http://intelligence.house.gov/hearing/preventing-violent-radicalization-america
In December 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder told journalists that the terrorist threat had changed from “foreigners coming here to… people in the United States, American citizens”. A number of independent studies have confirmed this assessment. One of the most recent – published by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University – showed that “nearly half” of the 175 cases of Al Qaeda related homegrown terrorism since September 11, 2001, occurred in 2009 and 2010.
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Last September’s report by the National Security Preparedness Group, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, concluded that the lack of a coherent approach towards domestic counter-radicalization has left America “vulnerable to a threat that is not only diversifying, but arguably intensifying”.
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selected points from the testimony:
• There isn’t a simple template or formula that would explain how people radicalize. Radicalization involves many steps and stages at which the process can be stopped or reversed. They are opportunities for prevention, which can (and should) be harnessed by policymakers.
• Unlike counterterrorism, which targets terrorists, counter-radicalization is focused on the communities that are targeted by terrorists for recruitment. The aim is to protect, strengthen, and empower these communities, so they become resilient to violent extremism.
• Counter-radicalization is a policy theme, not a single policy. It is delivered through a multitude of channels. The range of relevant activities is potentially unlimited, but typically involves: messaging; engagement and outreach; education and training; and capacity-building.
• None of the instruments of counter-radicalization are coercive. Counter-radicalization is not primarily a law enforcement tool. Law enforcement, however, has a role to play. It represents a “bridge” between counterterrorism and counter-radicalization, and helps to inform both.
• Governments need to be careful in choosing community partners. Outreach efforts should reflect communities’ diversity, and distinguish between “engagement” and “empowerment”.
• Policymakers need to respect the values embodied in the Constitution. This means countering extremist narratives in the “market place of ideas”, and refraining from “adjudicating intra-religious affairs”.
• Counter-radicalization in America must account for the diversity and attitudes of American Muslims. Approaches will need to be varied, and should seek to capitalize on Muslims’ commitment to the American Dream.
• Very little training is aimed specifically at counter-radicalization. DHS and DoJ offer counterterrorism and cultural competency training for their staff. They also provide training grants for state and local governments.
• Communication with Muslim communities must include an “ask”. If the government believes that American Muslims have a unique role to play, it shouldn’t be reluctant to say what it is.
• Al Qaeda’s ideology should be challenged as well as contested. The government’s current efforts focus on contesting Al Qaeda’s ideology by contrasting the positive vision of equal citizenship, religious freedom and shared aspirations with Al Qaeda’s claim that being Muslim is incompatible with being an American. Especially in smaller settings, rather than only offer a competing vision, it may be appropriate to challenge the group and its ideology directly and aggressively.
• Government should be careful not to meddle in religious debates. While government should rebut the claim that devout Muslims can’t be loyal Americans, government pronouncements about the character of Islam or the “true” meaning of religious concepts – however well intentioned – are not credible, nor do they do justice to complex theological debates. It is not for the U.S. government to decide what Islam – or any other faith – is, and what it is not.
• The policy of refusing to name the ideological underpinnings of Al Qaeda is contrived and counterproductive, especially when educating law enforcement officers and other officials. Police officers, FBI agents, and prison guards should be taught how to distinguish between the faith practices of ordinary Muslims and the murderous ideas of “violent Islamist extremists.”
• Counterterrorism and counter-radicalization must be separate. None of the agencies that are mainly concerned with counterterrorism should be seen to play a dominant role in counter-radicalization.
• Outreach efforts should reflect the diversity of Muslim communities. Government mustn’t rely on religious interlocutors alone to convey its message to American Muslims.
• Officials need to understand the difference between engagement and empowerment. The government should seek to maintain open lines of communication with a wide array of community groups, but recognize that not all groups are appropriate government partners.
As a minimum, government partners should be committed to (1) upholding the Constitution of the United States, and be consistent in (2) expressing their opposition to acts of terrorism and (3) the killing of Americans anywhere.
• More training needs to be offered on engagement, outreach, and cultural competency. Such training should be available to police and “civilian” officials at all levels of government.
Community Policing
• Government must recognize the limits of community policing. Community policing is an important element of generating trust, but it is not a substitute for counter-radicalization.
Above all, the government must be persistent. Building resistance to Al Qaeda and its narrative will not occur overnight, and it will require the government to review how well counter-radicalization policy is being implemented and improved over a long period of time. Congress and the American public have an important role to play in ensuring the government’s commitment to challenging and countering radicalization never wavers. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, making America safe from terrorism is a “generational challenge”, and “the American people are entitled to expect their government to do its very best” in meeting it.
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SEE ALSO the testimony by John C. Gannon - BPC National Security Preparedness Group Member - Former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence - Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council ...
