—who have thus far volunteered some of the most fruitful leads in preventing domestic terror attacks.

It might be theoretically possible to ward off such an outcome if police could be provided with impeccable training. But one of the central problems is that the demand for training far exceeds the supply of qualified instructors. Even the CIA and FBI have had trouble finding people with the key skills to fill their ranks. For state and local law enforcement departments, the scarcity is even more acute. Into the void, self-styled experts have rushed in.

While expertise in counterterrorism training may be in short supply, money for it is not. Each year the federal government directs billions of dollars (no one knows exactly how much) in terrorism-related training grants to state and local governments. These funds cascade down into myriad training programs like the one at Broward College, where instructors like Kharoba ply their trade with only minimal supervision.

am Kharoba came to the United States from Jordan when he was seventeen to study computing at Louisiana State University. When the 9/11 attacks happened, he was working as a programmer. Noticing that the hijackers used multiple aliases, he became convinced that the American intelligence community was unequipped to deal with the multiplicity of Arab names. Kharoba quit his job and began work on a database of every jihadi website and name that he could find. “For nine months, I worked developing this database, with no income. I knew I could do it,” he told us. “It would be the best thing. I would solve a critical problem for the intelligence community, and then I’d call the Bureau, call the CIA, sell it for five million, and I’m done. I did my patriotic duty, and lived my American dream.”

Neither the CIA nor the FBI showed much interest in the database, though. Ten years later, Kharoba is still working on it. He fell into teaching by chance, in 2002, when the Community Oriented Policing Services Program in Louisiana invited him to give a talk. Kharoba had no professional experience in law enforcement, no academic training in terrorism or national security, and is not himself a Muslim. But as a Jordanian-born Christian he was able to turn his place of birth into a selling point. When we asked the dean of the Institute of Public Safety why she recruited Kharoba to teach there, her answer was that Kharoba “put the flavor of Middle Eastern culture into it.”

Kharoba is an especially colorful character, but he is in some ways typical of the kinds of people who have migrated into the police counterterrorism training business. Many have limited background in U.S. counterterrorism and domestic law enforcement, and little patience for the rules and conventions that govern both fields.

Quite a few have found their way into the profession by using their military experience to teach courses in how to respond to terrorist attacks. The trainer Joe Bierly, based in Riverside County, California, served twenty-two years in the Marines, “and another ten plus years in the black world, doing operations.” Bierly has a shooting range at his house, and practices every day. Most cops, he said, only go to the range, “what, once a year?” He doesn’t think American law enforcement is ready for the next terrorist attack. At the end of the day, he said, the question is this: “Can you run fifteen yards on a blood-slicked floor, take aim, and still hit the target?”

Richard Hughbank, another counterterrorism trainer, is a fourth-generation combat veteran on his father’s side. “Honestly, I kinda fell into it,” Hughbank told us when we interviewed him in November 2009. “I think most of us did.” The idea that fighting terrorism was a mission that might extend beyond his military career began to sink in when Hughbank was in Afghanistan. “A man I very much respect, with whom I turned the first five hundred people in to Guantanamo Bay, told me, ‘Richard, this is your future, this is your enemy.’;” Hughbank went on to found and became president of Extreme Terrorism Consulting, which provides counterterrorism training to law enforcement.

John Giduck was a practicing lawyer in the 1980s. Then, he says, during the late Gorbachev era, the American Bar Foundation dispatched him to Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), where he met the head of the KGB for Leningrad. (“Putin’s boss,” he says.) They became fast friends, and Giduck began traveling frequently to Russia. He claims to have trained with multiple Russian special forces units, and to be certified by the “Vityaz Special Forces Anti-Terror School.” In 2004, Giduck traveled to Russia immediately after the Beslan school massacre and wrote a book called Terror at Beslan. It was published in 2005, and it raised Giduck’s profile, earning him a guest appearance on the Glenn Beck show in the fall of 2007. Among the book’s most sensational allegations is that the terrorists at Beslan systematically raped their hostages, a claim that no other primary source account has made. In the meantime, Giduck has also become an in-demand counterterrorism trainer.

Some trainers do have roots in law enforcement. In a major recent report on America’s efforts to use local police to monitor the population for terrorist threats, the Washington Post’s Dana Priest and William M. Arkin spoke to a counterterrorism trainer named Ramon Montijo, a former Los Angeles police detective and Army Special Forces sergeant. Like Kharoba, Montijo made sweeping generalizations about Muslims. “They want to make this world Islamic. The Islamic flag will fly over the White House—not on my watch!” he said. “My job is to wake up the public, and first, the first responders.”

Despite their different backgrounds, the counterterrorism trainers we interviewed have a remarkably similar worldview. It is one of total, civilizational war—a conflict against Islam that involves everyone, without distinction between combatant and noncombatant, law enforcement and military. “Being politically correct inhibits you,” Hughbank said. “I know Islam better than my own religion. Some things need to be called a spade.”

In Terror at Beslan, Giduck recounts giving a presentation on the 2002 hostage crisis at the Nord-Ost Theater in Moscow. After most of the terrorists were knocked unconscious by the gas that security forces pumped into the building, Spetsnaz, the Russian special forces, came through, methodically shooting each of the terrorists once in the back of the head. Giduck is convinced that as Americans we could do better: we could shoot them twice. Giduck writes of being alarmed when a policeman came up to him after the talk and said that not one of the cops in the room would ever have considered doing this. “I think the first thing we need to do is pass federal legislation exempting law enforcement from any civil or criminal prosecution, any liability at all, for what they do if there is a terrorist attack on U.S. soil,” Giduck writes. “In attempting to prepare the American psyche for the worst possible terrorist act—the taking and killing of children—we must all shed the veil of civility and luxury in which we conduct our lives.”

“The former military guys [working as trainers] are always looking at this thing from a battlefield perspective,” explains Jack Cloonan, a twenty-five-year veteran of the FBI who worked in the Osama bin Laden special unit from 1996 to 2002. “They are always looking at it as a U.S. military operation. But what does that have to do with sitting in the Bronx? Or trying to blend into society to carry out an attack? It’s just not related.”

And yet these trainers reach a considerable swath of law enforcement personnel. Of the half-dozen instructors we spoke to, most estimated that they had individually trained between 10,000 and 20,000 students over the course of the past five to six years. There are about 800,000 police officers in total in the United States.

When I look at the life of Muhammad, I get a very nasty image,” said Kharoba, pausing to look around the auditorium. The audience was silent. “I am talking about a pedophile, a serial killer, a rapist,” Kharoba said. “And that is just to start off with.

“Anyone who says that Islam is a religion of peace,” he continued, “is either ignorant or flat out lying.”

Frustration seemed to be burning in the air, and a cop—looking grim, anguished—spoke up. “From a law enforcement standpoint, what can we do?” he asked. “What do we do to deal with these people?”

“The best way to handle these people is what I call legal harassment,” Kharoba answered. “Start to identify who is coming into your area.” Go to the DMV and see who has applied for a driving license. Look at the owners of convenience stores. Corner stores are one of the principal ways Hezbollah launders money in the United States, he said. (The claim is not true.) “You only need one precedent,” Kharoba said. “Health inspectors, alcohol trade officers, these guys can turn a convenience store upside down without a warrant.”

Eventually the discussion turned to Islamic names, a subject in which Kharoba claims a specialty. There are two types of Muslim immigrants, Kharoba told the class: honest ones who Americanize their names, and those who use long Arabic names as a smokescreen. “If I pull someone over at a traffic stop,” said Kharoba, “I’ll ask for a couple of IDs. And if I see different spellings of a name, my Christmas tree is lit up. That’s probable cause to take them in.”

As a law enforcement officer in the audience pointed out, this is hardly true. People have different names for all sorts of reasons. Arabic names often include a long chain of references to ancestors, occupations, places, and relatives, and don’t readily fall into the pattern of first, middle, and last names common in the Christian West. A Muslim name on a passport might be rendered one way by an immigration clerk, and quite another by a desk agent at the local DMV. These differences are not illegal.

Kharoba was undeterred. He pointed out a laminated reference card that he had included in the course materials. With this card, an officer could see if a driver’s name follows the standard naming pattern for the Arabic world. If the police officer remained in doubt, he should call Kharoba, who has an unusual hobby: he collects phone books. Kharoba has a collection of Jordanian phone books right up until 1992. If a cop were to call up with a Jordanian name not shown in the phone book, Kharoba’s advice would be unequivocal. “Fingerprint him. Take him to prison.”

Kharoba reiterated the need to fight ruthlessly, sharing a story about the government of Syria quelling an uprising in Aleppo by shelling the city and killing more than 7,000 people. It’s a terrible story—but no such thing happened in Aleppo. It happened in Hama, a city about ninety miles to the south, in 1982.

Similarly, when we examined his manual, A Law Enforcement Guide to Understanding Islamist Terrorism, we found the claim that when the Muslim population of a country exceeds 80 percent, one should expect “state-run ethnic cleansing and genocide.” The examples given were Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Neither state has ever been involved in genocide. In fact, large sections of Kharoba’s guide turned out to be word for word the same as open-source materials found online—everything from publicly available Facebook pages to anonymously authored PDFs.

Though the federal government covers much of the cost of counterterrorism instruction, it has surprisingly little control over who is chosen to conduct the training. Structural problems abound. There is no unified system of expert evaluation or regulatory authority to impose quality control. The Tenth Amendment, which states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” has been interpreted to mean that police powers, and officer training, are the preserve of the states. By design, state and local law enforcement is not the responsibility of the federal government, and neither is officer training. While the Department of Homeland Security offers certification, this only means that approved courses are eligible for DHS funds. If the course is paid for by other means—by a regional source, or by another federal department—DHS accreditation isn’t necessarily required. Even DHS money, once received by a state or local police department, can often be used for trainers without DHS accreditation.

Another theoretical gatekeeper to the world of training is at the state level. In many states, entities called Police Officer Standards and Training (POST) boards determine what should be taught both in basic training and in continuing education courses. However, POST approval does not entail evaluation of the content of each course. If an instructor submits a syllabus that lists appropriate topics and concepts, teaching accurate course content is that instructor’s job. Approval of the instructor, in turn, is usually done on the basis of a resume.

This is the case even with stricter states. Instructors in California must submit a course description, an expanded outline of the material covered, a budget, and—if the course involves such skills as firing a weapon—a safety plan. Under these criteria, Kharoba was deemed qualified.

There are also private accrediting agencies that supposedly vet trainers for competence and expertise and offer a kind of seal of approval. But many of these organizations sprang up after 9/11, and they often consist of little more than websites and a few names.

One of these accrediting organizations is called the Anti-Terrorism Accreditation Board, or ATAB, founded in 2001. ATAB promises that if you pay $695 for their certification (or $495 with a fee waiver), you will receive forty PowerPoints and over eight hundred books. Among ATAB’s promotional materials is a PowerPoint slideshow outlining current al-Qaeda tactics. One of the slides features a grainy picture of someone swinging a golf club and warns of “Golf Course Assassinations,” and the possibility of grenade attacks on the carts.

Richard Hughbank, of Extreme Terror Consulting, has taken ATAB’s more advanced course and become a certified master anti-terrorism specialist (CMAS). He provides ATAB with a glowing reference on its website, as well he might, because although the website doesn’t mention it, Hughbank is also the chairman of ATAB’s Standards Committee.

The certification chairman for ATAB is a man named Keith Flannigan. Flannigan claims numerous qualifications: a BA from Kent State University in 2008, an MA in psychology from the University of Frankfurt, likewise in 2008, and a PhD in philosophy from Northfield University—once again in 2008. However, the National Student Clearing House, a degree-verification service, was unable to find record of Flannigan at Kent State, nor did the University of Frankfurt find any evidence of attendance. When queried, Flannigan claimed that we couldn’t find his records because Keith Flannigan is not his legal name. Flannigan may well have a doctorate, for what it’s worth, from Northfield University, as it is run by the University Degree Program, described by Chronicle of Higher Education as “the granddaddy of diploma mill operations.”

None of this has stopped ATAB from gaining some important clients. For example, the U.S. Navy pays its personnel to get certified with ATAB. Why? “Any certification agency whose subject matter matches 80 percent or more of what the sailor does becomes eligible,” explained Keith Boring at the Navy’s credentials office. “Once the learning center and Navy leadership approves it, then we can pay for the exams.” To date, more than 2,000 Navy personnel (each presumably at the rate of at least $495, for a total of nearly $1 million) have been certified by ATAB.

Another way to gain authority as a counterterrorism expert is to publish a book. Richard Hughbank just published his first, The Dynamics of Terror and Creation of Homegrown Terrorism. John Giduck told us that his career got a significant boost from his book Terror at Beslan, which purports to be the most “complete and accurate” story of the Beslan school siege. We asked Giduck to clarify the sources for his most sensational charge: that scores of rapes occurred during the siege. Who were the alleged rape victims, and when exactly did these alleged incidents occur? In an email to us, Giduck didn’t provide much in the way of clarification but alleged there has been a public cover-up by both the terrorists and the Russian government. He did not explain why no other journalist among the dozens assigned to cover Beslan had managed to unearth such accounts.

“Who was raped? Give me one name and date,” said C. J. Chivers, a New York Times reporter and former Marine who published an 18,000-word narrative reconstruction of the school siege for Esquire magazine and won a 2007 National Magazine Award for his work. Chivers says he interviewed scores of hostages immediately after the event and in the following months and specifically examined Giduck's allegations of rape. “There were no rapes at Beslan,” he says.