*** I have reproduced it below ***
Opening Statement of John C. Gannon
to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and CI (THACI) Subcommittee
27 July 2011, 3:00 p.m.
Madame Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I retired from the Intelligence Community (IC) nearly 10 years ago, but have remained involved with it ever since. In my career, I held senior positions including CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. After retirement, I worked in the White House Transition Planning organization for the Department of Homeland Security, heading the team for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. I subsequently served for two years as the staff director of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security and briefly as the first staff director of the permanent Homeland Security Committee.
Since government retirement, I have served voluntarily on various research committees and task forces supporting US intelligence agencies, including on counterterrorism. I am currently a sector president of BAE Systems, which provides products and services to customers including the US defense and intelligence communities. From all these experiences, I have observed the performance of the IC in recent years with keen interest, though I clearly no longer qualify as an insider. My comments, therefore, should be seen as informed impressions rather than authoritative assessments, but hopefully they will be helpful in any case.
I am a member of the National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), which sponsored the study on preventing violent radicalization ably conducted by Peter Neumann. I was pleased to provide comments to Dr. Neumann during the research and drafting phases. I regard the finished paper as a constructive, insightful contribution to the evolving debate today on counter-radicalization in the United States. The paper is finished, but the national debate will continue for some time.
I would identify five key judgments in the report:
• Today, we benefit from many commendable government and non-government counter-radicalization initiatives at the Federal, state and local levels. They need, however, to be better coordinated, more sharply focused, and increased – especially at the local level.
• The successful targeting by foreign-based terrorist groups of vulnerable US communities, while not an epidemic, is a serious and growing problem that needs
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to be addressed with greater urgency at every level of government and community.
• Counter-radicalization, which defies easy definition, relates to multi-front policies to prevent recruitment of individuals to violence. These broad-based policies are directed largely toward vulnerable communities with influence on potential recruits. They are not law-enforcement policies aimed at recruited terrorists. Counter-radicalization is not counter-terrorism, though, if and when successful, it should reduce the terrorist threat.
• Federal, state and local policies to promote counter-radicalization are interconnected, but the greatest impact is at the local level where government, law enforcement, and non-government groups have the greatest potential to understand community strengths and vulnerabilities, to develop constructive partnerships, to promote open dialogue and otherwise to prevent radicalization. Many promising local initiatives, however, appear to be seriously under-resourced and their performance across the country is uneven.
• US Muslim communities may be the most targeted by foreign terrorists today, but there is no basis for an “us against them” approach to this disparate and diversified US population. Negative generalizations about US Muslims, from leadership at any level or location, can lead to isolation of these communities and are clearly counterproductive to needed outreach, engagement, and capacity building for counter-radicalization. <<-- EXACTLY !!!
• There are lessons to be learned from foreign counter-radicalization experiences, but the US will – and should – continue to develop its own model based on the preponderant role here of local government and community, on our preference for decentralized government, and on our historic commitment to civil liberties.
I will make four personal comments based on my professional experience that go beyond what the reports states, while not contradicting it.
• The number of known homegrown terrorists since 9/11, while growing in recent years, is relatively small. But the urgency is big. In the era of IT-driven globalization, small groups of terrorists can move people, finance, and information (including destructive know-how) across borders as never before. Minor actors can do catastrophic damage!
• Still, it is important to recognize the positive aspect of the small numbers. I believe this is testimony to the bedrock commitment of most Americans to our Constitutional freedoms and democratic way of life. If you or I hear about a terrorist conspiracy, we call the local police. We don’t aid and abet the terrorists. In my CIA career, this was not the case in many countries I analyzed on a day-to-day basis at different times in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia. It is not the case among Arab peoples fighting for their freedom today. The trust between people and local government in the United Stated, including law enforcement, is the global gold standard.
Any policy or activity that erodes that traditional confidence within local communities weakens our counter-radicalization efforts. Our Constitution is our strongest instrument against radicalization, not an impediment. This is not fanciful rhetoric for me. It is the revelation from a career of assessing the rest of the world.
• I would build on the passing reference the report makes to the impact of perceived US foreign policy to terrorist narratives. Long before 9/11, we heard Al Qaeda protest US support of repressive regimes in the Middle East. What we have observed over the past year, however, is US sympathy toward Arab populations who are now dying in growing numbers to remove those corrupt and repressive regimes. The Arab protesters, who have lost their fear, are demanding political rights and economic opportunity in the 21st century, not – as Osama bin Laden would have it – calling for restoration of a 16th century Islamic Caliphate. Surely, all of this should freshen the narrative for America’s counter-radicalization policies.
• Finally, it is clear enough that our counter-radicalization efforts today, along with those of our European counterparts, are focused on the threat from extremist Muslim ideologues. In recent decades, however, we also have experienced violence at the hands of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma, militias and cult groups in our western states, and a range of “radical groups” in the “anti-establishment” era of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, hostile foreign governments have continued to target and recruit many once-loyal Americans to betray their country. There has to be benefit for the future in a broader study of the factors that impel people to cross the line to violent extremism – or that prevent them from doing so. We still have a lot to learn.
Thank you Madame Chairman. I would be pleased to take any questions or comments you may have.