When we wanted to know more about Giduck’s time with the Russian special forces, Giduck wrote back to say that he had done a “series of trainings with Vityaz [a unit of Spetsnaz, the Russian special forces] at their special forces compound and training school on the Balashikha Army Base about 30 miles east of Moscow from 1999 to 2004” and had had close access to a series of elite Russian units, including Rus, another Spetsnaz division. When we made inquiries at the Russian Interior Ministry, we were informed that Giduck had not trained with Vityaz. Instead, he took a commercial course in extreme survival skills, with no counterterrorism component. Representatives from Rus said they had never heard of Giduck.

Even organizations cited for their high standards lack an adequate system for screening trainers. The best example is the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, known as FLETC. FLETC has been around since 1970, and it provides training to more than eighty federal law enforcement agencies—all of them, in fact, except for the DEA and the FBI. Its course development process, according to former FLETC curriculum developer Les Jenson, is stringent. “Subject-matter experts tear apart course proposals,” says Jenson. “They look at handouts, lesson plans, textbooks, and then they say to an instructor, We can accredit you if you make these changes.” FLETC can readily call on both in-house experts and outside contractors to evaluate course proposals and materials. In short, FLETC represents the gold standard for rigor in curriculum evaluations.

So did Sam Kharoba make the cut? Indeed he did. In 2004, Kharoba says, a FLETC training coordinator happened to hear him speak at a counterterrorism conference and was so impressed she invited him to teach sessions to law enforcement agents at FLETC headquarters in Glynco, Georgia. His courses were so well received that Kharoba was soon invited to teach senior instructors at FLETC. Those instructors then began, on an ad hoc basis, incorporating Kharoba’s curriculum into the courses they taught at agency-specific academies at FLETC. Kharoba told us that on March 15, 2005, he received an email from FLETC stating that they wanted to include his materials in the center’s basic curriculum.

As things turned out, though, the students of FLETC wound up being more skeptical than the school’s course evaluators. The same month that Kharoba was being invited to incorporate his material into the FLETC curriculum, FLETC received a complaint from an Immigration and Customs Enforcement official named Muhammad Rana. Rana had been angered by course materials that included a handout describing “fundamentalist Muslims” as people with “long beards and head coverings” who, while “we call them radicals … are practicing true Islam.” Eleven out of fifteen members of the class submitted a letter in support of Rana’s complaint, and Rana took his case to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in his favor.

Perhaps embarrassed by the Rana incident, FLETC suspended the official incorporation of Kharoba’s course into the standard curriculum. However, once core FLETC classes are completed, officers and agents attend additional classes specific to their agencies, and as Les Jenson explained, “If an agency hired someone, it would be up to a specific agency to do the quality control.” Via this loophole, Kharoba continued to teach at FLETC for at least a year, from 2005 to 2006. The FLETC website continued to list “Islamic Culture and Names,” which is the name of Sam’s course, in its Fundamentals of Terrorism Training Program until January 22, 2010. That day, we telephoned to inquire about Sam Kharoba and received no answer. By the next day the information had disappeared from the website. Despite the fact that online archives show “Islamic Culture and Names” as part of the curriculum through 2008, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request about the course, FLETC maintains it has “no records.”

Though he is no longer a presence at FLETC, Kharoba continues to teach in other places. In November 2010, the St. Petersburg Times reported that the sheriff in Pasco County, Florida, planned to spend $45,000 of a $361,000 training budget teaching local officers how “radical Muslims groom their facial hair and wear their pants, as well as a ‘behavioral analysis technique to distinguish visually between moderates and radicals.’;” Those classes held at Pasco-Hernando Community College will be taught by Sam Kharoba.

In law enforcement training, student feedback is supposed to act as a check on questionable trainers. Positive course evaluations from police officers are central to the steady employment of those who would train them. The trouble is that most of the terror trainers stay in business precisely because their audience members, few of whom have any background in Islam, report favorably on the instruction they’re receiving.

Police attend classes like Kharoba’s for a variety of reasons. Local and state law enforcement officers must meet annual or biannual training requirements, a certain number of hours of which are slated for maintenance of “perishable skills”: things such as driving and shooting. Officers or their departments can generally pick the rest. Often, departments need a “go-to” person, someone who is a source of information on a subject such as counterterrorism. Attendees tend to be self-selected, motivated by an awareness of how little they know about Islam or a heightened concern about Islamic terrorism, and this can make them more inclined to be receptive to an instructor like Kharoba.

It also helps that the terror trainers are often entertaining. They engage their audience with questions, jokes, stories, and visuals. Like other trainers, Kharoba has a useful stage presence. “He kept an audience of police chiefs captivated,” said Phil Ludos of the Florida Police Chiefs Association. “That is not an easy thing to do.”

When we spoke to students from Kharoba’s class in Florida, many were enthusiastic. Olga Gonzalez, who is a TSA officer in Miami, told us she had taken several of Kharoba’s courses. “This guy is brilliant,” she said. “I can’t believe it: just like gang affiliations, you can distinguish between secular and jihadist Muslims.”

Such enthusiasm was echoed by dozens of Kharoba’s students and former students. On one occasion, we asked a student whether gangs—a more conventional subject of police attention—weren’t a more pressing issue for cops than terrorists.

“Yeah, the gangs are a threat,” answered the officer. “But they don’t have 1.5 billion members.”

Sam Kharoba says that in seven years of teaching he has done only one marketing function, because each training session leads to further invitations. Other trainers said similar things. If you are popular with cops, the word spreads; if you are not, you won’t last long. “It’s a very closed community,” Kharoba told us. “Cops are not going to read an advertisement, they are going to listen to friends.”

Were any cops skeptical of Kharoba’s teachings? Some certainly were. David McKaig, a deputy with the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, enjoyed Kharoba’s class but noted that its lessons were not always applicable. “We have to uphold the rights of citizens,” McKaig noted. “You can’t violate the constitutional rights based on a hunch.”

But that doesn’t mean that trainers like Kharoba aren’t influential. “Now that I know these people might hate ‘the infidel,’ and be doing whatever they can to undermine the civilized world, I am somewhat leery of dealing with Muslims,” McKaig told us. “I go into their residences respectful but wary, which is not good in my position.”

When we attended one of Kharoba’s seminars in California, the training coordinator happened to sit in with us on the class. He too had serious reservations about the course, which he expressed to us and in a memo he later sent to his superior. His superior privately contacted some of his peers; to date, Kharoba has not been invited back to teach in California. But for both the coordinator and his superior, complaining to the agency that had provided Kharoba’s class—the Florida Regional Community Policing Institute of St. Petersburg College—was out of the question.

That’s because the course had been provided free of charge, through funding from the Department of Justice to the Florida Regional Community Policing Institute, and training coordinators around the country rely on such free courses to supplement state offerings. “Look, if we decide to say that he is full of shit, it would mean that we’re never going to get another class from those guys, because that is how cops are,” the California coordinator told us. “They’d say, ‘That rotten son of a bitch, after we’ve been so good to him and his friends.’;”

How to clean up the mess? Federal control is not the answer. For one thing, federal standards aren’t especially high. For another, constitutionally, law enforcement is the preserve of the states.

Moreover, there is no one-size-fits-all package for training. “What is relevant in a major city like Los Angeles may be entirely different than in Portland, Maine,” says Mike Rolince, who spent more than thirty years at the FBI, some of it working in counterterrorism. “And if you’re from NYPD or a Chicago PD and you have squads of officers and detectives working something, your budget and your training is significantly different than if you’re one of the majority of departments in the country that have less than thirty sworn officers.”

No matter what size the department may be, though, police need clear guidelines. Officers have to make decisions every day about when and how to apply the law, and when guidelines are bad or lacking, officers can go astray. In 2005, for instance, the Homeland Security and Intelligence Division of the Maryland State Police began secretly infiltrating a wide variety of activist groups—death penalty opponents, bicycle lane advocates, even a citizens group protesting utility rate hikes. Though not a single member of these groups was ever found to pose a security threat, troopers labeled dozens of them as “terrorists” and placed their names and files in a database shared by other regional law enforcement agencies. Perhaps worse, a subsequent state investigation found that no one in the Maryland State Police chain of command “gave any thought whatever to the possibility that its covert surveillance of these groups … was in any way inappropriate.” It is not hard to imagine that under the new Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, countless innocent Muslim Americans could similarly wind up being questioned, documented, and even arrested by local and state authorities, and their names, fingerprints, and other personal information entered into FBI databases, where they would sit for years.

This is a civil liberties issue, but it is also a matter of police effectiveness. As Bill Bratton, who headed up the police departments of both New York and Los Angeles, explains, “There is a real risk as you educate people that you do not, in fact, educate—whether it is law enforcement officers or community—to the degree that you misinform or create a fear or bias that should not be there.”

Indeed, having a bunch of ill-trained local cops sleuth around for jihadists could jeopardize the very counterterrorism efforts the government is supposed to be conducting. For one, it is likely to generate a lot of white noise, forcing analysts to spend precious time sifting through useless information. It could also “dry up important sources of information,” warns Matthew Waxman, an associate professor of law at Columbia University, who has written extensively on the role of local and state law enforcement in counterterrorism.

In counterterrorism, as in most areas of intelligence and law enforcement, vital information often comes from those closest to the suspected perpetrators—from neighbors, friends, even family members. It was an anonymous handwritten note from an Arab American in Lackawanna, New York, a small city outside Buffalo, that led the FBI to arrest six men accused of comprising a sleeper terrorist cell in that city in 2002. In another case last fall in Portland, Oregon, a tip from the Muslim community led federal authorities to arrest in a sting operation a nineteen-year-old Somali-born American for intent to set off a bomb at a Christmas tree lighting ceremony. Ham-handed and overly aggressive behavior by local police toward the Muslim community could break the trust necessary for this kind of information to flow.

The demands placed on police will only increase in the coming years. The Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative asks law enforcement to interpret everyday incidents and decide whether they are indicators of terrorist activity. These decisions are then fed into a nationwide system. Merle Manzi, from the Michigan State University Intelligence Program, argues that requiring line officers to specify that a suspicious activity is probably related to terrorism doesn’t make sense: “The thing about checking a box about terrorism is that, is the officer on the street going to know it is about terrorism? Or will they just know that it is a peculiar thing, something out of the ordinary?”

None of this is to say that state and local police and other first responders cannot play a role where terrorism is concerned. It’s crucial that they be well trained to cope with terrorist incidents once they occur—for instance, to detect and cordon off areas that have been hit by radiological weapons. But intelligence gathering is another matter. Paradoxically, the best thing the police can do in the struggle against terrorism may be to not do “counterterrorism” but simply perform the duties they are already mandated to perform: serve the communities they live in, keep their eyes open for suspicious activities of all sorts, and build the links that result in tip-offs like the one that led to the arrest of the men in Lackawanna.

But regardless of what role cops on the streets should or should not play in fighting terrorism, the fact is that rivers of federal training dollars are already flowing, many of them straight into the pockets of instructors like Sam Kharoba. The training system clearly needs reform. Again, federal control is not the solution, but a first step would be for the federal government to issue voluntary guidelines on how states can best reform their oversight of counterterrorism training—since the most robust reforms will need to happen at the state level. State accreditation should be made mandatory for counterterrorism training courses—it often isn’t—and the accreditation process itself must also be toughened. There should be subject-matter experts who evaluate courses, and they should sit in on classroom sessions anonymously. If such a system of state-based oversight worked properly, then bad trainers would have their state accreditation revoked, and they would no longer be allowed to teach in the state. If states agreed to share lists of bad trainers, then the trainer would effectively be banned nationwide. Time is of the essence. Within the next year, the Department of Justice plans to implement the Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative nationwide, and this will amplify the effects of the bad training being provided—unless the system is reformed quickly. It also behooves us to ask the fundamental question of what role beat cops should play in counterterrorism. But instead of a broader discussion, what we have now is a system that fails to police the ranks of those who train our frontline officers, while no one is paying attention. Apart, that is, from the police.

Canadian police push limits of civilian UAVs laws

2011-02-17T18:40:00.000-08:00

FROM: http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/canadian-police-push-limits-civilian-uavs-laws

A local police department in Ontario, Canada is exploring the use of small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and pioneering civil aviation laws for future use of these aerial drones; in 2007 the Kenora Police Department set a new precedence when photographs of a homicide scene, taken from a UAV, were admitted as evidence in a trial for the first time; unlike the large drones used in Afghanistan these smaller UAVs are not practical for surveillance and are primarily used to record photos for trials and provide aerial reconnaissance in hostage situations or bomb threats; the small UAVs are equipped with several cameras including digital still, video, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera; the Canadian government is working on developing regulations for the use of these UAVs in civilian airspace.

A local police department in Ontario, Canada is exploring the use of small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and pioneering civil aviation laws for future use of these aerial drones.

Ontario Provincial Police Constable Marc Sharpe has been flying various custom built fixed wing and commercially available rotary wing UAVs to photograph crime scenes and highway accidents as a cheaper alternative to airplanes or helicopters. In 2007 Sharpe set a new precedent when his photographs of a homicide scene, taken from a UAV for the Kenora Police Department, were admitted as evidence in a trial for the first time.

Constable Sharpe began by using custom built fixed wing UAVs that he created himself, but has since switched to using commercially made miniature helicopters. He currently flies the X-6 made Draganfly Systems and the Scout designed by Aeryon Labs Inc., both manufactured by Canadian firms.

These new UAVs are superior to his original designs as they are able to take off and land vertically, require less area to operate, and can hover over fixed areas. Manual controls are also supplemented by GPS and computerized controls that help fly the aircraft.

The small UAVs are equipped with several cameras including digital still, video, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras. Image quality is also much higher as cameras include vibration dampeners and image stabilization technology.

Unlike the large drones used in Afghanistan, these smaller UAVs are not practical for surveillance. Instead, they are primarily used to record photos for trials and provide aerial reconnaissance in hostage situations or bomb threats.

Flights usually last five to fifteen minutes and require three man teams consisting of a pilot, camera operator, and an aviation safety officer. Radio controlled UAVs are also restricted to line of sight flights and maximum altitude of 400 feet due to Canada’s aviation safety laws.

Current laws only allow pilots to fly their radio controlled model aircraft in designated locations, but Transport Canada, the government body that regulates airspace, classifies these UAVs as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) which exempts them from such laws.

Sharpe explains, “According to regulations it’s not a model aircraft, it is an aircraft and we have to follow the rules that apply to aircraft.”

“The rules are designed around having as safe an operation as possible.”

Constable Sharpe is currently working with Transport Canada to develop regulations for the use of these UAVs in civilian air space.

“Currently there is no legislation governing UAVs in controlled civilian air space,” Sharpe said. “There’s a big future for UASs and the government is trying to figure out how to integrate them into civilian air space.”

Starting in November of last year, UAVs have been operating under a Special Flight Operations Certificate which allows it to fly over urban areas. The certificate must be renewed annually with Transport Canada.

According to Sharpe, “Kenora was the first use of an UAV in civilian airspace within an urban environment in North America,” and “the Draganfly was the first commercial system of its kind to be used in an urban environment.”

*** GREAT idea: free up the pilots and the choppers to focus on other more pressing matters of public safety. MS ***

Michael Ross: Canada does not need its own CIA

2011-02-15T16:39:00.000-08:00

In an interview reported last week, Arthur T. Porter, chairman of the Canadian intelligence-community watchdog agency known as the Senate Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), stated that a Canadian CIA is not needed.

“You have to recognize that [by spying] you are probably breaking [some other country’s] law by just the definition of what you’re doing,” he said in his first interview since becoming chairman of SIRC. “It’s also incredibly expensive to set that sort of apparatus up. I’m just not sure that we’re ready to go in that direction at this time.”

The National Post headline on the article was “Canadian CIA not needed: Official.” When the point is phrased that way, I would agree: The last thing our intelligence community needs is a bloated, risk-averse, turf-war-mired bureaucracy where some 90% of employees operate domestically, as is now the case with the CIA. What we do need in Canada is a small, nimble, and effective overseas intelligence service that conducts covert information-gathering on the capabilities, intentions and activities of rogue states, transnational terrorist groups and other foreign entities before they appear on our door-step.

A case in point is the recent and sudden regime change in North Africa. Well-placed sources in those countries may have given us a hint of what was about to occur; or at least, which direction events were taking. Unfortunately, Canada now stands as one of the few Western nations without overseas case officers conducting clandestine information-gathering on threats affecting our national security.

Dr. Porter, who according to SIRC’s website, “brings a unique blend of medical practice, finance and business experience to health-care leadership” and his four colleagues on the committee (whose backgrounds are also about as far-removed from the intelligence realm as possible), balk at what they see as the prohibitive cost of setting up an overseas intelligence service. But in the scheme of national security expenditures, a spy agency can be set-up for a fraction of the cost of a single F-35 fighter jet.

The business of spying is a lot less complicated and expensive than many think. It’s the world’s second oldest profession, after all. When broken down to its basics, it merely involves tasking spies to make contact with foreigners who have access to intelligence that we need. It’s not rocket science.

The most common counter-arguments to creating our own spy agency is that we already possess one in CSIS. While it is true that CSIS has a mandate to counter threats overseas should they appear, CSIS is primarily a domestic security service with little in the way of mandate or experience to conduct foreign intelligence gathering on a full-time professional basis. Many of the people with information vital to our national security don’t come to Canada — or, for security and other reasons — cannot leave their own country.

What about our diplomats and their in-country channels of communication? Fictional portrayals notwithstanding, diplomats and spies do not move in the same circles; and, more importantly, diplomats are routinely, if not constantly, put under surveillance by their host countries’ security services — even in friendly nations.

The other argument is that we have good multilateral relationships with allied intelligence services, which share their information with us. But what if another country has to weigh our interests against theirs when it comes to sensitive intelligence that they gathered and don’t feel like sharing? Moreover, how does it look when a country as rich, advanced and strategically important as Canada has no qualms about asking its allies’ spies to endure extreme risk and hardship because we’re too law-abiding and cheap to do it ourselves?

Domestic security services such as CSIS are not spy agencies. They operate on home turf with all the powers and support of the state behind them — including, in Canada’s case, the long arm of the RCMP should things go awry. To coin a metaphor, CSIS can be thought of as a good gamekeeper; but what Dr. Porter and the other committee members need to realize is that, in our world of political instability, terrorist threats and non-conventional weapons proliferation, Canada also needs a few good poachers operating on foreign soil as well.
National Post

“Michael Ross” is a former deep-cover officer with the Israel Secret Intelligence Service (Mossad).

Read more: http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/02/15/michael-ross-canada-doesnt-need-canadian-cia-it-needs-better/#ixzz1E4tWUcoU

*** The only reason to make me (somewhat) reluctant about a foreign service capability is that we have enough concerns domestically to worry about as opposed to opening up a whole new can of accountability worms based on foreign ops. I have some ideas how a foreign capability would work but not really willing to share it here on a public blog. ;) MS ***

Govt. CAN withhold secret evidence in terror trials

2011-02-10T11:31:00.000-08:00

FROM: http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Government+withhold+secret+evidence+terror+trial+court/4258134/story.html

OTTAWA — The country's top court has upheld the federal government's right to withhold evidence for national security reasons regarding the Toronto 18 terrorism plot, which was broken up in June 2006.

In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada said Thursday that the provisions adopted by the government were constitutional, but it also concluded that suspects could be released whenever the evidence against them is too sensitive to be presented in a trial.

"Sometimes the only way to avoid an '(unfair) trial is to have no trial at all," members of the Supreme Court of Canada wrote in their ruling.

"As we have explained . . . the criminal court trial judge possesses the means to safeguard the accused's fair trial rights."

The Toronto 18 bomb plot was to have targeted the Toronto Stock Exchange, a CSIS office in Toronto and a military base between Toronto and Ottawa.

A separate faction of the Toronto 18 had also spoken of storming Parliament.

Authorities stepped in to break up the scheme in June 2006 as group members unloaded bags labelled "ammonium nitrate" at a rented warehouse.

The courts never heard evidence that was considered to be a threat to national security following a request from the federal government.

Nonetheless, seven of the 18 suspects admitted guilt in the plot, while four others were convicted based on other evidence presented. The charges against the others were stayed or dropped.

Shareef Abdelhaleem, who has been portrayed by the Crown as the "principal architect" of the plot, is due to be sentenced in March.

Supreme Court set to rule which judges should review national security evidence

2011-02-09T18:46:00.000-08:00

FROM: http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/breakingnews/supreme-court-set-to-rule-which-judges-should-review-national-security-evidence-115664104.html

TORONTO - Canada's top court is set to decide Thursday whether part of a national-security law is unconstitutional because it stops a judge in a criminal trial from deciding what evidence should be kept secret.

The issue arose in the high-profile terrorism case known as the Toronto 18, when Ontario Superior Court Justice Fletcher Dawson struck down provisions of the Canada Evidence Act.

Prosecutors in the case — as is common in terrorism cases — argued that disclosing certain information to the defence could hurt national security.

Under Section 38 of the act, only a Federal Court judge can determine whether the assertion of national security privilege is valid.

In the terrorism trial, the prosecution relied on evidence police and intelligence agents gathered, some of which was considered too sensitive to release.

In a pre-trial motion, the accused challenged the validity of the act related to the secret material.

In striking down the provisions, Dawson ruled that giving Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine privilege in such cases was unconstitutional.

"That scheme removes this court’s ability to determine whether (national security privilege) applies to prevent the disclosure of relevant information to the accused," Dawson wrote in January 2009.

"Although it is this court that is responsible for the fair trial of the accused, the Section 38 scheme vests exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions of (security privilege) in the Federal Court."

Dawson worried that having to take secrecy challenges to Federal Court would prove disruptive and could derail such trials.

"The applicants have the right to have their constitutional rights in relation to a fair trial determined in the court of competent jurisdiction," he said.

"It is not permissible for this court to defer to the Federal Court, which is not a court of competent jurisdiction . . . in these particular circumstances."

Instead, Dawson said the judge hearing the criminal case should have the authority to review the assertion of national security privilege, and assumed that power in the case he was hearing.

"Dawson's ruling was used for the purposes of that trial," Michael Lacy, who acted for one of the accused, said Wednesday.

"It cut out the Federal Court from making those decisions (on secret evidence)."

The federal government, while agreeing to Dawson's approach for that trial, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada in hopes of preserving the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

The high court heard the case last March and will issue its ruling on Thursday.

In the summer of 2006, police arrested 18 people in the Toronto area in connection with a plot to attack Parliament and commit other terrorist acts.

Of those, 11 were convicted, while charges were withdrawn or stayed in the other seven cases.

Thursday's high court ruling will have no impact on the convictions.

*** Public prosecutions continue to remain the preferred choice of dealing with terrorism cases. Where the rule of law is paramount and where due process extends to all, THIS establishes the credibility and integrity of our approach in this regard. MS ***

Cancelled debate highlights tension among Canadian Muslims

2011-02-07T08:20:00.000-08:00

FROM: http://life.nationalpost.com/2011/02/07/cancelled-debate-highlights-tension-among-canadian-muslims/

February 7, 2011 – 6:00 am

By Jessica Hume

TORONTO —

More than 600 people showed up at the North American Muslim Foundation on a recent Saturday to hear a debate over secular liberalism in Islam.

It would have been something of a face-off. The prospective debaters, Tarek Fatah, author and self-described secular Muslim, and Sheharyar Shaikh, president of NAMF and a conservative imam at Masjid Qurtabah, are known polemicists who have not shied away from very public disagreements in the past.

In fact, the event only came about after an open challenge to Mr. Fatah was published late last year by Mr. Shaikh, who called on the controversial author to publicly defend his moderate views, which have been called unIslamic by some in the Canadian Muslim community. Mr. Shaikh — who has openly defended polygamy and opposed secular education for Muslims — is among them.

When it was announced shortly after 6 p.m. that the debate was cancelled after Mr. Fatah declined to participate at the last minute, more than 600 people were disappointed.

The moderator was changed shortly before the event was to begin, angering Mr. Fatah, who described the audience as “hostile.” His associates with the Muslim Canadian Congress — a grassroots organization Mr. Fatah helped found — then requested one of their replacement moderators be called in, angering Farooq Khan, executive director of NAMF, who described MCC members as full of “hyperbole and imaginary fear.”

At around 6 p.m., Mr. Fatah said he was warned by police of threats to his safety, though he added he has no proof.

“I did not feel comfortable there,” he said.

For their part, neither Mr. Khan nor Staff Sergeant Jim Qualtrough at Toronto’s 42 Division said they were aware of any safety concerns or threats. Staff Sergeant Qualtrough said that “as far as the police are concerned, nothing happened at that location Saturday night.”

Some members of the prospective audience dismissed the debate as being akin to an after-school playground fight — meet me at the monkey bars — between two men whose disapproval of each other was already well known.

But for others, both the events that transpired and those that didn’t only highlighted what they see as growing disparity in the Muslim community in Toronto and in Canada, a population that is expected to triple by 2030, according to a recent report by the Washington-based Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.

What that means for Toronto, the city with the highest concentration of Muslims in North America, is unclear. A rise in population alone is not cause for concern. What has some members of the Muslim community here more worried is what they describe as an increasing tendency toward more radical and political sermons being delivered in Toronto mosques.

“I see Wahhabism as a growing factor in Toronto,” says Imtiaz Baloch, who lives in Markham and works as an accountant.

Born in Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism is among the most conservative and fiercely insular forms of Islam, in which followers subscribe to a literal interpretation of the Koran. The term isn’t being thrown around in mosques here just yet, but its fundamental principles provide the underlying theme for the majority of sermons Mr. Baloch has heard in recent years.

“I mean sermons about Afghanistan, about Iraq, about Kashmir, about suicide bombing and chaos in the Muslim world. As a project I visited mosques in each corner of the city and in lectures, statements and sermons at Sunni mosques from Stouffville to Toronto, imams are preaching about how Muslims all over the world are being attacked by non-Muslims and they are justifying the violence by Muslims against NATO and everyone else,” he said. “I’m scared to take my children to the mosque. So I don’t.”

Another audience member who wished to remain anonymous said he has stopped going to mosques in Toronto altogether.

“I used to go to the downtown mosque [at Dundas and Bay] but I don’t anymore,” he said. “I didn’t like the political discussions, they were divisive. I saw no indication of interest in promoting integration into Canadian society. It was always about how different we are, how Muslims should live in Canada. There were political undertones of why some of the international events were happening and how we should feel about them.”

The “downtown mosque” refers to both Masjid Toronto and the Muslim Association of Canada, both of which are housed in the same building just south of the Greyhound bus station. It first opened in 2002 — Dr. El-Tantawy Attia, a retired engineer originally from Alexandria, Egypt, has been there since day one. Mr Attia says there are few bad apples in every bunch and that the Toronto Muslim community is no exception, but says he preaches “middle of the road Islam” — a seemingly innocuous statement until he qualifies it.

“Here, we follow the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood,” he said.

The Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest and largest international Islamic political group. Though it espouses non-violence, the Brotherhood is a banned party in Egypt, where it is the biggest opposition organization in government, known both for its conservatism and its goal of the creation of an Islamic state.

Mubin Shaikh, a national security consultant who is also known as the informant in the Toronto 18 case, said more than deriving from hubristic imams, any radicalization among Toronto Muslims is likely a function of cultural and identity crises among the city’s Muslim youth.

He sees the phenomenon as affecting second-generation Canadians, who lack the cultural links to their parents’ countries of origin, but can feel equally unintegrated into Canadian society.

“They look to mosques for religious education. Then the more they learn, they don’t think their parents are religious enough. I know, I went through it myself,” Mr. Shaikh said. “These are the ones who can become more aggressive and more radical. It’s a way of asserting an identity separate and apart from the parents and from society and authority.”

If there is a growing pocket of radicalism within the Toronto Muslim community — and Mr. Shaikh says there certainly is — there are two things to take note of from the Toronto 18 case. One is that the sophistication for pulling off acts of terrorism in Canada has not yet been realized. The other, however, is that the low incidence of violence is certainly not for a lack of trying.

“There are more than enough people to keep an eye on here.”

---

*** The problem is when you "dare" others to call you on your claims not thinking they will do just that. Then when it comes to the last minute, decide not to follow through based on clearly fabricated claims of "threats" which the Police themselves dismiss, is to show the weakness of the claims being made in the first place.

Fear-based understandings do nothing to give us a proper understanding of how we can devise solutions - I liken it to "bad intelligence" which is then proferred as a basis for a course of action. If this is the way we're going to go about framing the discussion on national security ... we have a rude awakening waiting for us because clearly, everyone is still asleep at the switch.

How it helps this discussion by using fear mongering talking heads with ZERO operational experience and ZERO professional academic qualifications is beyond me. Would we do this when it comes to Medicine? Engineering? Law? So WHY would we do so for something as vital as national security?

MS

CSIS director balks at new powers for national security adviser

2011-02-07T06:46:00.000-08:00

FROM: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/csis-director-balks-at-new-powers-for-national-security-adviser/article1868097/

The head of Canada’s spy agency has serious objections to beefing up the powers of the national security adviser — effectively rejecting a key recommendation of the federal inquiry into the 1985 Air India bombing.

In a secret memo to Public Safety Minister Vic Toews, Canadian Security Intelligence Service director Dick Fadden said the Air India report’s call to hand new authority to the adviser would undermine ministerial responsibility.

Mr. Fadden said bolstering the role of the adviser – currently a low-profile federal official – would “fundamentally misunderstand” the long-held notion the minister is ultimately accountable for what happens in his portfolio.

“In short, while there is always room for improvement, I believe the report does not fully take into account the measures that have been implemented since 1985, and leads as a result to some unfair and potentially misguided recommendations,” Mr. Fadden said.

The Canadian Press obtained a declassified copy of the four-page June, 2010, memo from CSIS, with few redactions, under the Access to Information Act. The Privy Council Office released a heavily censored version of the same memo under the access law in November.

While the copy disclosed two months ago left a clear impression that CSIS bristled at criticism from the Air India commission, the newly released memo spells out Mr. Fadden’s concerns in considerable detail.

“In several instances, the report’s recommendations seem to be based on the premise that simply adding another level of management or dispute resolution early on in an investigation will somehow resolve outstanding legal issues that may arise later,” Mr. Fadden said.

In its spring report, the Air India inquiry, led by retired Supreme Court justice John Major, recounted a litany of federal failures before and after the June, 1985, terrorist attack that killed 329 people, most of them Canadians.

Authorities believe Sikh extremists fighting for an independent homeland planted explosives on the jetliner, which blew up over the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Ireland.

Mr. Major’s June report called for changes to intelligence-handling, criminal prosecutions and aviation security to prevent another such tragedy. Under the retired judge’s recommended plan, the national security adviser would essentially become an intelligence czar, served by a deputy and a staff of representatives from front-line security agencies, including CSIS, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency and Foreign Affairs. The adviser would resolve disputes among these agencies. Mr. Major concluded that serious miscommunication and turf wars had contributed to the Air India disaster.

Mr. Major said the current practice of limiting the information CSIS provides the RCMP – to prevent disclosure in possible criminal proceedings – is wrong and results in an “impoverished response to terrorist threats.”

He advocated legislation that would require CSIS to report information that might be used in an investigation or prosecution of an offence to police, prosecutors or the national security adviser. The adviser would also be empowered to pass information to relevant authorities.

Mr. Fadden said in the memo to Mr. Toews that while CSIS is keen to solve long-standing issues related to information-sharing and evidence, “our initial reaction to some of the recommendations – such as relinquishing control of the dissemination of our information to the [national security adviser], and diluting promises of source anonymity – is of serious concern.”

Last month, Mr. Toews seemed to dismiss the notion of making the national security adviser a more powerful point person, using much the same rationale Mr. Fadden did in the memo. “In Canada now, we do have a co-ordination of many of these efforts already and we’re not about to set up a new bureaucracy,” Mr. Toews told a news conference.

In the memo, Mr. Fadden also takes issue with Mr. Major’s assertion that lingering problems of communication and co-ordination, especially between CSIS and the RCMP, have not been resolved.

“I fundamentally disagree with this statement, and submit that, had the same level of effort been applied to an examination of the current operational environment and administrative policy frameworks between the two agencies, the overall tone of the report would have been tempered, and the resulting recommendations would be more reflective of the current realities,” Mr. Fadden says.

“The simple truth is that the chain of events of 1985 could not, or would not, in my view, be repeated today.”

The Canadian Press

SORRY FOR TERROR BUST?

2011-01-10T11:42:00.000-08:00

http://www.torontosun.com/comment/editorial/2011/01/07/16803741.html

The RCMP did not "apologize" for doing their job. Notwithstanding there WAS NO BOMB and that there was NO IMMINENT threat - the question does remain why they were arrested in Ramadan AND named it, "Project Samosa". Someone is having waaaay too much fun with what they learned in Islam 101.

The way in which its being portrayed, you'd think the wheels of justice stopped turning!! You'd think the RCMP would let a bomb go off rather than offend the Muslim community because its Ramadan!! COME ON people! Don't be so foolish.

And how is it "impeding" justice by acknowledging that "yeah we know its your religious holiday...but we didn't mean anything by it" <<-- is that REALLY "pandering" of "mollycoddling"???

I mean, where the heck do you think informants, agents and spies come from? Will we cut off our nose to spite our face?

The RCMP have a hard time as it is without armchair idiots telling them how to do their job - especially when it comes to terrorism. NEVER question the RCMP's resolve in prosecuting terrorism offences and the inevitable ramifications for minority communities they will have to deal with also.

YES they have their own internal issues to deal with in this regard but to suggest they would let bombs go off rather than offend a community is GARBAGE and very irresponsible. That kind of false rhetoric does not belong in such serious matters.

LIFE FOR TORONTO 18 PLOTTER ABDELHALEEM?

2011-01-06T07:53:00.000-08:00

http://www.thestar.com/news/article/916578--toronto-18-plotter-should-serve-life-in-prison-crown-says

Isabel Teotonio Staff reporter

Toronto 18 bomb plotter Shareef Abdelhaleem has shown no remorse for his role in a macabre plot to blow up buildings and should be sentenced to life in prison, a prosecutor told a Brampton court Wednesday.

Abdelhaleem’s attempts to minimize his blameworthiness and his involvement in the foiled 2006 plot are not the hallmarks of a man who is remorseful, Crown prosecutor Iona Jaffe said at his sentencing hearing.

“Abdelhaleem was prepared to engage in mass murder of innocent women and children on Canadian soil,” said Jaffe of the last member of the so-called Toronto 18 to be sentenced. “There’s no remorse and no evidence for a real hope of reformation,”

In her arguments, Jaffe referred to a psychiatric report suggesting Abdelhaleem, 35, was motivated, in part, by extremist ideology and a desire to get rich by profiting from the attacks.

“The motivational cocktail of unquantifiable extremist ideology and monetary . . . is clearly a deadly combination,” said Jaffe. “We have received no assurances that this mix will not reignite in the future, putting us all at risk again.”

Jaffe urged Justice Fletcher Dawson to deliver the stiffest sentence possible. If not, then a fixed-term of about 30 years would be appropriate, she said.

Meanwhile, defence lawyer William Naylor suggested a sentence of fewer than 20 years. He said his client is remorseful and noted mitigating factors, such as Abdelhaleem’s early suggestions that the bombs not go off during morning rush hour, that they be smaller in size, and not contain shrapnel. (He later recommended increasing the size to weapons of mass destruction, so there would be “blood, glass and debris” for “several blocks.”)

The judge is expected to rule next month.

He was convicted in January 2010, then argued unsuccessfully he had been entrapped.

Court heard Abdelhaleem was the right-hand man of Zakaria Amara, an Islamist extremist who masterminded the bomb plot and is now serving a life sentence.

The potentially deadly scheme involved detonating truck bombs, packed with three tonnes of ammonium nitrate, outside the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Toronto offices of Canada’s spy agency and a military base near Hwy. 401.

Abdelhaleem was the middleman between Amara and an explosives supplier, who was an undercover agent. He believed if the TSE was shut down, markets would plunge and money could be made by selling stocks short.

Police busted the cell in June 2006, moments after the explosive material was delivered.

PAY A HEAVY PRICE FOR EVEN THINKING TERRORISM

2010-12-17T09:19:00.000-08:00

http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/908672--appeal-court-hikes-sentences-for-terror-convictions

Ontario’s highest court has restored Canada’s anti-terror law to full strength and sent an unmistakable message that terrorists acting on Canadian soil “will pay a very heavy price.”

The Ontario Court of Appeal released six major decisions in terrorism cases Friday.

In its leading judgment, the court dismissed an appeal from Ottawa software engineer Momin Khawaja, the first person convicted under Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation, increasing his sentence from 10 ½ years to life in prison.

Terrorism, Justices David Doherty, Michael Moldaver and Eleanore Kronk said in their decision, “is a crime like no other.

“Once detected, it must be dealt with in the severest of terms,” they wrote.

In a key component of its ruling, the court said an Ontario trial judge presiding at Khawaja’s case in 2006 erred in striking down portions of the Criminal Code’s anti-terrorism provision after concluding the legislation could inhibit fundamentalist Muslims from expressing their political or religious beliefs.

Khawaja was found guilty of building a detonator known as the “hi-fi digi-monster” as part of a plot to use fertilizer bombs to blow up shopping malls and night clubs in Britain.

The court also upheld — and, in two instances, increased — prison terms handed to three members of the Toronto 18 in connection with the plan to detonate bombs at the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) headquarters on Front Street and an unspecified military base east of Toronto.

Zakaria Amara, the mastermind of the Toronto 18, pleaded guilty and was given life in prison.

The court dismissed his appeal of his sentence and increased from 12 to 18 years the sentence handed to Saad Gaya, who also pleaded guilty to participating in the plot.

Their co-conspirator, Saad Khalid, had his 14-year sentence increased to 20 years.

“In truth, the respondent was engaged in a diabolical plot that most 19-year-olds would never think of, let alone pursue,” the judges said.

In effect, the court said it didn’t matter that they were first-time offenders.

The appeal panel also dismissed appeals from two men, Piratheepan Nadarajah and Suresh Sriskandarajah, who were ordered extradited to the United States to stand trial on terrorism charges. They are alleged to have assisted the Tamil Tigers, a group at war with the Sri Lankan government, by offering to purchase surface to air missiles and an AK-47s on the black market.

Canada’s justice system puts the premium on individual freedom and accepts that offenders can be rehabilitated, but this belief system might also be seen as a sign of weakness by those who reject democratic values, the court said on Friday.

“Terrorists, in particular, may view Canada as an attractive place from which to pursue their heinous activities.

“And it is up to the court to shut the door on that way of thinking quickly and surely.”

ONTARIO APPEAL COURT - DEFINE TERRORISM

2010-12-17T06:50:00.001-08:00

http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/breakingnews/ontario-appeal-court-to-hand-down-decisions-on-canadas-definition-of-terrorism-112053859.html

TORONTO - Ontario's highest court will hand down decisions today that weigh in on the debate over Canada's definition of terrorism.

The Ontario Court of Appeal is being asked whether the definition of "terrorist activity" in the Criminal Code is constitutional.

The issue is being raised in three cases before the court, including that of convicted terrorist Momin Khawaja.

The Ottawa software developer is appealing his conviction while the Crown is cross-appealing, asking the court to impose a life sentence rather than the 10 1/2 years the trial judge imposed.

The challenge of Canada's terror law was also brought in the appeals of two men ordered extradited to the U.S. to stand trial on terrorism charges for their alleged roles in assisting the Tamil Tigers.

The Appeal Court will also deliver three more decisions today on terror cases, dealing with sentences handed to three men who pleaded guilty to being members of the so-called Toronto 18 homegrown terror group.

The decisions are set to be released at 10:55 a.m. ET.

ONTARIO APPEAL COURT - DEFINE TERRORISAM

2010-12-17T06:50:00.000-08:00

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*** What?! no more turban bombs?! Oh well - I guess its back to Mosque bombings, IED'S that maim children, cutting of noses and limbs and let's not forget the acid pack: now available in family size. :s ***

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SORRY FOR TERROR BUST?

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ONTARIO APPEAL COURT - DEFINE TERRORISM

ONTARIO APPEAL COURT - DEFINE TERRORISAM

* What?! no more turban bombs?! Oh well - I guess its back to Mosque bombings, IED'S that maim children, cutting of noses and limbs and let's not forget the acid pack: now available in family size. :s *